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Assessing the Efficacy of International Peacekeeping in Bosnia

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I. DEFINITION OF GENOCIDE

Prior to 1944, no term existed to differentiate between what we accept today to be genocide and war crimes, despite the significant and important difference of motive. In the wake of World War Two (WWII) as the full terror of the extermination and concentration camps in Germany emerged into the public spotlight, it became clear that the acts committed against the Jewish people were far different from war crimes. Winston Churchill stated that the atrocities challenging the international community were, “A crime that has no name.”¹ The lack of precedent in both degree and nature from which to address this newly distinguished crime added to the ambiguity surrounding its recognition and prosecution for decades to come. However, in 1944 Raphael Lemkin, a Polish Jew who served as an adviser to the United States War Ministry published a book titled Axis Rule in Occupied Europe which sought to define this unnamed crime. Lemkin argued that, “New conceptions require new terminology,”² and thus he assigned the word ‘genocide’ to describe these crimes. The word ‘genocide’ has shared roots in both Greek and Latin, with the Greek word ‘genos’ meaning race or tribe and the Latin word ‘cide’ meaning to kill. The first definition of genocide as defined by Lemkin explicated, “The destruction of a nation or of an ethnic group.”³ His definition included the execution of a calculated and coordinated plan, which seeks to destroy its victims due in entirety to their membership of a selected group of people.

On December 9, 1948 the United Nations (U.N.) General Assembly passed Resolution 260 (III) A, endorsing a more comprehensive definition of the word ‘genocide.’

In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group, as such:

- (a) Killing members of the group;
- (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
- (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
- (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;

¹ "Frontline: The Crime of Genocide." *PBS*. Web. 05 May 2010. Page 1
<<http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/rwanda/reports/dsetexhe.html>>.

² "Frontline: The Crime of Genocide." Page 1

³ "Frontline: The Crime of Genocide." Page 2

- (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.⁴

From its conception in Lemkin's book to the U.N. endorsement of a more encompassing definition, the ambiguity of genocide has proven detrimental to humanitarian intervention since WWII. While the intention of the perpetrator is vital to the recognition and classification of genocide, it is nearly impossible to unanimously determine the true intentions of such perpetrators, particularly in the midst of civil wars and state violence. As this research will explore, frequently genocide is disguised either intentionally or accidentally by deep ethnic and racial tensions and feuds.

II. BACKGROUND

Prior to 1991, the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) was composed of six republics; Bosnia Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Serbia, Montenegro, and Slovenia. Until his death in 1980, Marshal Tito ruled the former Yugoslavia for forty-five years as a communist state. Under his leadership, Tito pursued the goals of brotherhood and unity, seeking to eliminate ethnic definition despite the ethnic diversity of the Republic.

Following Tito's death, SFRY experienced rising nationalist movements throughout the 1980's and 1990's. After an aggressive nationalist movement, Serbian president Slobodan Milošević seceded from the Republic in June 1991, followed by a brief ten-day war. Following Milosevic's lead, Croatia declared independence soon after, however due to the fact that Croatia had both desirable coastline and a Serb minority, the Yugoslav National Army (JNA) refused to let the nation secede. This disagreement resulted in a longer seven-month war which left 10,000 dead and 700,000 displaced.⁵

As the surrounding nations sought to secede from SFRY, Bosnia was caught in the middle of an increasingly dangerous predicament. Bosnia's population was the most diverse of all the SFRY nations as its composition was 43% Muslim, 35% Orthodox Serb, and 18% Roman Catholic Croat. If Bosnia remained part of SFRY, due to Milosevic's rising power, Bosnian Muslim's and Croat's would face abuses. If Bosnia chose to secede, Muslims would have no protective base within SFRY, as the Bosnian-Serbs could retreat to Serbia and the

⁴ U.N. General Assembly, 3rd Sess. *Resolution adopted by the General Assembly. 260 (III) Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.* (A/RES/260) Dec. 9, 1948. Available: UN Documentation Centre: <<http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/3/ares3.htm>>

⁵ Power, Samantha. *"A Problem From Hell" America and the Age of Genocide.* New York: HarperCollins, 2003. Page 247

Bosnian-Croats could retreat to Croatia, but Muslims had no ethnic homeland within SFRY, making them the responsibility of the international community.

Unsure of how to proceed, Bosnia turned to the United States and Europe for help. In response they suggested that Bosnia hold a referendum on independence, and offer human rights protection to its Muslim citizens. Additionally, to demonstrate their opposition to Milosevic's aggression, in 1991 the United Nations imposed an arms embargo on Yugoslavia. Despite its intentions, the embargo only intensified the situation for Muslims and Croats who had no means of defense and no access to weapons upon the enactment of the embargo. On the contrary, the Bosnian Serbs were backed by the JNA, which was both controlled by and largely composed of Serbs.

