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Failing Women? Structural Violence's Relevance in Responses to Sexual Violence: A Case Study of Rwanda

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Sexual violence (SV) often causes survivors to experience devastating health, social and economic impacts. Framed within Galtung's structural violence theory, Crenshaw's intersectionality theory, and Giddens structuration theory, this paper explores the relevance of structural violence within two community based organizations in Rwanda that provide legal justice and economic resources as a way to address SV in the country. Both were established by the Rwandan government; gacaca was established after the 1994 Rwandan genocide and Isange One Stop Center was established in 2009. Part one of this paper aimed to integrate survivors' personal experiences in gacaca with several scholars' research and the Human Rights Watch reports in order to test for the relevance of structural violence in gacaca. Part two utilizes primary data and several scholars to test the relevance of structural violence within Isange. Ultimately, this paper argues and aims to demonstrate that structural violence is relevant in both organizations, and therefore is correspondly relevant within the global pathology of SV. Given this, it argues that structural violence be named as a preventable problem. Drawing from Isange and gacaca, it provides insight into the ways in which survivor-centered support, educational campaigns, coordination between Government ministries and nonprofits working with SV, and

the allocation of further resources could be utilized to better tackle the issue of SV. Ultimately, grounded in the theory of structuration, it advances a transformed approach to SV at all levels of society in order to revolutionize the SV pathology.

Methodology: Part one of this paper uses qualitative content analysis to evaluate the gacaca court system as the system relates to the experiences of women who survived sexual violence (SV) during the 1994 Rwandan genocide. Included in this data are survivors' testimonies. Primary researchers obtained informed consent from survivors' before using their stories, and noted that stories were shared voluntarily. Survivors reported to these researchers that they shared their stories in order to integrate their narrative into the broader narrative of gacaca, and to prevent other women from experiencing similar manifestations of violence. In order to maintain an ethical framework as a secondary researcher, I avoided deceptive practices, and aimed to maintain the stories' integrity by reflecting them as they were originally told, and keeping the welfare of the research participants' in mind. When a survivor chose to include her name to the primary researcher, I used this form of identification as well. Part two utilizes primary quantitative data that I collected in Kigali, Rwanda during the summer of 2018 as well as qualitative content analysis. Data were collected at Isange One Stop Center (Isange), a government-established, multi-sectoral clinic in Kigali, and analyzed the clinic's role in addressing SV. Data were collected through anonymous, semi-structured questionnaires, distributed to doctors, psychologists, and police officers from the center, as well as gender based violence (GBV) officers at the Ministry of Gender and Family Promotion (MIGEPROF). The head of each sector within Isange received questionnaires to distribute among her/his employees; thirteen of the twenty-three Isange staff members were interviewed. Questionnaires for Isange

employees' explored: perceptions of the clinic's work in regards to SV, the main drivers of GBV, how MIGEPROF continues to work with the clinic, and what constraints limit the employees' work with survivors. Questionnaires for the government officers questioned: their perceptions of Isange's ability to accomplish its goal in respect to SV and how the Ministry coordinates with the Kigali clinic. The ethics of the data were approved by the Rwanda National Commission of Science and Technology. Data from part two were analyzed using Statistical Package for Social Sciences. The data from Isange are not generalizable to all Isange clinics present in Rwanda; however, do provide nuanced insight regarding the pathology of SV in Rwanda.

Theoretical Framework: This paper was guided by Johan Galtung's structural violence theory, Kimberle Crenshaw's feminist intersectionality theory, and Anthony Gidden's theory of structuration. Broadly, Galtung defines structural violence as violence built into structure without a primary actor, which enables the reproduction of unequal distribution of power, privilege and resources through policies. The deficiencies and barriers presented in structural violence reinforce inequitable social patterns, and most greatly impact those of lowest race, class, and gender ranks. Critically, the oppressed tend to be limited in their abilities to gain coordinated power against the oppressors.1 Kimberle Crenshaw's feminist theory adds to this framework, describing the interconnected patterns of race and class present in structural violence against women. She defines the ways that policy undermines the ability of women with these intersecting identities to launch out of abusive circumstances.2 These two frameworks are relevant in the context of Rwanda, where issues of poverty impact women. They support the analysis of the many power dynamics present in Rwandan women's lives that inhibit their access to resources and justice following SV. Finally,

Gidden's structuration theory complements both, describing the dynamic relationship between structures and human agency, supporting the potential of flexibility, creativity, and long-term changes within structures through group action.3 His theory is relevant when considering the global pathology of SV, and the interrelations of community organization, political will, and structural shifts.

Introduction: Estimates approximate that as many as a half million women experienced SV during the Rwandan genocide.4 Testimonies by survivors recall gang-rape, rape with sticks and gun barrels, the deliberate transmission of Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV), sexual mutilation, and/or sexual enslavement by militia men.5 Adding to the humiliation of the trauma, women were often raped in front of their children, after witnessing their loved ones killed and/or their homes destroyed. While some testimonies state that perpetrators killed the woman following the rape, other perpetrators left the women to "die of sadness"6 and/or sexually mutilated them.7 Each exemplifies SV as a weapon used to terrorize women in an effort to promote the Hutu cause during the 100 days of the Rwandan genocide.

The health effects of SV were substantial. Psychologically, survivors' quality of life was damaged due to high rates of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and depression.8 Rwandan doctors also reported that sexually transmitted infections (STI) were particularly common among survivors. Literature estimates that 70% of SV survivors were HIV+ following the genocide.9 Although it is unknown which cases of HIV were transmitted through genocide related rape, women's testimonies confirm that HIV+ men did deliberately "infect" them with the virus. Medical treatment was not widely available, so those with the virus faced a high risk of death. Moreover, HIV was highly stigmatized, leading to social isolation of carriers. Therefore, perpetrators burdened women physically and

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emotionally with a stigmatized terminal illness that survivors would be forced to endure through death.10 Doctors also reported high rates of complications due to self-induced abortions as well as pain, infections, and birth complications due to sexual mutilation. Since sexual abuse and abortion were highly stigmatized, professionals state that many women did not seek consultation, causing further infection and stress.11

Identity also played a significant role in the trauma experienced. Perpetrators of SV, not only harmed the individual woman's physical body, but also damaged fundamental aspects of her Tutsi identity like her ethnicity, religion, social class and/or political affiliation.12 Due to the social stigma of rape, following the trauma, the woman not only carried her own shame, but also the shame of her community, adding to the complexity of the stress survivors experienced following the genocide.13 Additionally, as was alluded to previously, SV leads to detrimental social stigma throughout Rwanda. SV survivors reported that they felt an intense sense of isolation and ostracization, and feared that speaking out would cause them to be rejected by their family, friends and neighbors.14 This destruction of social capital caused women to be outsiders in their community, impacting their sense of belonging, and also limiting their ability to marry and build their own family.15

Connected to the physical and social trauma experienced, women faced dire economic disempowerment. Many women experienced the death of male relatives during the genocide, or lost them due to imprisonment. Due to reliance on these male relatives, women did not have the resources necessary to maintain their livelihoods, so they struggled to feed themselves and their families, and/or to reclaim their property and fix their homes.16 Property was a particularly prominent issue as men had dominant land rights over women leaving women without resources and legal rights, and yet with a dire need to reclaim the property through a legal process. As the Human Rights

