

---

6-1-2021

## The Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan Border: A Legacy of Soviet Imperialism

Liam Abbate  
Santa Clara University, lp2abbate@gmail.com

Follow this and additional works at: <https://digitalcommons.fairfield.edu/jogc>

---

### Recommended Citation

Abbate, Liam (2021) "The Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan Border: A Legacy of Soviet Imperialism," *Undergraduate Journal of Global Citizenship*: Vol. 4 : Iss. 1 , Article 4.

Available at: <https://digitalcommons.fairfield.edu/jogc/vol4/iss1/4>

This item has been accepted for inclusion in DigitalCommons@Fairfield by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Fairfield. It is brought to you by DigitalCommons@Fairfield with permission from the rights-holder(s) and is protected by copyright and/or related rights. **You are free to use this item in any way that is permitted by the copyright and related rights legislation that applies to your use. For other uses, you need to obtain permission from the rights-holder(s) directly, unless additional rights are indicated by a Creative Commons license in the record and/or on the work itself.** For more information, please contact [digitalcommons@fairfield.edu](mailto:digitalcommons@fairfield.edu).

# The Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan Border: A Legacy of Soviet Imperialism

LIAM ABBATE

## Abstract

Kyrgyzstan, a small country in Central Asia, shares a complex border with its neighbor Uzbekistan. While these borders were created during the Soviet era, and were drawn by leaders in Moscow, in the post-Soviet years new problems have arisen from the complex borders. A number of different ethnic groups are spread amongst the five Uzbek exclaves and two Tajik exclaves that are located adjacent to Kyrgyz territory. This difficult set of national borders also complicates sharing the water that flows through the Ferghana Valley.

## Introduction

In this paper, I will analyze the international border dispute between Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, and how the contemporary Uzbek-Kyrgyz border's division of the surrounding ethnic groups remains as a legacy of the Soviet era. I start by explaining the complicated border which is the basis for the dispute. I then examine the origins of the dispute back in the Soviet era, before moving on to developments in the dispute since Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan gained their independence in. Finally, I explore the wider geopolitical implications of the

dispute, particularly in relation to the U.S.-China rivalry.

## Background

Kyrgyzstan is among the poorest of the nations of Central Asia: its per capita is a mere tenth of its larger neighbor Kazakhstan.<sup>1</sup> Formerly a constituent republic of the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics, the Kirghiz Soviet Socialist Republic declared independence as Kyrgyzstan on August 31, 1991. Between 1924 and 1927 Soviet officials drew curly borders for their then-constituent republics, and in the process, they separated groups of Kyrgyz, Uzbeks, and Tajiks inhabiting the Ferghana Valley:<sup>2</sup> home to nearly one quarter of Central Asia's population.<sup>3</sup>

Unlike the other former Soviet republics of Central Asia, Kyrgyzstan has largely experienced democracy since independence. Revolutions ousted the Kyrgyz presidents in 2005 and 2010; the former revolution was peaceful, while the latter included carnage in its chronology.<sup>4</sup> Furthermore, a competitive election in 2017 resulted in a peaceful transition from President Almazbek Atambayev to his protégé Sooronbay Jeenbekov, without a revolution. However, despite handing over power, former President Atambayev continues to harshly criticize the actions of his successor. President Jeenbekov has also worked to consolidate his power, as he has threatened to imprison a political opponent of his – Ömürbek Babanov – on the charge of inciting conflict between the ethnics Uzbeks and Kyrgyz.<sup>5</sup>

Kyrgyzstan lies between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan in the west and south, China in the east, and Kazakhstan in the north. The country is covered in mountains with 88 mountain ranges.<sup>6</sup> These mountain ranges separate communities within Kyrgyzstan, contributing to regional differences and

national instability.<sup>7</sup> The capital of Bishkek is the main population center for northern Kyrgyzstan, while the area between Jalal-Abad and Osh comprises the most populated part of southern Kyrgyzstan. As seen in Figure 1, the former lies just South of Kazakhstan while the latter area lies just east of Uzbekistan; Osh and Bishkek are two cities the lie outside of the seven oblasts (regions) and hold an equivalent status as the oblasts.<sup>8</sup>