Following the recommendations provided by Europe and the U.S, Bosnia held a referendum in March 1992 in which 94.4% voted to secede from SFRY. However, the Bosnian presidency at the time was composed of two Muslims, two Serbs, two Croats and one Yugoslav. After the referendum the two Serb members of the presidency resigned and declared the creation of a separate Bosnian Serb state backed by Milošević within the borders of old Serbia. The JNA contributed 80,000 troops to the new Bosnian Serb army, demonstrating additional support.

Shortly after, the Serbs began their systematically engineered process of ethnic cleansing, which followed a four step pattern. The calculated Serb plan was aimed at undermining any Muslim resistance by killing, mistreating and deporting Muslims from their lands. The first step of this systematic process was the establishment of military control over Bosnia, which the Serbs began in the cities. The next step moved to establish Serb domination in the countryside; this step required delaying anti-Muslim action so the Serbs could actually use Muslims to fill ranks. Once both the countryside and city had been captured, the Serbs began anti-Muslim actions and the process of creating an ethnically 'clean' Bosnia. Finally, the Serbs limited access to Bosnia by international observers in order to minimize the chances of quick international intervention and allow control over how the situation was portrayed internationally.

The anti- Muslim campaign began with subtle actions then escalated rapidly, following typical patterns of ethnic cleansing. Initially, the Serbs began by limiting employment opportunities available to non-Serbs and imposing rules stripping non-Serbs of their basic freedoms, signifying the beginning of a brutal Serb offensive aimed at creating an ethnically homogenous state in Bosnia. Within days of the secession, Bosnian Serb soldiers created lists of Muslim and Croat intellectuals, musicians and professionals and began their systematic

tortures and executions. Serb soldiers began to destroy religious and cultural sites in order to completely purge Bosnia of the cultures and memories of Muslims or Croats. In destroying the cohesion of their communities and cultures, the identity of the Muslim people was also destroyed, causing the Muslim community to lose their will to resist and thus making it easier for the Serbs to uproot and displace them.

In order to truly ensure ethnic purity in Bosnia, and serving as an indicator of Serb intentions, sexual warfare was used on a large scale. Serb soldiers forced fathers to castrate their sons, and molest their daughters. Rape was also used as a tool of war against young women with the intent of impregnating them in order to destroy the purity and continuance of non-Serbs races.

Serb run concentration camps began to appear all over Bosnia. Serbs forced Muslims and Croats from all over Bosnia into camps where they were humiliated and tortured, frequently resulting in death. Muslim and Croat women were forced into rape camps.

As the international community began to acknowledge and question Serb actions and intentions in Bosnia, Milošević denied the acts, attributing them to inevitable realities of warfare, like most leaders committing genocide do. Milošević used three predominant arguments to justify his claims of Serb innocence. Primarily, he argued that Muslims had committed identical crimes as the ones Serbs were accused of, portraying a situation of civil war grounded in ethnic feuds rather than genocide. Secondly, Milošević argued that the deaths were the inevitable consequence of combat and civil war. Finally, he argued that the Muslims deserved the treatment they were getting, and that the Serb actions were benefiting the Western world by eliminating Muslims. Milošević was quoted repeating a popular Nazi euphemism, “The key to the entire operation from a psychological standpoint was never to utter the words that would be appropriate to the action. Say nothing; do these things; do not describe them.”⁶ Milošević’s attempts to conceal the nature of the situation in Bosnia demonstrate that he was fully aware of the power that an engaged citizenry has in influencing humanitarian intervention.

By the time the international community finally stepped in to stop the genocide, 200,000 Bosnians has been killed, two million had been displaced and the European republic had been divided into three separate and ethnically clean states.

⁶ Power, Samantha. *“A Problem From Hell” America and the Age of Genocide*. New York: HarperCollins, 2003. Page 249

III. A NEW TYPE OF WAR

A significant factor which influenced the shape of humanitarian intervention in Bosnia was the lack of precedent surrounding this new type of war. The types of wars represented by situations in Haiti, Somalia, Bosnia and Kosovo were situations that emerged in the post-Cold War era. This new category of war was less likely to result from power conflicts between dominant nations, and more likely to come from the propagation of civil wars fueled by ethnic and racial conflict. These wars posed a challenge to the international community as they were less significant in themselves, but in their accumulation had the potential to trigger wider conflicts. The humanitarian issues represented within these conflicts also had immense potential to deteriorate the moral fundamentals of newly established liberal international order. Due to the infancy of these types of war, the international community had no precedent from which to address these situations. No framework existed to provide guidance, and, due to their roots in ethnic feuds, cultural barriers proved to be a driving force preventing intervention.

The president of the Council on Foreign Relations, Les Gelb, addressed this problem in 1994. "The core problem is wars of national debilitation, a steady run of uncivil wars sundering fragile but functioning nation-states and gnawing at the well-being of stable nations. These 'teacup' wars can spill over into the wider region, drawing larger states into conflict. There is also a moral cost, the failure to deal adequately with such strife, to do something about mass murder and genocide, corrodes the essence of a democratic society. If democratic leaders turn away from genocide or merely pretend to combat it, their citizens will drink in the hypocrisy and sink into cynicism."⁷

IV. THE QUESTION OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION

In all genocides following the Holocaust, the "gray area" of moral ambiguity surrounding the concept and definition of genocide has been exploited by policy makers to support inaction or insufficient action.