Watch (HRW) reported, in 1996, the Justice, Law Enforcement, Health and Rehabilitation Ministries still had not created a coordinated strategy to account for womens' dire circumstances.17

To address the devastations of the Rwandan genocide for broader society, the Rwandan government established three levels of courts throughout the country. These judicial bodies included the International Criminal Tribunal Court (ICTR), national courts, and the gacaca court system. The most in line with Western standards were the ICTR and the national courts, while the gacaca court was a hybrid system that took an alternative approach to navigating the legal systems. In sorting which crimes went to each court, four categories of genocide crimes were established, each depending on individual responsibility and holding a different penality. The international and national courts heard the most extreme category one cases, while gacaca heard category two through four cases. SV specifically had been a category one crime, heard by the ICTR, but due to slow processing rates was reduced in seriousness and therefore heard in gacaca courts.18

Gacaca's goal was pitched as a social process that offered an alternative approach to revealing the truth and ending impunity. It favored community engagement, aiming to provide healing through the truth and distributive justice to survivors.19 Moreover, it aimed to reintegrate perpetrators into their homes, rather than keeping them locked in prison. The community centered hearings, open for all community members to participate in as witnesses and judges, theoretically fostered an environment where evidence was easily brought forth and discussed, allowing for an open conversation, and thus truth and reconciliation. During 2004 and 2005, the government established billboards marketing gacaca with propaganda stating "the truth is healing."20 The campaign aimed to complement the courts' goal of transforming the harmful ideology that

caused the ethnic violence and to rebuild the nation—socially and economically.21

Gacaca left many SV survivors without medical or psychological help. Beyond those who were not able to access services through the system, the majority of survivors did not speak openly about their experience due to the fear of having to testify or due to the social stigma associated with rape.22 This left women in a vulnerable position. For instance, survivors of SV have far higher rates of PTSD.23 Since gacaca's shortcomings, Rwanda seems to have made progress advancing women's rights and roles. Since the genocide, there has been a breakthrough in women's empowerment efforts, coming from the top-down. Benevolent dictator, President Kagame has been popular for presenting gender equality as one of his priorities, and for the apparent progress that has followed.24 Today, 67.5% of the parliament is composed of women—the highest percentage in the world. The World Economic Forum ranks Rwanda number six for its effort to reduce the gender gap, highlighting the ways that Rwanda serves as an international leader in efforts towards gender equality.25 The United Nations (UN) highlights recent domestic laws passed in an effort to combat GBV in Rwanda, including a minimum requirement of 30% participation of women in decision-making at all levels, as well as the Gender Observatory, charged with monitoring the implementation of gender indicators in all programs, at all levels.26 Legally, Rwandan women now have the right to own land and property due to the Inheritance Law of 1998.27 The government has also made efforts to address GBV through the establishment of the Law on the Prevention and Punishment of Violence Against Women (Rwanda: Law No. 59/2008).28 The law includes all forms of intimate partner violence, and the minimum penalty is six months in prison, while SV oleading to terminal illness or death of one's spouse can lead to life imprisonment.

Still, Rwanda continues to grapple with inequalities against women in the health, education, and economic realms. In the modern day, GBV, the spread of HIV, and the interrelations of the two have continued to burden women with long term trauma, stigma, social isolation, and economic hardship.29 In 2009, Isange was established under One UN. This clinic offers psycho-social, medical, and legal services to survivors of domestic abuse and SV, as well as women living with HIV. Since Isange's establishment, the UN found that the clinic has a significantly higher success rate than similar services that had previously existed in Rwanda. Still, the report found deficiencies in regards to the clinic's ability to conduct follow-ups with victims, the consistency of legal help, the breadth of awareness raising, and the strength of links between the clinic and relevant ministries. Ultimately, the UN listed the need to: provide victims with more consistent legal aid and advice, improve follow-up services, and establish better connections with legal institutions as well as members of the community.30

Part I of this paper tests for the relevance of structural violence within the gacaca system in regards to the experiences of survivors of SV. Part II of this paper includes my exploratory study of Isange, which analyzed the short fallings named by the UN, testing for the relevance of structural violence. Gacaca and Isange are both government-sponsored, community-based organizations offering access to legal justice and resources for survivors of SV. An examination of the shortcomings of Gacaca and Isange and the relevance of structural violence to these short fallings allow for a broader understanding of the ways in which structural violence manifests within community based organizations. The research allows for a greater understanding of the role of structural violence in the global pathology of SV, ultimately allowing for the public to combat it.

PART I: Relevance of Structural Violence within Gacaca in regards to SV Survivors
A. Dangers within the Courts: This section explores the relevance of structural violence within the gacaca system. Scholars, NGO officers, and sexual violence survivors alike advocate that the gacaca system wasis not safe fo SV survivors. For instance, while the National Service of Gacaca Jurisdictions (SNGJ) emphasized the need to mobilize sexual violence survivors to bring cases to court, scholars and NGO officials argued that gacaca as an institution and within the context of the culture in Rwanda lead to further harm for survivors psychologically and physically.30 A 2002 survey by the NURC reports "unanimous agreement…that the risks of testifying female survivors are much greater than those of their male counterparts."31

One key aspect of harm within the gacaca model for sexual violence surviovrs was high risk of further traumatization. One survivor said, "A negative effect of gacaca is that for many people it increases the trauma. Among people who had just found a way to cope with it, I notice a relapse because they must talk about the genocide and they remember the events again."32 Similar to this, Clementine stated "I never went to the gacaca court when [my rapists] were being tried because I could not bear to see them again. I also could not tell the gacaca judges [the truth] because the rapists' supporters would have mocked and intimidated me. I don't want to give them the satisfaction of seeing me traumatized again."33 A report from the Gacaca Jurisdiction in 2005 validates this argument that gacaca led to people experiencing further trauma; however, the statistics are not able to be separated by gender or gacaca crime.34 The 2005 progress report also includes statistics of the number of victims who showed trauma symptoms during trials. According to the report, there were 273 in sector courts, 43 in appeals courts, and 637 during the data collection phase.35 Trauma counsellors have found the majority of survivors reported

increased emotional and psychological suffering after testifying.36 Without engaging in gacaca, scholar Brouneus found that gacaca women survivors already had higher rates of PTSD and depression than men, showing how vulnerable survivors who testified were.37 The National Unity and Reconciliation Commission reported that fifty-eight percent of women report that they have already "suffered too much to be interested in gacaca."38

Adding to the psychological harm experienced, several accounts advocate that survivors also experienced physical dangers following their testimony. Scholars explain that violence serves both to silence witnesses and also to punish "those who make the mistake of testifying."39 NGO leader stated: Victims fear that testifying and consequently exposing their experiences of sexual abuse will lead to community ostracism, ineligibility to marry and other secondary harms not similarly associated with the disclosure of non-sexual wartime assaults."40 Survivors' testimonies echo this. One survivor states, "After [testifying at] gacaca everything has changed because they even dare [to] destroy my house, break my windows."41 Another survivor, who was mass raped during the genocide at the age of 15 and has one child from rape, testified, "I am not safe because the people who hurt me have been released from prison. After [my gacaca testimony] they came. They broke my windows. I was afraid. I thought I would be killed. I do not go to gacaca any longer."42 Another survivor explained that after testifying, community members asked "if she knows when the Interahamwe [the militia men who had raped her] are coming."43 Other survivors share that following their testimonies, perpetrators brought cows to graze on their land plots as a way to jeopardize their access to food and to further humiliate them.44 Yet another survivor states, "When I wanted to testify, they did not want me to give correct testimony, so they tried to make me be quiet...They attacked my home three time successively. Before testifying, there was neither insecurity nor

attacks."45 The 2011 Human Rights Watch report highlights the theme of these testimonies, featuring a significant number of Rwandan SV survivors who voiced concerns about retaliatory actions and renewed violence.46