The Ferghana Valley is an area divided among Kyrgyzstan and its neighbors: Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. The valley's fertile agricultural land produces a large amount of food for Central Asia, while subject to the availability of water.<sup>9</sup> The twisting borders and narrow stretches of land are relics of Soviet rule and continue to cause disputes between Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. Its 10 million inhabitants include ethnic Uzbeks, Kyrgyz, and Tajiks.<sup>10</sup> However, during the Soviet era, residents became accustomed to their ability to cross the inter-Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR), as the Ferghana Valley lacked the border controls present in other areas of the Soviet Union.<sup>11</sup>



**Figure 1.** Political Divisions of Kyrgyzstan, map from Bigstock (Richard Weitz, “Kyrgyzstan and the Afghan Campaign’s Logistical Challenges,” *Second*


*Line Defense*, last modified November 16, 2011, <https://sldinfo.com/2011/11/kyrgyzstan-and-the-afghan-campaigns-logistical-challenges/>).

## Misaligned Ethnicities in the Ferghana Valley

While many countries have borders that were drawn arbitrarily, Kyrgyzstan’s borders are especially problematic. There are five exclaves where portions of Uzbek territory are completely surrounded by Kyrgyzstan: Sokh, Shohimardon, Chon Qora/Qalacha, and Jani-Ayil (Halmiyon), as well as two Tajik exclaves.<sup>12</sup> At 350 km<sup>2</sup>, Sokh is the largest of these exclaves, and according to Baumgartner, has experienced several conflicts between its 50,000 Uzbek citizens and the guards securing the Kyrgyz border.<sup>13</sup> To complicate matters further, Sokh’s residents are 99% ethnic Tajiks.<sup>14</sup> This mismatch of residency and identity is not unique to the Sokh exclave; national borders separate divide ethnic groups of the Ferghana Valley while pushing together other distinct groups (fig. 2; fig. 3).<sup>15</sup> Furthermore, this disconnect between ethnic identity and location within national boundaries is especially pronounced in northern Tajikistan, where Uzbeks and Tajiks are interspersed<sup>16</sup> like chocolate and vanilla in a marble cake.



**Figure 2.** Political Map of the Ferghana Valley (Sabatar, “Normalization process between.”).



**Figure 3.** Demographics of the Fergana Valley (“Central Asia: Tensions.”).

Ethnic tensions in the region are nothing new and most recently flared up in 2010 when clashes between the two ethnic groups left hundreds of locals dead.<sup>17</sup> The Soviet era infrastructure impacts contemporary disagreements over water resources and the border itself. A Soviet-built network of canals connects the water supply systems of Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, causing disagreements over how much water each of the three “stans” should receive.<sup>18</sup> In general, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have an abundance of water but lack electricity, while Uzbekistan (and Kazakhstan) have excess electricity but a scarce amount of water.<sup>19</sup> There have been multiple efforts to improve the water distribution system in the Ferghana Valley. The world bank funded improvements and modernizations in Uzbekistan’s water infrastructure from 2010 to 2016.<sup>20</sup> Similarly, the International Water Management Institute had a project started in 2001 which sought to respect local needs for water resources and improve the soil fertility in Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan.<sup>21</sup> In 2017, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan were able to agree on a dam on the Naryn River, while in 2018, Uzbekistan’s president announced his support for the Rogun dam in Tajikistan. Continued cooperation is possible, provided the three nations are willing to overlook the “deep-seated mistrust”<sup>22</sup> that currently exists.

Throughout history the Ferghana Valley had been subjected and inhabited by numerous cultures, such as the Greeks, Arabs, Mongols, and Turks, all of which affected the socio-political landscape of the valley.<sup>23</sup> In the mid-19<sup>th</sup> century Tsarist Russia conquered the Ferghana Valley from the Khanate of Qo’qon.<sup>24</sup> Also known as Kokand, the Khanate was not ethnically-based, but rather was a “dynastic and feudal entity.”<sup>25</sup>