The post WWII era represented an era in which nations were being held to increasingly higher standards regarding human rights, democratic rule, humanitarian justice and rule of law. Single world standards were emerging which acknowledged certain rights that all people are entitled to enjoy, and which both independent states and the international community are obligated to protect and observe. Human rights were becoming an integral component of international politics. Problematically, the international community had yet to define a

⁷ Schnabel, Albrecht, and Ramesh Thakur, eds. Kosovo and the Challenge of Humanitarian Intervention: Selective Indignation, Collective Action, and International Citizenship. New York: United Nations UP, 2000. Page 88

mechanism or process by which it could respond to flagrant offenders with the force and authority needed to mitigate humanitarian crises.

The growth of human rights peaked throughout the 1940's beginning with Franklin D. Roosevelt's speech establishing the importance of protecting human rights. In 1943, the U.S. State Department drafted a charter for a planned world organization that included the International Bill of Rights. The Nuremberg War Tribunal and the United Nations charter both placed an emphasis on human rights. In December of 1948, the Universal Declaration of Human rights was adopted. Although the Cold War temporarily slowed the spread of human rights, the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 placed human rights more evenly between East and West. The election of US president Jimmy Carter in 1976 and even Ronald Regan in 1980 further boosted the push for human rights.

A few main factors are responsible for driving the human rights norm. First, Western states in the wake of WWII pushed strongly for a world establishment that would not only work to maintain peace, but that would also serve as a protector for specific basic human rights. The same Western leaders who championed the United Nations (UN) also championed the proliferation of universal liberal political norms that would protect basic human rights. The American preoccupation with the promotion of democracy also added immensely to the global push for human rights, as democracy and human rights are closely intertwined. While Western states were one force driving human rights, two other groups contributed significantly to the strength of the movement. Citizen movements and non-governmental organizations worked tirelessly to pursue human rights, and UN declarations provided the foundation they needed to build a more legally binding international law protecting human rights.

The movement for human rights culminated in a transition from human rights as part of interstate law to a law of humanity. Interstate law represents the way human rights had previously been promulgated, where rights were articulated and secured by the state. The transition to law of humanity shifted the responsibility of articulating and defending human rights to the global community.

V. GLOBAL DIPLOMATIC CLIMATE

Before assessing the roles of international peacekeeping bodies in relation to the genocide in Bosnia, it is necessary to understand the global diplomatic climate and evaluate the likely effect it had in shaping intervention. Historically, after major wars peace settlements allow the victors and emergent powers to define new rules and institutions to govern post-war global order. However, in the

wake of the Cold War, no such actions occurred, resulting in a perplexing combination of new norms, enforced by old institutions, uni-polar U.S. power, uncertain leadership and declining political authority within the international community. Three trends also are responsible for the confusing post-Cold war global order. Primarily, the rise of humanitarian and human rights standards in the absence of an international mechanism capable of enforcement left the global community with poorly defined standards. Second, the transformation of NATO after WWII left the world with uncertain leadership and an inefficient enforcement organization. Finally, the international distribution of power following WWII and the Cold-War had become radically uni-polar, leaving the U.S. as the only serious military power in the world.

Out of the confusion and complexity of post-war international order arose two trends. Primarily, constructive American participation became crucial to the global quest for solutions to problems of security, justice, economic growth and political governance.⁸ However, the uneven distribution of power made it increasingly difficult for smaller countries to cooperate with the large and erratic superpower that the U.S. had become. Despite its position within the global community, the U.S. remained uncertain about how much global leadership it was willing to provide, what its obligations were within the international community, and how much it wanted to sacrifice its own welfare in the interest of promoting and protecting human rights. The second trend that arose was due to the absence of new international agreements following the Cold-War. Due to this absence, the international community had no guidance in terms of upholding new human rights and humanitarian justice standards and thus was forced to adhere to informal governance methods. These methods proved to be inconsistent and insufficient due to their informality.

VI. ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES

The role of the U.S. in post-Cold War order was immensely significant to its role in Bosnia, and magnifies its shortcomings. U.S. emergence from the Cold War as the world's only super power meant that the U.S. played a vital role in shaping the international community's ability to respond to state crimes and humanitarian abuses. However, the U.S. was also viewed as a 'bully' within the international community, raising concerns about the consequences of unchecked American power, such concerns peaked during the Clinton Administration. While the U.S. championed enlightened self-interest and humanitarian intervention, U.S. pre-eminence within the international community proved a barrier to the

⁸ Schnabel, Albrecht, and Ramesh Thakur, eds. Kosovo and the Challenge of Humanitarian Intervention: Selective Indignation, Collective Action, and International Citizenship. New York: United Nations UP, 2000. Page 87

emergence of institutions with the capacity to uphold and enforce the international community's newly defined human rights standards.