B. Institutional Failings: The physical danger experienced and the prominence of stigma and social rejection around sexual violence indicate the need for protections for survivors who chose to utilize the gacaca courts. In fact, records by SV leaders tend to document women feeling neglected by the government.47 The government did offer some security for survivors who chose to utilize the courts; however, there lacked proper implementation. For instance, one amendment to the gacaca court laws established that survivors could testify in front of a camera rather than an audience.48 Gacaca also experimented with "women only" courts and courts in which one judge heard a survivor's testimony and then reported it back to the full gacaca court.49 Again, because of inconsistent implementation, many NGOs reported survivors were unaware of the option.50 Even with the ability to testify privately, scholars have argued that gacaca sessions were held in public spaces, so community members were able to see who was entering the building and automatically classify them as a rape victim.51 This in turn resulted in similar stigma and violence as described.

Scholars have argued that even further protections should have been put in place. For instance, NGO officers assert that lack of legal representation for the victim was likely to cause further trauma as the survivors often had little knowledge of the system, undermining her capacity to navigate the legal bureaucracy and defend herself during questioning.52 The lack of trained judges also jeopardized the safety of testimonies, as they did not receive training around handling SV in a survivor-centric manner.53 Scholars argue that victim participation in gacaca was constrained by social attitudes towards sex in Rwanda. One often used line, to emphasize the degree to

which Rwandans do not talk about sex, is: "the words to describe some sexual acts do not even exist in Kinyarwanda."54

C. Distributive Justice: Along with reconciliation, the gacaca courts were also theoretically supposed to provide distributive justice to survivors. Distributive justice is focused on providing support to survivors. Thus, reparations are hailed as a vital component of transitional justice programs because they are the "most victim-centred justice mechanism available."55 The HRW has taken special interest in this topic as a way in which both domestic and international communities might better meet the needs of the rape survivors in post-conflict settings.56 In 1996, organic law mentioned a compensation fund for survivors, which was known as FIND; however, this fund was never officially launched. Draft laws regarding FIND stated that gacaca courts were responsible for compiling lists of damages to survivors and reporting them to FIND. Following, and in accordance with gacaca recommendations, the organization would award reparations. These lists do exist and could have been used to achieve distributive justice; however, due to an insufficient political will and scarce financing, survivors will likely never receive the resources they are entitled to.57

Without said resources, survivors' immediate needs for food, shelter, and health care were often left unmet. Personal narratives demonstrate the need for distributive justice. Emely, a survivor of sexual enslavement and tested HIV-positive stated to HRW, "HIV-positive women who have money simply pay for ARV drugs, but other women can't."58 Another need of survivors living with HIV was transportation to health clinics. This need was particularly prominent among the 90% of the population living in rural areas and also for those who were already too weak to walk.59 Finally, the lack of distributive justice affected the accessibility of the court system. MG, who

was facing severe financial distress due to being too weak to farm because of HIV explained, "I decided to deal with the problems I have . . . I thought about going to [a legal assistance center], but I wanted to be at peace. And that meant dealing with my HIV...and having my baby." Her story demonstrates the compromise women had to make between meeting their health needs and seeking legal redress while surviving on limited resources.[60]

HRW found that one third of the Rwandan rape survivors interviewed were frustrated by the lack of monetary compensation after her perpetrator had been convicted.[61] This statistic contributes to broader notions of justice for survivors of SV, suggesting that compensation would provide women with a stronger sense of justice. Moreover, without survivors' post-genocide needs for health care, food, and shelter being met, survivors were unable to seek legal redress, build their families, careers and communities, and to heal from the trauma. Given that many lost their family and friends during the genocide, the lack of financial resources meant they were without all possible supportive means to assist them in rebuilding their lives. The proper implementation of distributive justice would help mitigate the health and economic effects of violence in post-conflict settings, and provide a desired avenue to justice.

D. Relevance of Structural Violence: Structural violence theorist, Farmer wrote: structural violence describes "social arrangements that put individuals and populations in harm's way."[62] Mullen, structural violence theorist, echoes this saying that structural violence is "built-in" systemic vulnerability and dehumanization.[63] I argue that the psychological trauma and the physical violence endured by survivors who utilized the gacaca system demonstrates the manifestation of structural violence in the form of secondary victimization and punishment of victims. While survivors were seeking justice and resources through the restorative process, they ultimately faced harm without any gained

resources. As scholars asserted, these women faced much greater harm than men who testified. As the research demonstrated, survivors experienced further violation of their human rights following their testimony. While it may seem that individual people are committing interpersonal harm against the women, theorist Kathleen Ho writes that total focus on interpersonal violence obscures the underlying causation of structural violence.[64] Structural violence theorists argue stigma unfolds within contexts of inequitable power relations, and that the stigma that shapes exclusion from social life is rooted in structural processes rather than individual attributes.[65] Theorists have argued that stigmatization is entirely contingent on access to social, economic and political power that allows the identification of differentness.[66] In light of this, I argue then that if SV and the act of speaking out against SV were not rooted in structural violence in the form of unequal power relations between survivors and non-victims, the process would have been more peaceful, and survivors would have experienced less harm.

We witness the reinforcement structural violence and further normalization through the gacaca model as the harassment and endangerment of survivors is not taken seriously. I argue that stricter protective policies that successfully held people accountable for inflicting harm were necessary in order to protect the survivors' human rights. The dichotomy present where survivors testified and in the process had their human rights compromised due to a lack of protective policy and social stigma, suggest that the survivors are the ones who bear the responsibility of the crime when they testify.[67] This is compounded by the fact that perpetrators were often released after survivors' testimonies as part of the gacaca model, causing distress in survivors while providing power back to non-victims.[68] In this phenomenon, I argue structural violence is reinforced as the non-victims are not held responsible for their wrongdoings, a pivotal part

of holding actors within structural violence accountable.69 I argue that the lack of accountability in the legal system and by the government normalizes violent dynamics. Thus, this phenonomon reinforces the power dynamic of sexual violence, whereby women are powerless, men hold the power, and there is the silent actor of structural violence, normalizing these dynamics.