Many of the issues from the Kyrgyz-Uzbek border and other borders in the region are a product of Russian imperialism – first in the way of the Russian Empire, and later by the hand of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). Before 1924, when the creation of the Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan border began, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan had not existed as sovereign states. According to Megoran, there were not Kyrgyz and Uzbek ethnic groups quite the way there are today.<sup>26</sup> Before the creation of the border in the 1920s, ethnic identification was not familiar to many inhabitants of Central Asia.<sup>27</sup> The history of migrations in the region had not provided clear, geographically segregated ethnic groups. The Uzbeks, Karakalpaks, and Kazakhs likely all descended from the people inhabiting the Uzbek confederation of the fifteenth century.<sup>28</sup> The origins of the Kyrgyz people are less clear, but the consensus is that part of the Kyrgyz population migrated from southern Siberia to modern Kyrgyzstan in the fifteenth century, but that another portion of the Kyrgyz population is descended from nomads who had arrived in the region long before the fifteenth century.<sup>29</sup> When considered on the basis of language, the Tajiks are distinct from the other four large ethnic groups of post-Soviet Central Asia: the Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, Uzbeks, and Turkmens,<sup>30</sup> who all speak Turkic

languages.<sup>31</sup> The Tajik Language, however, is a relative of Persian.<sup>32</sup>

The Soviet Union selected historical designations and used them as the basis for ethnicities, by codifying distinct languages, selecting capitals for the union republics, and compiling national historiographies.<sup>33</sup> The ethnicity names created by the Soviet Union did not match the self-identification of residents of Central Asia: boundary surveyors reported confusion about matching people to ethnic labels if their own labels were not on the official list of Central Asian ethnonyms. Perhaps most consequentially, the Soviet officials drew borders between the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR), the Kirghiz SSR, and the other central Asian SSRs. Even after the creation of these borders, many residents did not “distinguish between Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan”.<sup>34</sup>

## **A New International Border**

Kyrgyzstan’s most important relations are with its neighbors: Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and China, as well as nearby Afghanistan and Turkmenistan. Uzbekistan has accused both Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan of inadequately protecting their borders, allowing an unlimited flow of drugs to travel across the latter two countries.<sup>35</sup> Uzbekistan relied on its authoritarian dictator Islam Karimov to strongly enforce its borders – Karimov died in 2016.

Upon independence in 1991, the border between Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan became an international border overnight. Initially, the border was not tangible and the respective countries made a minimal effort to demarcate the border.<sup>36</sup> However, over the next few years, political and economic differences between Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan caused the lenient border

practices to disintegrate. In 1993, Uzbekistan temporarily closed its border to Kyrgyzstan and introduced its own unique currency. Later on, Uzbekistan abandoned daylight savings time and adopted the Latin alphabet, all the while Kyrgyzstan kept daylight savings and the Cyrillic alphabet.<sup>37</sup> Disagreements have pitted the Ferghana Valley portion of Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan against the remainder of the respective countries. During the 1990s, the Ferghana Valley played an important role in Tajikistan’s civil war,<sup>38</sup> providing many anti-regime fighters.<sup>39</sup> Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan also experienced regional instability in the 1990s, in which their portions of the Ferghana Valley experienced unrest. During that period, there were extremists from the Ferghana Valley who executed sporadic attacks in southern Kyrgyzstan.<sup>40</sup>

The situation between Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan became more tense in 1999. In January 1999, Uzbekistan closed its border for an indefinite amount of time. On February 13, 1999, President Karimov declared that “Kyrgyzstan is a poor country, and it is not my job to look after the people”.<sup>41</sup> In August 1999, The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) – an organization of “dissident Islamist guerillas headed by Ferghana Valley exiles linked to militant Islamist groups in Tajikistan and Afghanistan”<sup>42</sup> – invaded southern Kyrgyzstan and adjacent areas of Tajikistan. As a consequence of the IMU’s actions, Uzbekistan began erecting a fence – which is two meters high - along its Ferghana Valley border; factories in Uzbekistan were required to fire any employees who were ethnically Kyrgyz. The creation of a borderland continued as President Karimov decreed that all visitors to Uzbekistan staying longer than three days needed a visa.<sup>43</sup> Understandably, this did not go over well with Kyrgyzstan, for as Karimov knew

quite well, most Kyrgyzstan's residents were already struggling economically.

### **The Chinese and the Americans**

The other important state actors interacting with Kyrgyzstan are the U.S. and Russia, who vie with China for influence in Kyrgyzstan. The U.S. global war on terror has affected Kyrgyzstan, albeit not as severely as Afghanistan, and pressured it to strengthen its border security.<sup>44</sup> However, Russia, China, and the U.S. do not place Kyrgyzstan as a high priority, meaning each state does not have the goal of eliminating the influence of the other two.<sup>45</sup> Nevertheless, these three major powers have reasons to maintain an interest in Kyrgyzstan.