Domestically, much of the American public was expressing weakening support for global engagement and intervention. The rising costs of foreign aid, UN membership dues, regional security partnerships and multilateral economic cooperation, enhanced hesitations regarding humanitarian intervention. American presidents and the mainstream policy establishment faced increasing struggles with major political factions who wanted to cut back international involvement and return the focus to domestic issues. Thus, despite its leadership role, the US was just as conflicted regarding the proper use of force in terms of humanitarian intervention as was the rest of the world.

The public was divided on this issue as two conflicting beliefs emerged regarding foreign policy. One side believed that as a world-power, and following the precedent set in the Gulf War, the US was morally obligated to intervene on the behalf of any country facing aggression. This belief was championed by liberal humanitarianists. On the contrary, the other side championed the belief that international affairs were not the business or responsibility of the US regardless of its position within the international community, unless they posed a threat to national safety or interests. This side was represented by selective engagers.

Selective engagers dominated President George H. W. Bush's administration from 1989 to 1993, as well as the senior military officer corps, who believed strongly that US military intervention should be reserved for remote incidents in which US strategic interests were directly threatened or attacked. With the end of the Cold War, the Horn of Africa and the Balkans had both dramatically decreased in strategic importance to the US. Throughout 1991 and the majority of 1992 selective engagers opposed any type of US military intervention in either Somalia or Bosnia. Additionally, for selective engagers, the dissolution of Yugoslavia was initially seen as a concern only to the extent that proliferation of ethnic and racial hatreds threatened to create regional instability. Based upon this analysis, selective engagers believed that the best approach to the problem was to endorse some centralized authority supporting gradual change. From the beginning of the crisis in 1990 until the outbreak of war in Croatia in June of 1991 and Bosnia in March of 1992, the Bush administration focused its attention on emergent strategies that would prevent or at least postpone the collapse of SFRY. Upon the outbreak of war, selective engagers maintained their position, simply shifting their attention from prevention to containment. Given that few opposing views existed, the public supported the Bush administration's

policy of containment as a necessity to prevent the situation from spreading to areas like Kosovo, Macedonia, Albania, Greece, Turkey and Bulgaria; areas that did represent geo-strategic interests to the US.

Liberal humanitarianists initially held less political power domestically, representing a minute fraction of Congress, and instead composing humanitarian and human rights non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Unlike selective engagers, liberal humanitarianists supported military intervention in Bosnia to both halt the Serb offensive against civilians and to provide relief to distressed populations. Despite their smaller and less influential power base, liberal humanitarianists proved to be an increasing threat to the selective engager camp. Liberal humanitarianists argued that in addition to being an issue of human right, US interests were at stake. Without opposition, Milošević would inevitably turn on the Albanians in Kosovo, sparking regional wars that would, in fact, directly affect US interests.

In 1991, Deputy Secretary of State and former ambassador to Yugoslavia, Lawrence Eagleburger took a trip to the region and warned Milošević against using violence. Milošević, however, was unaffected by international pressure for two reasons; first he was aware that verbal warnings would not be followed by any military action, and second he was more concerned with his campaign of ethnic cleansing than with his reputation in the international community. Upon his return, Eagleburger informed Bush that there was little the US could do, as any action would fail and essentially be harmful to the US in the process.

As the situations in both Bosnia and Somalia unfolded, the Bush administration was initially able to frame both as conflicts fueled by ancient tribal and ethnic hatreds, in which case US involvement could accomplish very little. Throughout the first four months of the Bosnian conflict, the American public largely supported the Bush administration's selective engagement policy. Very little information emanated from the conflict contradicting the legitimacy of the administration's policy decisions. "The intelligence community is responsive to what the bosses want to know. You could say 'I'm deeply interested in a green-eyed abominable snowman,' and you'd get all the briefings you could ever want. But when the higher-ups are blaming the killings on the victims, you aren't going to get much intelligence."⁹

Initially no one was in a position to challenge the administration's paradigmatic framing of the situation in Bosnia for several key reasons. In the

⁹ Power, Samantha. "A Problem From Hell" America and the Age of Genocide. New York: HarperCollins, 2003. Page 280

spring of 1992 when war broke out in Bosnia, no precedent had been set for post-Cold War humanitarian intervention despite rising emphasis on human rights. This complexity was magnified by the fact that SFRY had been an economically and politically advanced society prior to the outbreak of war. This meant there had been no previous need for humanitarian or non-governmental presence, immensely restricting the amount of knowledge that existed surrounding the conflict. Additionally, only a small number of Congressmen had any interest or knowledge of the events in Bosnia, and the few who did had no organized base from which to mobilize public and political support for intervention.

The American public was told that the situation in Bosnia constituted a humanitarian ‘nightmare’ or a civil war, but not genocide. The Bush administration made a calculated decision not to use the term genocide when describing events in Bosnia, as the use of the word would denote a moral obligation to intervene.