Finally, the lack of distributive justice suggests that it is acceptable for people who were victims of SV to not receive medical care and financial resources. Theorists argue that poverty, as a form of structural violence, reveals in the form of unemployment, lack of education, healthcare, food, and shelter. This violence inflicts suffering on members of society. Especially for those with medical complications following SV, the lack of resources causes further harm to survivors as they are not able to receive medical care. In this case, women were forced to face death or the possibility of it when they were unable to secure HIV treatment. This preventable harm demonstrates structural violence.70 In light of other theorists, I further argue that a lack of resources reinforces structural violence as it forces women to bear the responsibility for men's SV, thus normalizing interpersonal violence against women as well as women not having access to necessary resources.71

PART II: Relevance of Structural Violence within Isange in regards to SV Survivors:
Part II of this paper analyzes the short fallings of Isange named by the UN, as listed in the Introduction, and tested for the relevance of structural violence. The data showed three prominent themes. First, there was a lack of confidence in the victor justice legal system that currently stands. Staff expressed specific ways in which the systematic forensic barriers and cultural norms limit confidence in the legal system. Second, the lack of resources results in survivors not only experiencing the trauma of sexual assault, but moreover, not being

financially empowered to leave a dangerous situation. Finally, there is a lack of collaboration between MIGEPROF's policy work and Isange's grassroots efforts. An analysis of the shortcomings of Isange and the relevance of structural violence allow for a broader understanding of the ways in which structural violence manifests.

A. Legal Barriers: Zero of the thirteen Isange respondents reported legal justice as the strongest method to address SV, showing low levels of confidence in the legal avenue among employees in terms of achieving punitive justice. Importantly, the justice being sought through the modern day court system in Rwanda is focused on victor-punitive, aiming to punish perpetrators because it is what they "deserve."72 This form of justice is often powerful for survivors, as punishing perpetrators can "offer victims the opportunity to affirm the 'wrongness' of the crime committed against them."73 Moreover, punitive justice is linked to deterrent justice, which is the idea that "punishment is necessary, not simply because perpetrators deserve it, but because it should help discourage a convicted perpetrator from committing another crime, for fear of receiving punishment."74 This model of justice compares to the community-centered restorative justice described earlier in gacaca.

Overall, 75% of staff interviewed labelled similar constraints within the legal sector. These include (1) social stigma that caused a barrier for women to tracking abuse through forensic evidence; ; (2) the inability to track longevity of abuse.; (3) gender norms within the courts; (4) lack of financial redistribution. 100% of the doctors and psychologists named the collection of forensic evidence as a barrier. The evidence requires a rape kit, and is necessary to build a strong case against a perpetrator. It is essential for rape kits to be collected while DNA is still available, meaning before the survivor has bathed. 3 of the 13 staff and 2 of the 2 the ministry officers attributed finances as a barrier. For instance, one

doctor explained: "women need to be aware that the Isange clinic has rape kits available, and they must be able to go there during the clinic's workday." 100% of the people interviewed explained that there is serious stigma around the topic of rape, and especially rape inflicted by an intimate partner. One doctor said: "Many believe that it is an issue that should stay within the home, and many will not believe women who claim to have been raped." One police officer validated this saying: "claiming rape often means that women will face social isolation and possibly lose economic opportunities." 75% of staff also alluded to the overarching cultural reality impacting how legal disputes are handled. One employee expressed that federal and local courts make it difficult to prosecute domestic and sexual abuse cases. He explained: the courts are majority men, and traditional, patriarchal marriage values remain, where violence [is believed to be] a private matter.

The data from Isange is supported by other scholarly research in Rwanda. The UN writes: "there are concerns over limited legal assistance [in Rwanda] to victims owing to a lack of forensic evidence to support cases in courts and limited or delayed reporting of VAW cases.75 Scholars found that the necessity of forensic evidence leads to women's hesitation pressing charges. These scholars found that women's hesitation was entrenched in the belief that gender violence should be kept within the household.76 Literature supports the connection between Rwanda's culture of silence and the hesitation around providing forensic evidence. Scholars explain that many Rwandans still have the culture of keeping family secrets to preserve their family's image, undermining their rights and likeliness to report SV.77 Reinforcing the culture of silence, scholars also explain male back-lash patterns, whereby women experience increased conflict within their relationships when husbands felt their roles were challenged. These back-lash patterns ultimately further

undermine women's capacity to seek legal justice.78

The problems expressed within the Rwandan context are not exception, and are contextualized by a common theme within the global pathology of sexual violence, where stigma deters reporting. Scholars found that in Nigeria, social stigmatization leads to under-reporting and thus not collecting forensic evidence. This scholar argues that the lack of forensic evidence adversely affected the prosecutions of perpetrators.79 In South Africa, scholars found that survivors did not seek PREP or report the violence because the fear of being blamed and not receiving social support had profound psychological impact.80 Scholars reported that in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, up to 29% of survivors of sexual violence in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) are rejected by their families and communities.81 This stigmatization and rejection undermines survivors willingness to report violence following. Survivors of SV echo this sentiment all over the world through local press. In 2020, a news article in the United Kingdom was published: "Sexual violence not being reported by asylum seekers due to 'culture of disbelief'."82 A similar article was published in Los Angelos, United States of America, titled: "Rape victims: afraid to report crime; problem for America is to eliminate the stigma of reporting the trauma."83 In Barhain, a news article titled "Social stigma 'barrier to reporting rape crimes'" was published in 2010.84 Though further research would be necessary to draw significant connections between Rwanda and other contexts, this broad examination demonstrates that Rwanda is not exceptional in the struggles it faces regarding SV.

Beyond the minimal forensic evidence report needed to pursue legal justice, research suggests doubt of legal systems as an avenue to correcting and ending SV. While Rwanda has made significant strides including women in decision making bodies, scholars have argued that in Rwanda, "it is 'too simple to assume that

the participation of women will lead directly to fundamental changes in itself and transform "the hegemonic order of the legal system."85 They assert that men's roles as economic providers and decision making authorities in the household hold deep roots continuing to impact legal processes.86 Additionally, in a policy and legal analysis, scholars write that patriarchal norms continue to produce gaps within the legal system. They write:

> Given that men have traditionally controlled household assets and resources, the recent (2013) law, which provides equal ownership of land between wives and husbands, has put many women at risk of domestic violence; their husbands can force them to sign documents when they want to sell land, and women who resist or refuse were reported to experience violence as a result.87

Burnet echoes the sentiment that despite progress at the top, it is still quite difficult for women to claim rights. She explains that strides in gender policy conflict with entrenched patriarchal attitudes that reflect a more traditional society. This means that reforms do not always stretch to all levels of society.88

Challenges accessing the legal system, even with forensic evidence, is echoed in other contexts that prosecute rape as well. In Nigeria, the prosecution of rape is a very demanding exercise, because beyond reliable evidence, the case also needs witnesses. Given that the perpetrator will often stop the violence when someone walks in, finding a witness is difficult. This scholar also reported that the police indulge in poor investigational practices which compromise the prosecution of cases.89 Additionally, health care scholars found that despite the increasing implementation of standardized rape kits across jurisdictions, the medico-legal findings generated by these tools are often not related to positive criminal justice outcomes.90

B. Lack of Resources: 100% of people interviewed stated that there are no readjustment services, including rehabilitation services and/or safe homes. Since neither exists, survivors of violence often return home to the abuse of their partner. Staff explain that when the survivor is economically dependent on her abuser, there is a risk that she will need to continue to be dependent on her abuser. 90% of the employees advocate that abusers withdraw financial support when a survivor reports him. Related to resources, 100% staff expressed that there are communication barriers limiting the work of psychologists and lawyers. Staff explain that communication is an important part of mental health programming because treatment for depression and PTSD takes time to complete. Without the ability to adequately communicate, psychologists cannot follow up with the survivors. Additionally, survivors need to be able to be easily reachable in order for their lawyer to be able to work with them. Similar to psychologists, without accessible communication, lawyers are not able to properly represent and work with their clients. The lack of economic reintegration support as well as the clinic's inability to provide long-term succinct treatment, make clear the ways in which the clinic is not able to empower survivors long term.