China has the greatest reason to worry; its officials fear that instability in the Kyrgyz Republic could contribute to unrest in China,<sup>46</sup> particularly the autonomous territory of Xinjiang which is home to a large number of ethnic Uyghurs. Uyghurs and Kyrgyz are both Turkic ethnic groups. The U.S.'s concerns regarding Kyrgyzstan derive from its proximity to Afghanistan: only Tajikistan separates the two countries. The short distance separating Kyrgyzstan and Afghanistan has allowed the U.S. to use Manas International Airport in the former for its military operations in the latter.<sup>47</sup> The U.S. found this arrangement necessary after Uzbekistan expelled U.S. military officers from its territory in 2005.

### **C**onclusion

The Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan border dispute has taken a century to develop into something threatening enough to make the two neighbors adversaries of one another. The borders as drawn by the Soviets fail to align with the distribution of persons of differing ethnicities; the enclaves only make negotiations more difficult.<sup>48</sup> Perhaps the

national borders could be redrawn by the countries themselves, allowing the borders to align with the ethnic groups in the valley. It would also be beneficial for the countries of the Ferghana Valley (Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan) if they could devise a plan to share the water in the valley. The situation would also benefit from Uzbekistan being more understanding of Kyrgyzstan.

Yet, perhaps Uzbekistan is not the biggest threat to Kyrgyzstan's well-being. Megoran argues that middle-class Kyrgyz people worry most about the elites destroying the country. Uzbeks agree, and one Uzbek told a researcher that the 'big ones,' or the wealthy elites, "keep gobbling [up] [Kyrgyzstan] the way they are at the moment, the mountains themselves may disappear".<sup>49</sup> This reasoning suggests that Kyrgyzstan's income inequality is causing issues that should not be neglected. Logically, the residents hope for no continuation of the environmental degradation that occurred under Soviet rule, although the Soviet environmental damage persists in Kyrgyzstan<sup>50</sup> – and other portions of the former U.S.S.R. This hope of theirs opposes any plans to exploit the land and the common people of Kyrgyzstan for the benefits of the wealthier elites. Creating a more just and equitable society could improve the socio-economic stability within Kyrgyzstan.

The first step in decreasing income inequality is to decrease corruption in the Kyrgyz government. If the politicians in power ceased imprisoning their opponents or purging governmental officials they quarreled with, government transparency and fairness could emerge. If international aid was permitted to reach the communities it is intended to benefit, better economic opportunities could emerge for all residents of Kyrgyzstan. Providing more economic opportunities for the economically

marginalized residents of Kyrgyzstan is the most promising solution to this border dispute, because a major source of tension over the Uzbekistan-Kyrgyzstan border is the movement of migrants from Kyrgyzstan to Uzbekistan in search of better-paying employment.<sup>51</sup> Like many border disputes, this dispute is a proxy: a proxy for the sources of distress causing residents of Kyrgyzstan to leave their homeland in search of economic improvement in their lives.

### **Bibliography**

Arnold, Katie. "In Kyrgyzstan, Warming Brings Less Water – And More Conflict." *Reuters*. Last modified November 8, 2018. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-kyrgyzstan-water-climatechange/in-kyrgyzstan-warming-brings-less-water-and-more-conflict-idUSKCN1NE0BW>.

Baumgartner, Pete. "Tug-of-War: Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan Look to Finally Settle Decades-Old Border Dispute." *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty*. Last modified December 14, 2017. <https://www.rferl.org/a/uzbekistan-kyrgyzstan-resolving-decades-old-border-dispute/28918059.html>.

"Central Asia: Tensions grow in the Fergana Valley." *Stratfor*. October 8, 2013. <https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/central-asia-tensions-grow-fergana-valley>.

Dalbaeva, Alina. "End the Weaponisation of Water in Central Asia." *International Crisis Group*. March 15, 2018. <https://www.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/central-asia/kazakhstan/end-weaponisation-water-central-asia>.

The Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica. "Central Asia." Encyclopaedia Britannica. December 28, 2018.