The Bush administration portrayed the events unfolding in Bosnia in three ways to support its selective engagement policy and satisfy the increasingly important moral obligation to protect human rights. Primarily, the events were depicted as a tragedy, stemming from civil war and ethnic hatred. Secondly, the administration emphasized the perverse consequences for both Muslims and peacekeepers, which would result from any confrontation with the Serbs. Finally, the lack of military involvement was justified in relation to post-Vietnam foreign policy perspectives, threatening that involvement would result in another bloody quagmire costing many innocent lives and ultimately ending unsuccessfully.

Instead of using military force to protect the Bosnian people, the Bush administration took a non-violent approach: withdrawing their ambassador from Yugoslavia, closing two consulates in Serbia, expelling the Yugoslav ambassador from the US and moving military forces into the Adriatic to enforce the arms embargo. However, none of those diplomatic soft -actions had any effect on Milošević who considered the consequences an acceptable cost associated with the process of establishing an ethnically clean state.

General Colin Powell was also a strong force in preventing any governmental action in Bosnia. His well-known foreign policy strategy, the “Powell Doctrine,” constructed a framework for intervention which consisted of four qualifications: first, ample troops must be available so that the deployment can be carried out with overwhelming force; second, the political and military objectives must be clearly defined; third, the mission must be achievable; and, finally, public and congressional support must be widespread. Powell asserted

steadfastly that the classification of the Bosnian situation as a civil war meant intervention would be messy and unsuccessful.

Despite this argument however, many sources suggested the opposite, insisting that intervention was possible without risking another U.S. entanglement in a Vietnam-like quagmire. Proponents of this belief suggested that if the U.S. focused its intervention on Serb aggression and Milosevic, directing a targeted military strike against him and radical Serb supporters, violence in Bosnia could be mitigated with relative rapidity.

As the crises in Somalia and Bosnia continued into 1992, liberal humanitarianists and the media began compiling their own independent knowledge about the situations, challenging the way that selective engagers had framed the situation. Together they were able to reframe the conflicts as highly coordinated and violent campaigns aimed at eliminating Muslims and Croats in Bosnia. As the information from these groups amassed and continued to challenge the administration's portrayal of the situation, pressure began to mount for intervention.

When intense shelling began in the western enclave of Sarajevo, the media coverage was massive. The American public demanded to know what actions the Bush administration would take to mitigate the bloodshed in Bosnia. Regardless of rising pressure, the administration maintained its position, insisting that intervention ran contrary to U.S. national interest and that any military intervention would be unsuccessful due to the nature of the conflict. The administration promised to continue providing humanitarian aid, supporting diplomatic soft-responses and maintaining economic sanctions, but that would be the extent of their involvement.

However, as media coverage started to unearth the existence of Serb-run concentration camps in Bosnia in early August, the world responded in outrage. Immense pressure and opposition to U.S. neutrality forced Bush to respond, vowing not to rest until the international community gained access to and evacuated the Serb camps. While the reaction to the camps signified growing knowledge of the situation within the U.S. and abroad in the international community, little was still known about the larger issue surrounding the camps. Thus, liberal humanitarianists intensified their pressure on the Bush administration to intervene in Bosnia. The portrayal of the situation by liberal humanitarianists as a calculated and systematic campaign of ethnic cleansing was reinforced as information of the camps emerged. The images emanating from the

camps proved conclusive of accusations that the Bush administration was deliberately distorting the situation in Bosnia in order to justify neutrality.

By the time of the Republican Nation Convention in 1992, it was becoming undeniably clear that liberal humanitarianists were defining the public image of the Bosnian situation. The Bush administration was receiving heavy criticism for his foreign policy decisions, even among highly respected policy commentators. Afraid that his presidential legacy would reflect these negative policy reviews, Bush was aware that he would have to lead some form of humanitarian intervention, demonstrating the power of an engaged citizenry to influence public policy.

Public support for intervention escalated and Clinton won election on Nov, 3 1992, seemingly bringing humanitarian intervention to the forefront of the political agenda. The Bush administration understood that liberal humanitarianists would rule both the White House and Congress and pursue a strong campaign for humanitarian involvement. Given the situation, and wanting to avoid an unfavorable foreign policy reputation, the Bush administration decided intervention was necessary. As intervention in Somalia required less effort and the situation was less complex, the Bush administration announced on November 21, 1992 that it would send 25,000 troops to Somalia.

Intervention in Somalia, which Clinton inherited, was deemed a failure by most. U.S. efforts did little to remedy the situation and the withdrawal of troops resulted in significant Somali casualties. Failure in Somalia temporarily diminished U.S. public and political support for intervention in Bosnia.