This argument is supported by other scholars' research. Literature cites that women in low-income settings have reduced capacity to leave violent situations due to dependence on a husband for financial security.91 Economic factors including women's unemployment, homelessness, food and financial insecurity have been found to constrain women's responses, and ultimately, whether or not a woman had a job was seen as a major factor empowering her to leave a violent situation. Moreover, reporting the violence led to negative financial implications because the husband would be put in jail, which would end his ability to provide for his family, and thus lead to food insecurity and homelessness.92 Other scholars

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support these arguments explaining that resource-limited programs have limited capacity to support survivors in obtaining safety, since they do not have access to formal shelter systems or emergency food networks.93 A published article for the United Nations advocates that the government of Rwanda needs to continue to raise awareness of the fight against violence against women, and follow up on the socio-economic reintegration of victims.94

C. The Tensions between Policy and Cultural Norms: 100% of Isange staff were unaware of MIGEPROF's economic empowerment initiative that promotes technical school education for young women. Though this does not directly relate to the health aspect of GBV, economic inequalities are a driving force of GBV. Perhaps, Isange and MIGEPROF could collaborate on this initiative together. Nine of the thirteen staff stated advocacy and sensitization campaigns as a means to address and end SV, showing great optimism in community-wide efforts. That said, 100% of staff interviewed did not know of any modern-day campaign work addressing SV. This compares to the 2 of the 2 ministry officers' stated that there is a "zero tolerance" to GBV across all sectors and an anti-GBV law which provides severe punishment for all GBV policy. Of course, as explained earlier, there are several shortfallings to this legal policy.

The discrepancies within the Isange staff responses and the MIGEPROF responses are significant because they demonstrate a gap in collaboration, and therefore a gap in ending SV. Scholars advocate for close partnerships between nonprofits and government agencies in order to create gender equitable policies, and to promote strong outcomes within agencies that address SV.95 Close collaboration facilitates a strong evidence base that supports policy, practice, monitoring and evaluation at all levels. Scholars advocate that close partnerships also enable effective educational community wide

campaign work, because bottom-up campaign work allows for the roots of SV to be addressed.96 For instance, involving men in redefining masculinity in order to shift public opinion about SV, rather than top-down pressure on men to change their behaviors.97 The UN echoes this stating: widespread messaging on GBV through community media platforms ensures that the root causes of GBV are directly targeted. Close collaboration allows for cultural appropriateness. The UN advocates that this messaging is therefore has been most effectively done with all sectors of society involved—from health providers to government stakeholders.98

D. Relevance of Structural Violence I argue that the gaps explored within Isange demonstrate the manifestation of structural violence. First, similar to during gacaca, where women faced much greater harm than men who testified, women are faced at a disposition in the modern day when they pursue legal justice, since harmful stigma continues to exist. In this case, the stigma debilitates: due to this barrier, women's capacity to utilize the court system to pursue safety is undermined. Through the structural violence lens, I argue that this stigma is rooted in structural processes rather than individual attributes. As argued in Part D of Part I, stigma is rooted in structural violence.99 In light of this, I argue tthat if power structures between survivors and non-victims were equal, the act of speaking out against rape would not cause stigmatization, and so the process would be more peaceful, and survivors experience less harm. While further data needs to be collected on the intricacies of Rwanda's legal system, I argue that the lack of confidence in the legal system demonstrates structural violence as well. Farmer writes that structural violence manifests as a lack of legal standing.100 Theorists DD Winter and D.C Leighton write: "Structural violence occurs whenever people are disadvantaged by political, legal, economic or cultural traditions."101 The lack of confidence

in the legal system, and the correspondent lack of empowerment to utilize the legal system, as well as the ways in which cultural traditions inhibit women's power all compromise survivors' legal standing. Therefore, structural violence implicitly strips survivors of their capacity to pursue legal justice.

I argue that the lack of economic resources for survivors of SV also demonstrates the manifestation of structural violence. Theorists explain poverty, as a form of structural violence, reveals in the form of unemployment, lack of education, healthcare, food, and shelter.102 This violence inflicts suffering on members of society. In this case, the survivors of SV experience this form of structural violence as many are not able to mobilize out of violence relationships due to a lack of resources. With a lack of resources present, and with women therefore needing to accept abusers' resources, inequitable gender norms are normalized and reinforced. The lack of resources therefore causes further harm to women that is completely preventable, revealing structural violence.103 Moreover, in light of other theorists, I argue that similar to gacaca, a lack of resources reinforces structural violence as it forces women to bear the responsibility for men's SV. This ultimately leads to continued harm against women and further normalizes interpersonal violence against women.104

I argue that the lack of collaboration and between Isange and the government and the need for greater education reflect how society allows structural violence through the form of SV to continue to manifest. Drawing from Galtung, structural violence is a social structure that perpetuates inequality, thus causing preventable suffering. Applying a structural violence lens, I argue that social stratification—systems where people who don't have access to things required to fulfil their needs—is at play here. DD Winter and DC Leighton write: "Because they are longstanding, structural inequities usually seem ordinary, the way things are and always have been."105 Further research

is needed to establish what is going on that is causing the gaps in funding, such as whether it is a lack of financial investment on behalf of the Rwandan government or a lack of financial investment by other stake-holders. Regardless, I argue that the lack of collaboration and grassroots campaign and education work enables SV to continue to manifest. In this case, the way society has been—where the MIGEPROF and non-profits do not collaborate to end SV, and where country-wide education is not implemented—ultimately enables further SV against women. There is not necessarily an individual perpetrator to hold morally responsible, but rather, the lack of collaboration and grassroots support enables continued vulnerability for women. These social arrangements ultimately put individuals and populations in harm's way, and therefore demonstrate structural violence.106 Moreover, I argue that the continued passivity enables the normalization of violence against women, thereby reinforcing structural violence.

Conclusion: This paper provided an in-depth analysis of two government-sponsored community organizations in Rwanda that provide(d) access to legal justice and resources for survivors of SV. This paper analyzed the ways in which unequal power dynamics have manifested. While steps have been made in an attempt to tackle the issue of SV against women, gaps limit the extent to which structures are truly affected. This structural violence discussed consequently results in harm in survivors' social, economic, and health realities. In line with Crenshaw's theory of intersectionality, women survivors' of lower class are particularly disadvantaged. This disadvantage is rooted in structural violence enabling the manifestation of patriarchal norms that undermine women as well as structural violence that limits access to opportunities based on class. Further research is necessary to test for the relevance of other manifestations of structural violence in the organizations, such as

white supremacism and homophobia. Ultimately, Isange and gacaca provide us with further context in order to understand overall themes present within the global pathology of SV. Going forward, in order to make strides within this pathology that is entrenched in structural violence, there is a clear need for preventable problems to be examined. Isange and gacaca provide insight into the ways in which survivor-centered support, educational campaigns, coordination between Government ministries and nonprofits working with SV, and the allocation of further resources could be utilized to better tackle the issue of SV.