<https://www.britannica.com/place/Central-Asia>.

"Fergana Valley Water Resources Management Phase-I Project." The World Bank. The World Bank Group. Last modified November 30, 2020. <https://projects.worldbank.org/en/projects-operations/project-detail/P110538>.

Geography Now. "Geography Now! Kyrgyzstan." YouTube. January 24, 2018. Video, 11:32. [https://youtu.be/Wo-b\\_MpguLo](https://youtu.be/Wo-b_MpguLo).

Heyer, Evelyne, Patricia Balaesque, Mark A. Jobling, Lluís Quintana-Murci, Raphaëlle Chaix, Laure Segurel, Almaz Aldashev, and Tanya Hegay. "Genetic diversity and the emergence of ethnic groups in Central Asia." *BMC Genetics* 10 (2009). <http://doi.org/10.1186/1471-2156-10-49>.

Johanson, Lars. "Turkic Languages." Encyclopaedia Britannica. August 11, 2020. <https://www.britannica.com/topic/Turkic-languages>.

"Kyrgyzstan's Geographic Challenge." *Stratfor*. October 16, 2012. <https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/kyrgyzstans-geographic-challenge>.

"Kyrgyzstan's Neighbours Have Too Little politics, but It Has Too Much." *The Economist*. April 17, 2019. <https://www.economist.com/asia/2019/04/17/kyrgyzstans-neighbours-have-too-little-politics-but-it-has-too-much>.

Megoran, Nick. "The Critical Geopolitics of Danger in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan." *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* 23, no. 4 (2005): 555-580. [doi.org/10.1068%2Fd56j](https://doi.org/10.1068%2Fd56j).

Megoran, Nick. "The Critical Geopolitics of the Uzbekistan-Kyrgyzstan Ferghana Valley Border Dispute, 1999-2000." *Political Geography* 23, no. 6 (2004): 731-764. doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2004.03.004.

Megoran, Nick. "Rethinking the Study of International Boundaries: A Biography of the Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan Boundary." *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 102, no. 2 (2012): 464-481. doi.org/10.1080/00045608.2011.595969.

Sabatar, Akmaral. "Normalization Process between Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan." *The AsiaN*. Last modified October 24, 2016. <http://www.theasian.asia/archives/96843>.

---

<sup>1</sup>"Kyrgyzstan's Neighbours Have Too Little Politics, but It Has Too Much." *The Economist*, April 17, 2019.

<sup>2</sup>Pete Baumgartner, "Tug-of-War: Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan Look to Finally Settle Decades-Old Border Dispute," *Radio Free Europe/Radio*.

<sup>3</sup>Katie Arnold, "In Kyrgyzstan, Warming Brings Less Water – And More Conflict," *Reuters*, last modified November 8, 2018.

<sup>4</sup>"Kyrgyzstan's Neighbours."

<sup>5</sup>Ibid.,

<sup>6</sup>Geography Now, "Geography Now! Kyrgyzstan," YouTube, January 24, 2018, video, 11:32.

<sup>7</sup>"Kyrgyzstan's Geographic Challenge," *Stratfor*, October 16, 2012.

<sup>8</sup>Geography Now, "Geography Now! Kyrgyzstan."

<sup>9</sup>Stratfor, "Central Asia: The Complexities of the Ferghana Valley," *Forbes*, last modified October 10, 2013.

<sup>10</sup>Nick Megoran, "The Critical Geopolitics of the Uzbekistan-Kyrgyzstan Ferghana Valley Border Dispute, 1999-2000," *Political Geography* 23, no. 6 (2004): 733, accessed May 31, 2019.

<sup>11</sup>Nick Megoran, "Rethinking the Study of International Boundaries: A Biography of the Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan Boundary," *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 102, no. 2 (2012): 471, accessed May 31, 2019.

Sanderson, Thomas M. "From the Ferghana Valley to Syria and Beyond: A Brief History of Central Asian Foreign Fighters." Center for Strategic & International Studies. January 5, 2018.

<https://www.csis.org/analysis/ferghana-valley-syria-and-beyond-brief-history-central-asian-foreign-fighters>.

<sup>12</sup>Geography Now, "Geography Now! Kyrgyzstan."

<sup>13</sup>Baumgartner, "Tug-of-War: Uzbekistan."