By the time Clinton took office in January of 1993, the Serbs had already extensively carried out their campaign of ethnic cleansing and occupied almost three-quarters of Bosnia. Throughout his campaign, Clinton had gained much support based on his promises for intervention and military force in Bosnia. Despite this, however, upon entering office, Clinton found that there was still strong opposition challenging intervention. Due to the persistent reluctance, even at this point in the situation, the Clinton administration adopted new terms with to frame the situation, emphasizing the complexities and ancient historical roots. Using words like “tragedy” instead of “terror” or “genocide” eliminated any moral obligation U.S. citizens felt to intervene. Clinton recognized the campaign of ethnic cleansing, but made a clear point to distinguish it from genocide. He recognized the situation but like Bush, argued that U.S. involvement would do little to mitigate the situation. Clinton justified not liberating the Serb concentration camps the same way the international community justified not

liberating concentration camps during WWII asserting that Serb retaliation would result in the deaths of thousands of prisoners.

Within the same timeframe, media coverage shifted from written reports and rumors to televised images of the situation, which resonated much more deeply among the American people. Simultaneously, Serb forces began targeting US and international reporters. The culmination of these two events resulted in a surge in US support for intervention in Bosnia. In May, 1993 Clinton agreed to a plan for intervention in Bosnia called the “lift and strike.” This plan included convincing the UN to lift the arms embargo on Yugoslavia, allowing Bosnian Muslims access to weapons, and then bombing the Serbs. However, this plan of action was quickly rejected by the European Union (EU).

Despite the fact that Clinton sympathized with Bosnia, three key factors influenced his inactivity and hesitation to intervene. Primarily, the military was adamantly opposed to intervention. Clinton and his senior advisors lacked experience with military operations, resulting in heavy reliance upon his military advisors. General Powell, who served as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was opposed to any military action which did not have clearly defined benefits for the US. This relationship was extremely influential in shaping Clinton’s actions. Secondly, Clinton’s foreign policy advisors were devoted multi-lateralists who refused to act without the consent of the EU. Finally, Clinton was afraid that although support for intervention was high, it was not strong enough to withstand the death toll that would result inescapably from contributing ground forces to peacekeeping mission in Bosnia. Additionally, due to failures in Somalia and Haiti, Clinton’s foreign policy was under heavy fire domestically.

Failed U.S. interventions in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia and Kosovo resulted in the establishment of a dangerous foreign policy precedent. The “Clinton Doctrine” is a neo-Wilsonian approach to humanitarian and human rights intervention. It concludes that the U.S. cannot respond to all humanitarian crises or human rights transgressions, and thus it will only use its power if doing so will make a difference and the costs are acceptable.

VII. ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS

The United Nations didn’t play any role in the situation in Bosnia until as late as September of 1991, when war had already broken out in Croatia. In addition to their late response, initial UN action was tepid at best, as the UN Security Council adopted resolution 713, imposing an arms embargo on all of SFRY. At the time the UN adopted resolution 713, it had already been established with relative certainty that Milošević would not be swayed by anything short of

aggressive military confrontation, rendering the embargo relatively ineffective. The embargo did however have perverse negative consequences on the Muslim and Croat populations within Bosnia. Since the Bosnian Serb army was backed by the mainly Serb Yugoslav National Army (JNA) it had no trouble obtaining weapons, enforcing Serb military superiority in Bosnia. The Muslims and Croats on the other hand were rendered essentially defenseless as a result of the embargo, as they had no ability to obtain weapons and thus no means to defend themselves.

Following the adoption of the embargo, in October of 1992 the Secretary-General of the UN appointed an envoy for Yugoslavia headed by former U.S. secretary of state Cyrus Vance. Vance managed to negotiate a cease-fire which temporarily halted hostilities in Croatia. Upon the negotiation of the so-called "Vance Plan," the UN Security Council adopted resolution 743, organizing UN Protection Forces (UNPROFOR) which would be deployed to certain areas of Croatia to enforce the cease fire.

As the situation in Bosnia escalated, the already insufficiently armed UNPROFOR mandate was extended into Bosnia. The new mandate permitted UNPROFOR to take control of the Sarajevo airport in order to ensure the delivery of humanitarian relief supplies, protect convoys of the International Committee of Red Cross (ICRC) delivering released civilian detainees and support the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) as it delivered humanitarian aid to various parts of Bosnia.

In 1993, the UN Security Council adopted resolutions 819 and 836, which established UN protected "Safe Areas" in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The territories, which were supposed to be protected by UNPROFOR upon the establishment of safe areas, included Bihać in the west, Tuzla in the northeast, Goražde, Žepa and Srebrenica in the east and Sarajevo, the capital. The resolution failed to establish a specific procedure by which the safe areas would be protected, particularly in a warzone like Bosnia. The international community and the populations in the Safe Areas expected the UNPROFOR troops to protect them from Serb aggression, ensure the delivery of humanitarian aid and potentially transport them to safer areas. However, the lightly armed UNPROFOR forces supported by a weak mandate did not have the power or absolute authority to deliver on any of these expectations.