In imagining the approach to ending SV, whether in our own US communities or in global communities, understanding the role of structural violence allows us to strategically target powerful forces operating within the institution of family, state, and civil society.107 According to the theory of structuration, group action plays into the dynamic relationship between societal members and overarching structures.108 Whether in Rwanda or elsewhere, there is a need to determine how both internal and external agents can be used to challenge structure violence, and therefore empower victims of it, and ideally, motivate and inspire political will that reduces the harm perpetrated by it.109 I argue then that the naming of the relevance of structural violence, enables the opportunity to re-imagine how SV issues are approached, and will allow for stronger community organization. This will therefore help to cultivate necessary pressure on overarching structures that will assist in revolutionizing the global SV pathology.110 Where structural violence is relevant, we know that preventable problems manifest. Through structuration, we have the capacity to address these problems —on large and small scales— ultimately providing opportunity to improve the pathology of SV, and reduce physical, mental, social, and economic harm experienced by survivors.

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The Intersectional Experience of *Ndi Umunyarwanda*: An Interdisciplinary Analysis of Identity & Removing Ubwoko in Rwanda

ROZLYN M. PARADIS

Abstract

Hutu, Tutsi and Twa: These different *amoko* ("kinds" in Kinyarwanda) have shaped Rwandans' identities for centuries. Modern components include post-genocide identities and the individuals' degree of Rwandaness. Through 11 in-field interviews conducted in 2017, Rwandans' experience of the Ndi Umunyrwanda program was analyzed through the intersections of these identities. The "I am Rwandan" program was a government-sponsored, nationalistic campaign that promoted similarities in response to the Genocide against the Tutsi in 1994. It removed *amoko* from the public sphere for the sake of unity which, through this paper, was proven detrimental to vulnerable intersects of Rwandans.

Introduction

Rwanda has faced decades of conflict between three groups of Rwandans: the Abahutu, Abatutsi and Abatwa, which cumulated in 1994 with the Genocide against the Tutsi. Belgians colonized Rwanda in 1916 and enacted a "divide and rule" form of domination. The colonizers favored Abatutsi in government and education while synonymizing the Hutu identity with "second-hand citizens." The Abahutu were 85 percent of the Rwandan population and, in the 1950's began to use that to their advantage.[1] Violence sparked as Abahutu rose up and killed hundreds of Abatutsi, marking the Hutu Revolution lasting from 1959 to 1961. This period signified the end of Tutsi domination and increase tension between the Hutu and Tutsi.[2]

In the wake of the Hutu Revolution and as other countries announced independence (i.e. Congo independence in 1960 from Belgium and Tanzania in 1962 from British control), the Belgians quickly switched support in favor of the majority: the Abahutu. On July 1, 1962, Rwanda became an independent state.[3] The Abahutu used their power to continue marginalization of Abatutsi, eventually leading to the official peace agreement, the Arusha Peace Accords in 1991. This agreement aimed to make peace between the Hutu-led government of Rwanda and the predominately-Tutsi Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF).[4] During the 100 short days of the Genocide against the Tutsi in April 1994, the United Nations

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[1] Mahmood Mamdani, *When Victims Become Killers* (Princeton & Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2001).

[2] "Rwanda: A Brief History of the Country," United Nations, accessed October 2, 2018, http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/rwanda/education/rwandagenocide.shtml

[3] "Independence," The World Fact Book, CIA, accessed September 30, 2018. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2088.html.

[4] "Peace Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front," Document Retrieval, United Nations, accessed October 2, 2018, https://peacemaker.un.org/rwanda-peaceagreementrpf93.

officially reports more than 800,000[5] Rwandans were slaughtered by machete; the National Commission for the Fight Against the Genocide (CNGL) in Rwanda states 1,070,014 deaths.[6]

Rwanda looks toward a peaceful future and sets outs to heal from the atrocities that had plagued the country for decades. Numerous grass roots and government-sponsored programs have worked to encourage forgiveness and create peace in the country.

Soon after the genocide ended, the country sought justice for victims and victims' families through a traditional, grass roots form of community healing: the Gacaca Courts. In Gacaca Courts proceedings, which were led by respected community leaders, "priority was given to Rwanda reconciliatory norms and values, namely admission, repentance, apology and forgiveness."[7] In order to modernize and adapt to the more serious crimes which Gacaca Courts were being adapted for, an added form of punishment was introduced.

If perpetrators share their whole truth including the wrongdoings they committed as well as any other wrongdoings they had knowledge of, they were rewarded with half their prison sentence, with the rest spent in *Travail d'Interest Generale* (TIG; "works of general service"). TIG was a restorative alternative to imprisonment that focused on rebuilding: physically rebuilding the

communities that were destroyed and rebuilding mindsets through educational programs, destroying genocidal ideologies and promoting reintroduction into society.

Compulsory, government-led introduced and led programs like *Ubudehe*, *Umunganda* and *Ndi Umunyarwanda*[8] provided opportunity for community-centered reconciliation, support and self-reliance. *Ubudehe* was introduced as village-level community work "targeted at general poverty alleviation buil[t] on traditional practices of communal crop planting or house building – and is thus labelled 'a homegrown solution rooted in Rwanda's culture' (NURC 2007: 96)"[9] Similarly, *Umunganda* began to provide government-required, monthly communal work supporting the community. The work could include cleaning public spaces, filling potholes or building roads, maintaining drainage, planting flowers and more.

To complement the actioned-based programs outlined above, is *Ndi Umunyarwanda*.
Ndi Umunyarwanda is a nationalistic unity campaign that emphasizes a pre-colonial Rwandan identify over anything else, specifically targeting an override on one's *ubwoko* (*ubwoko* means "kind" in Kinyarwanda, in this context it is the categorization of Hutu,

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[5] United Nations, "Rwanda: A Brief History of the Country."

[6] "Background," National Commission for the Fight Against the Genocide, accessed August 17, 2018, http://www.cnlg.gov.rw/genocide/background/?L=0

[7] Callixte Kavuro, "Gacaca Courts, Reconciliation and the Politics of Apology in Post-Genocide Rwanda," *South African Journal of Criminal Justice* 30, no. 1 (2017): 43.

[8] *Ndi Umunyarwanda* (n-də oo-moon-ē-ruh-WAHN-duh) translates to "I am Rwandan"

[9] "Becoming Rwandan? The Impact of Two Decades of Unity Policies on the Batwa," Communauté des Potiers du Rwanda, the Institute of Research and Dialogue for Peace and Tilburg University, the Netherlands, accessed July 12, 2020, http://www.kaowarsom.be/documents/PDF%20 BULLETIN/GOODWIN.pdf; "The National Policy on Unity and Reconciliation," Republic of Rwanda, National Unity and Reconciliation Commission, 2007, accessed August, 29, 2018, http://www.nurc.gov.rw/index.php?id=70&no_c ache=1&tx_drblob_pi1%5BdownloadUid %5D =26.

Tutsi or Twa, defined in more detail later).[10] This program emphasized that the most important part of one's identity is their Rwandaness. It not only emphasizes similarities and denounces difference but simultaneously calls upon Hutu individuals to apologize for the actions of their ancestors, something that will be described more in depth later in the paper.