<sup>14</sup>Geography Now, "Geography Now! Kyrgyzstan."

<sup>15</sup>Akmaral Sabatar, "Normalization Process between Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan," *The AsiaN*, last modified October 24, 2016, "Central Asia: Tensions grow in the Ferghana Valley," *Stratfor*, October 8, 2013.

<sup>16</sup>"Central Asia: Tensions."

<sup>17</sup>"Kyrgyzstan's Neighbours."

<sup>18</sup>Katie Arnold, "In Kyrgyzstan, Warming Brings Less Water – And More Conflict," *Reuters*, last modified November 8, 2018.

<sup>19</sup>Alina Dalbaeva, "End the Weaponisation of Water in Central Asia," *International Crisis Group*, March 15, 2018.

<sup>20</sup>"Ferghana Valley Water Resources Management Phase-I Project," The World Bank, The World Bank Group, last modified November 30, 2020.

<sup>21</sup>Kai Wegerich, Jusipbek Kazbekov, and Murat Yakubov, "Integrated Water Resources Management in the Ferghana Valley," International Water Management Institute, accessed December 6, 2020.

<sup>22</sup>Dalbaeva, "End the Weaponisation."



- 
- <sup>23</sup>Nick Megoran, "Rethinking the Study of International Boundaries: A Biography of the Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan Boundary," *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 102, no. 2 (2012): 471, accessed May 31, 2019, doi.org/10.1080/00045608.2011.595969.
- <sup>24</sup>Nick Megoran, "The Critical Geopolitics of the Uzbekistan-Kyrgyzstan Ferghana Valley Border Dispute, 1999-2000," *Political Geography* 23, no. 6 (2004): 733, accessed May 31, 2019, doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2004.03.004.
- <sup>25</sup>Megoran, "Rethinking the Study," 470.
- <sup>26</sup>Ibid, 469.
- <sup>27</sup> Ibid, 470.
- <sup>28</sup> Evelyne Heyer, et al., "Genetic diversity and the emergence of ethnic groups in Central Asia," *BMC Genetics* 10 (2009).
- <sup>29</sup> Heyer, et al., "Genetic diversity."
- <sup>30</sup> The Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica, "Central Asia," Encyclopaedia Britannica, December 28, 2018, <https://www.britannica.com/place/Central-Asia>.
- <sup>31</sup> Lars Johanson, "Turkic Languages," Encyclopaedia Britannica, August 11, 2020, <https://www.britannica.com/topic/Turkic-languages>.
- <sup>32</sup>The Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica, "Central Asia."
- <sup>33</sup>Megoran, "Rethinking the Study," 470.
- <sup>34</sup>Ibid, 470.
- <sup>35</sup>Megoran, "The Critical Geopolitics of the Uzbekistan-Kyrgyzstan," 742.

<sup>36</sup>Megoran, "Rethinking the Study," 472.

<sup>37</sup>Ibid, 473.

<sup>38</sup>"Central Asia: Tensions."

<sup>39</sup> Thomas M. Sanderson, "From the Ferghana Valley to Syria and Beyond: A Brief History of Central Asian Foreign Fighters," Center for Strategic & International Studies, January 5, 2018.

<sup>40</sup> Sanderson, "From the Ferghana."

<sup>41</sup>Megoran, "Rethinking the Study," 473.

<sup>42</sup>Ibid, 474.

<sup>43</sup>Ibid, 474.

<sup>44</sup> Ibid, 475.

<sup>45</sup>Richard Weitz, "Kyrgyzstan and the Afghan Campaign's Logistical Challenges," *Second Line Defense*, last modified November 16, 2011, <https://sldinfo.com/2011/11/kyrgyzstan-and-the-afghan-campaigns-logistical-challenges/>.

<sup>46</sup>Weitz, "Kyrgyzstan and the Afghan."

<sup>47</sup>Ibid,.

<sup>48</sup>Megoran, "Rethinking the Study," 476.

<sup>49</sup>Nick Megoran, "The Critical Geopolitics of Danger in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan," *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* 23, no. 4 (2005): 573, accessed May 31, 2019.

<sup>50</sup>Megoran, "The Critical Geopolitics of Danger," 555.

<sup>51</sup>Megoran, "Rethinking the Study," 473-74.