In addition to being one of the most controversial decisions made by the UN, the establishment of safe areas created diplomatic tensions within the international community. Member states who voted in favor of the safe area

resolution were for the most part unwilling to take substantial action to ensure their safety.

In 1995, the situation in UN Safe Areas was deteriorating. The Srebrenica massacre represented one of the worst atrocities to occur in Europe since WWII, resulting in the deaths of over 8,000 civilians.¹⁰ Continued attacks on UN Safe Areas, in addition to the Srebrenica massacre and the continued siege of Sarajevo, demonstrated the failure of the UNPROFOR mission in Bosnia and eventually resulted in NATO intervention. By the end of the war, each of the six UN established Safe Areas had been attacked by Serb forces and they had conquered control of Srebrenica and Žepa.

Two key factors are responsible for the inability of UNPROFOR forces to protect the Bosnian people. First, UN troops were lightly armed and extremely undermanned. The initial request for forces estimated that 30,000 troops were needed to effectively protect the Safe Areas from Serb aggression, of which the UN Security Council approved only 7,400 troops. However, since the US refused to contribute peacekeeping troops and the EU was nearly depleted only 3,400 troops were ever deployed.¹¹ The UNPROFOR troops were immensely under-armed and under-manned rendering them incapable of protecting the populations within the Safe Areas. Any substantial involvement would risk armed conflict with Serb troops who had a significant military superiority. Secondly, the UN definition of peacekeeping and the UNPROFOR mandate crippled the troops' efforts to protect the Bosnian people. Peacekeeping is defined by the United Nations as, "Unique and dynamic instrument developed by the Organization as a way to help countries torn by conflict create the conditions for lasting peace."¹² Since enforcing peace was not part of the UNPROFOR mandate, UNPROFOR forces were not allowed to engage in combat with any of the major factions involved unless directly attacked, as this could be immediately considered sacrificing their objectivity. Objectivity, which is one of the foundational pillars of the UN peacekeeping proved detrimental to the UN's ability to successfully mitigate genocide in Bosnia.

In the face of mounting casualties and diminishing UN control, UNPROFOR troops were withdrawn, leaving the populations of the six UN Safe

¹⁰ Power, Samantha. "A Problem From Hell" *America and the Age of Genocide*. New York: HarperCollins, 2003

¹¹ Gow, James. *Triumph of the Lack of Will: International Diplomacy and the Yugoslav War*. New York: Columbia UP, 1997. Page 135

¹² "United Nations Peacekeeping Charter." *United Nations*. Web. 07 May 2010.
<<http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/>>

Areas to fend for themselves. In situations where direct UN involvement is either inappropriate or unfeasible, as it proved to be in Bosnia, the Security Council authorizes regional organizations such as NATO to undertake peacekeeping or peace-enforcement tasks.

VIII. ROLE OF NATO

The post-Cold War transformation of NATO played a significant role in shaping NATO involvement during the Bosnian genocide. During the Cold War, NATO served as a strong and authoritative defensive military alliance, and played a vital role in stabilizing Atlantic relations and Western Europe. NATO's power-binding and restraining function was also vital in shaping the conclusion of the Cold War in so far as it tied Germany to the West, Europe and the US. NATO provided the necessary institutional framework that both facilitated the unification of Germany and provided reassurance to the Soviet Union and Western allies.

The peaceful resolution of the Cold War required that Germany be included in NATO, a decision which required Soviet endorsement. In order to agree to German inclusion in NATO, the Soviet Union stipulated that NATO's mission be recast. At the July 1990 NATO summit in London, NATO members agreed upon the reforms in the Four Power Compromise. Even before the collapse of East Germany in November of 1989, Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev had argued for the evolution of NATO into a political organization, and less of a military organization geared towards confrontation with the Soviet Union. Thus, two main reforms which defined the transformation of NATO included: an invitation to Soviet and Warsaw Pact countries to establish permanent liaison missions to NATO, and the reorganization and downsizing of NATO's forces to rely on multinational troops, in an attempt to bring German forces into more close cohesion with the NATO command structures. Ironically, the transformation of NATO has threatened the institutional components, which made it such a successful stabilizing power through the Cold War.

While the changes agreed upon in the Four Power Compromise facilitated the peaceful conclusion of the Cold War, the long term consequences to NATO's ability to serve as an international peacekeeping and protective institution were extensively harmed. Due to its reformation as a more political organization, NATO has lost most of its ability to defend its members from territorial attack. Additionally, the decreased defensive capabilities of NATO have made its power much more controversial and uncertain, factors that were intensified by the confusion and lack of leadership in the post-Cold War global order.

Due to the failing UNPROFOR mission in Bosnia, NATO's first involvement came in February of 1992, when it issued a statement advising all involved opposition to allow the deployment of UN peacekeepers. While this initial statement was largely symbolic, it provided a basis for future NATO involvement in Bosnia. In July of 1992, at a meeting in Helsinki, Finland, UN foreign ministers agreed to aid the UN in its efforts to monitor compliance with sanctions established in UN Security Council resolutions 713 (1991) and 757 (1992). NATO assistance took the shape of Operation Maritime Monitor, which was based off the coast of Montenegro. In October of 1992, the UN Security Council passed resolution 781 which established a no-fly zone over Bosnia and Herzegovina. Responding quickly NATO expanded its mission to include Operation Sky Monitor on October 16th, 1992.