As nationality is emphasized, the *Ndi Umunyarwanda* program and other reconciliation efforts fail to support other intersections of Rwandans' identities, the hundreds of other components that create unique experiences. Intersectionality is the study of the interconnected nature of all the components of identity and social categorization working together to create these experiences. These categories include (but are not limited to) race, class and gender and individuals can move between different categories and the boundaries of each category can adjust over time to include more or different individuals. Some parts of identity cannot be separated from others, creating a mutually inclusive experience. The *Ndi Umunyarwanda* program will be analyzed through 11 in-field interviews under the lens of intersectionality and mutual inclusivity to create a full understanding of different people's experiences with the program and its overall effectiveness.

Research Methodology: Existing literature, theories and insights from multiple disciplines evaluated individual experiences with the *Ndi Umunyarwanda* program. The main source of data comes from eleven in-field interviews which were conducted over three weeks in April and May of 2017. Eight interviews were done in Kigali, Rwanda and three in Butare, Rwanda. The interviewees consisted of local academics, political officials and general citizens. The three groups were chosen to gain perspective on the way ethnicity was being taught, how it affected leaderships and how it was perceived at the citizen level. The individuals discussed identity politics in 30- to 120-minute informal, semi-structured interviews. These individuals were interviewed on the basis of understanding what ethnicity meant to them on a personal or profession-based level and observed political and cultural implications of these identities.

Eight of the interviews were conducted in English; three in Kinyarwanda. The interview in Kinyarwanda conducted in Butare, Rwanda was translated by a professor, Dr. Bernard Rutikanga while the two interviews conducted in Kigali were translated by a trilingual student, Margot Manuella. Interviewees gave permission to be recorded which were later transcribed and analyzed with ethnographic research methods and from a symbolic interactionist perspective. After demographic questions and relevant background information (as identified by the informant), the informant was asked to define how they understood the term "ethnicity." Individuals answered with definitions, personal statements and historical recaps of the terms' usage in Rwanda. Following, interview questions were taken from a prepared list. The informants had not seen the questions before the interview. Interviews were fluid and the informant directed the conversation with their answers. An example list of prepared questions is included in the appendix.

Taboo's surrounding the Hutu, Tutsi and Twa identities were respected as these terms can be offensive or triggering to individuals. One's *ubwoko* (kind, or again, in this context the Hutu, Tutsi or Twa categorization) affiliation was never assumed, guessed or questioned directly. Based on the subject of the interviews being ethnicity, it was often disclosed organically then attached to the respondent's ideologies.

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[10] Victor Visathan, "'*Ndi Umunarwanda*,' concept should be a legacy for posterity," *New Times*, March 26, 2015.

The two essential components in this study are *ubwoko* and post-genocide identities. The strength of Rwandan identity will be noted during the analysis of the interviews. Age is a variable that is only used to differentiate those alive during the genocide from those born after. Although class, political affiliation and occupation could correlate with one's *ubwoko* and post- genocide identity, for simplification, these will not be evaluated. Gender is not addressed due to the lack of representation in the sample group.

Limitations: Budget, time and travel all posed limitations. As an undergraduate student studying abroad, time was limited to two months of preparation, three weeks of interviewing and one month of in-country analysis. Positionality of the interviewer and the official government stance on this topic assuredly impacted responses. Ten of the 11 interviewees were men and no one interviewed identified as Twa. Travel limitations only allowed for interviews in two cities in Rwanda: Kigali and Butare. Both cities played key roles in the conflict as violence initially erupted in Kigali and reports suggest the most extensive slaughter in Butare. In 1994 and at the time of the interviews, Kigali and Butare were the largest cities in Rwanda granting it's citizens easier access to public resources, education and political supervision.

Limitations are important to note to qualify potential response bias and the note the sample was not representative of all intersections. This research is the beginning to further research on experience with this program, as it is not expansive to all Rwandans. These limitations do not discredit this research because it only analyzes the intersections that are represented and do not discuss experiences based off of gender. Overall this research is credible within its scope.

Interdisciplinarity: The evaluation of the individual experience with the *Ndi Umunyarwanda* in Rwanda satisfies all conditions calling for interdisciplinarity as outlined by Allen F. Repko and Rick Szostak: it is complex, requires two or more disciplines offering insights and works to explain an unresolved societal problem.[11]

For example, understanding the individual's experience with the *Ndi Umunyarwanda* program is complex: including the concept of identity, intersectionality, defining and removing *ubwoko,* understanding the *Ndi Umunyarwanda* program and evaluating the words of Rwandans. Many disciplines are consulted to understand these complexities but the volume of literature on specific to the program is limited due to the program's young age. Anthropological studies, historical explanations and political science rationalizations attempt to justify ideologies of the Abahutu, Abatutsi and Abatwa identities but remains incomplete and contradictory, leaving the understanding of Rwandan identity unsolved. Written literature on the program is sparse and field interviews gather testimonies from genocidal experience more often than the post-genocide era.[12] There is a hole in academic understanding that can be filled through this analysis.

Complexities and Themes
Identity, Intersectionality and Mutual Inclusivity: Identity is complex; it is composed of gender, race, ethnicity, sexuality, dis/ability,

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[11] Allen F. Repko and Rick Szostak, *Interdisciplinary Research: Process and Theory* (Los Angeles: SAGE Publications, 2017), 93.

[12] See Phillip Gourevitch, *We wish to inform you that tomorrow we will be killed with our families: Stories from Rwanda* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1998).

age, religion, socioeconomic status, political affiliation, power domain, family status, occupation and more.[13] Based in sociology, identity is socially constructed: a person cannot be separated from the people, historical events and social circumstances that surrounds them, particularly through socialization and the social groups within which one identifies. The plurality of social groups intersects, making unique circumstances for all individuals, the main premise of intersectionality.

Intersectionality is a method of analyzing the immense complexities in human experience through axis of social division and complex discrimination.[14] Different social belongings do not create identities that are "alternatives but combinations."[15] These layers of identity "operate not as discrete and mutually exclusive entities but build on each other and work together."[16]

The intersections of identity are cohesive facets to one's being and experience. For example, a black woman can never disassociate between her gender and her race; every experience she has is a combination of the two— as black and as a woman.[17] For this person, these two parts of identity are mutually inclusive. Mutual inclusivity relates to this

study: For example, a Hutu bystander can never have an experience as just a Hutu (*ubwoko*) or just a bystander (post-genocide identity), they will always be both and their lived experiences and ideologies will reflect that combination.

Over time, boundaries of groups are dynamic: they eb and flow to include or exclude others, often through the constant developing and overlapping intersectional identities and shared experiences identities and shared experiences.[18] The multiple dimensions and understandings of human experiences are unique to an individual and can also expand across a group of individuals who have the same or similar intersections and create dialogue between different intersections. In other cases, it can cause mistrust, blame and stagnation.[19]

In the context of Rwanda, "'Hutu' and 'Tutsi' are ancient terms with changing meanings; terms that diachronically (across time) evolve and synchronically (at a point in time) polyvalent."[20] The two essential components of identity for this study are *ubwoko* and post-genocide identities, which over time have flowed into overlapping and mutual inclusive duos.

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[13] David Newman, *Sociology: Exploring the architecture of everyday life.* (Los Angeles: SAGE Publications, 2014).