A month later on November 16th, 1992, NATO's mission evolved from a monitoring mission to an enforcement mission with the passage of UN Security Council resolution 787. Resolution 787 authorized all member states to inspect all incoming and outgoing cargo vessels to ensure their compliance with the UN-imposed sanctions. In response to its evolving mission, NATO established Operation Maritime Guard. Shortly after, NATO's air mission also evolved into an enforcement mission. With the issuing of resolution 816, the UN Security Council authorized states to use the necessary measure to ensure compliance with the no-fly zones. In April of 1993, NATO commenced Operation Deny Flight which enforced the no-fly zones with regionally based fighter aircraft.

Through 1993 the role of NATO in Bosnia continued to grow steadily. On June 10th NATO agreed to provide air support for UNPROFOR troops upon a request from the UN. Then on February 28, 1994 NATO involvement escalated. NATO troops operating under Operation Deny Flight shot down four Serb jets near Banja Luka, Bosnia. As the first combat operation in NATO's history, the events of February 28th allowed for further growth of NATO's role in Bosnia. The height of NATO involvement peaked with the creation of Operation Deliberate Force, which was carried out from August 30, 1995 to September 20, 1995. The mission was designed to protect the Safe Areas from increasing Serb threats and aggression. By its conclusion, Operation Deliberate Force had utilized four-hundred aircraft and 15,000 personnel from fifteen different nations.¹³ During the campaign 3,515 sorties were flown against 338 individual targets. Operation Deliberate Force along with increased international pressure on Milošević to participate in negotiations resulted in the Dayton Peace Agreement in November of 1995.

IX. CONCLUSIONS

The most important conclusion which can be drawn from this research is that no mechanism exists today to promote and protect human rights which is not reliant on entities outside of the peacekeeping body itself. In reality, the authority and efficacy of any international peacekeeping body to respond to situations of humanitarian crisis depends largely on the diplomatic culture and domestic politics of involved countries at that time, and the engagement of the citizenry within each country. This fact is contradictory to the philosophy of peacekeeping organizations in themselves, as human rights are theoretically absolute and separate of all political interests.

In addition to revealing the lack of a legitimate peacekeeping body in the world, this research also illuminates the dangerous precedent which was set during the Bosnian genocide. The lack of public scrutiny surrounding inaction in Bosnia demonstrated to policy makers globally that they would not be held accountable for refusing to protect human rights. This precedent has been exploited in every situation of humanitarian crisis since Bosnia. Policy makers have come to pursue human rights only when they coincide with political or economic incentives, unless heavily pressured by their citizens.

If, in a time when human rights were at the forefront of global politics, the international community still allowed genocide to be carried out in a developed European country without any legitimate intervention, little hope remains for the future of humanitarian intervention unless international peacekeeping bodies are radically reformed and the citizens of the world become perpetually engaged and active.

In order to eliminate the moral ambiguity surrounding the categorization of genocide, it is necessary for there to be a mechanism of global understanding which would be responsible for providing sufficient, unbiased and legitimate knowledge of situations of humanitarian abuses. This mechanism should be part of an international peacekeeping body with no specific obligation to any one country or group of countries.

In order for a peacekeeping body to truly be efficient, it requires a clearly defined and articulated mandate with an established framework for action. Additionally, any peacekeeping body needs absolute and certain authority to act in accordance to its mandate, free of diplomatic and political pressures. The efficacy of an international peacekeeping body requires that the sole goal of its existence is the protection and promotion of human rights in the global community. Such a body needs to be equally represented by the international

community, ensuring that once country doesn't have unequivocal power over the decisions that are made. The existence of an internationally ratified mechanism for investigating situations of humanitarian ambiguity and classifying such situations as either genocide or war crimes would define the moral obligation of the international community. Since there is no ambiguity surrounding the categorization of genocide under these circumstances, there would also be no ambiguity surround the international community's obligation to intervene and, more specifically, a nation's responsibility to intervene.

X. EPILOGUE

This paper is relevant to global citizenship because it illustrates the role a globally aware and engaged citizenry plays in promoting humanitarian intervention. The Bosnian situation demonstrates that without public scrutiny policy makers globally are not held accountable for refusing to protect human rights. Unless they are heavily pressured by their citizens, policy makers pursue human rights only when they coincide with political or economic incentives. It is in this capacity that being a globally engaged and aware citizen has its largest impact. If we act as citizens not of our specific nations, but rather as citizens of the world, making it our responsibility to be aware of the situations of humanitarian crisis around our world; when we bring the pressure of public scrutiny to policy makers, we are able to pressure our governments to place the protection of human rights at the top of their national agendas.