[14] Patricia Hill Collins and Sirma Bilge, *Intersectionality* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2016).

[15] Caroline Andrew, "Multiculturalism, gender, and social cohesion: Reflections on intersectionality and urban citizenship in Canada." In *Insiders and outsiders: Alan Cairns and the reshaping of Canadian Citizenship*, ed. Philip Resnick & Gerald Kernerman (Vancouver: U of British Columbia P, 2005), 317.

[16] Collins and Bilge, *Intersectionality* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2016), 4.

[17] Kimberle Crenshaw, "Mapping the margins: Intersectionality, identity politics, and violence against women of color," *Stanford Law Review* 43, no. 6 (July 1991): 1241-1299.

[18] Fredrik Barth, "Introduction," in *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries*, ed. Fredrik Barth (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1969).

[19] Ervin Staub, Laurie Anne Pearlman, and Vachel Miller. "Healing the Roots of Genocide in Rwanda." *Peace Review* 15, no., 3 (2003): 287-94.

[20] Andrea Purdeková, ""Building a nation in Rwanda? De-ethnicisation and its discontents," *Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism* 8 no. 3 (December 2008): 512.

Ubwoko: *Ubwoko* is pertinent to identity and references Hutu, Tutsi and Twa categorization.[21] The Abahutu, Abatutsi and Abatwa were historically perceived to be widely different from one another.[22] These "differences" were exacerbated by colonial rule and shaped individual experience, determining the fate of their descendants.

As once a distinction of profession and wealth—the Abatutsi were wealthy pastoralists, the Abatwa poor forest dwellers and the Abahutu were agriculturalists somewhere in between—*ubwoko* evolved to being much more.[23] Observed differences between these groups were well recorded and diverse, including height, weight, nose size, skin color, lactose in/tolerance and more.[24]

Before colonization, *amoko* was associated with one's clan.[25] During and after, the term became synonymous to the Abahutu, Abatutsi and Abatwa categorization.[26] *Ubwoko* is translated as ethnicity, genre, tribe and type, but the most authentic translation from Kinyarwanda to English is "kind." Every noun in Kinyarwanda has a "kind," as described by Informant IX in an interview conducted by the author in Kigali on May 3, 2017:

> Ethnicity, if you try to put it into Kinyarwanda, it is called *ubwoko.* And everything, it has ubwoko – even animals, computers – when you try to translate *ubwoko* into English, the meaning is not ethnicity, it is kind . . . This pen has ubwoko, this computer has ubwoko, this guy has ubwoko. It is confusing, it could mean different things.

Informant IX continues to discuss the confusion that began when Rwanda was colonized:

> But when the colonials came here, they brought ethnicity with its meaning of same culture, same background but here it was different…It was one people with one culture, we speak the same language. It means that, if we take the real meaning of ethnicity, our ethnic group should be Rwandanism – not Hutu and Tutsi. But people confused "kind" and "ethnicity." We used to say we have three groups, which is based on the truth. [Three ethnicities are not based on truth.] But genocide happened because of this confusion of ethnicities.

As described by Informant IX, colonizing Belgians noticed differences and labeled Hutu, Tutsi and Twa as ethnic groups. The Westernized concept of ethnicity was directly applied to these groups.[27] Differentiating one's "kind" as one's "ethnicity"

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[21] Lee Ann Fujii, *Killing neighbors: Webs of violence in Rwanda* (Ithica: Cornell University Press, 2009).

[22] See Mamdani, *When Victims Become Killers*; Newbury, "Ethnicity"; Purdeková, ""Building,"; Straub, Pearlman and Miller, "Healing the roots of genocide in Rwanda"; Vansina, "The politics," 37-44.

[23] See Mamdani, *When Victims Become Killers*; Amini Jean de Dieu Ngabonziza, "The Importance of Language Studies in Conflict Resolution." *Journal of African Conflicts and Peace Studies* 2, no. 1 (September 2013). White, "An African," 40-46.

[24] See Mamdani, *When Victims Become Killers*; Dean White, "An African Holocaust," *History Today* 64, no. 6 (June 2014): 40-46; Aimable Twagilimana, *The Debris of Ham: Ethnicity, Regionalism, and the 1994 Rwandan Genocide*, (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2003).

[25] *Ubwoko*, singular, means "kind;" *amoko*, plural, means "kinds."

[26] Fujii, *Killing neighbors: Webs of violence in Rwanda.*

[27] Wielenga, "'Lived,'" 122-136.

brought different implications to Rwandans: An ethnic group consists of people who share human behavior and culture. This gives members a sense of belonging to the ethnic group through shared practices, traditions and rituals.[28] Far and wide, ethnicity is described as a common culture, language, region, values and beliefs.[29] This definition was confirmed as a belief by multiple informants, specifically Informant V, interviewed by the author in Kigali on April 26, 2017: "Ethnicity is, I consider, as beliefs, cultures and perspectives that define a certain section of people. That brings them together and determines who the people of that section are and their origins."

When asked, however, how this applies to the differences between Hutu, Tutsi and Twa categorizations, the vital notions of "ethnicity" and "*ubwoko*" were lost in translation. It was quickly denounced by Informant X, interviewed in Kigali on May 3, 2017, that Hutu, Tutsi and Twa were ethnically different:

> No. Absolutely no. I think that here, the context of Rwanda does not have this ethnicity. How would you define people that are speaking one language, they don't have a second language, they have one culture, they have one leadership? … How would you explain to me that, you know? … But in Rwanda, [different ethnicities?] No way. No way![30]

The argument proposed by informants is confirmed in existing literature.[31] Despite these arguments, it must be stated: "ethnic diversity is socially articulated and maintained."[32] Belgians imposed their concept of ethnicity onto Rwandan culture and emphasized social difference between the "kinds." After independence, the Rwandan government maintained the groups as ethnicities. The social hierarchy was cemented and maintaining this "ethnic diversity" served as the path of least resistance for society's continuation.[33]

Barth emphasizes ethnicity is not

Figure 1: Post-Genocide Identities		
Term	Definition	*Ubwoko* Affiliation
survivor	any Tutsi who survived	Tutsi
perpetrator	individual who victimized the Abatutsi	Hutu, sometimes Twa
bystander	were not victims, did not add to or stop victimization	Hutu, Twa
Refugee	individual who fled from 1959 to 1994	Tutsi
Rescuer	individual who helped Abatutsi survive	Hutu, sometimes Twa
not born	those born after July 1, 1994	Rwandan

concrete categorization based on promordial blood lines, but is dynamic human collection seen as "a population which … has a membership which identifies itself, and is identified by others, as constituting a category distinguishable from other categories of the same order."[34] Hutu, Tutsi and Twa fell into this definition: the populations identified themselves and could identify others, and were distinguishable through physical appearance, economic status or association.

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[28] Barth, "Introduction."

[29] White, "An African," 40-46.; Wielenga, "'Lived,'" 122-136; Straub, Pearlman and Miller, "Healing the roots of genocide in Rwanda"; Mamdani, *When Victims Become Killers.*

[30] Informant X, interview by author, Kigali, Rwanda, May 3, 2017.

[31] See White, "An African," 40-46; Twagilimana, *The Debris of Ham.*

[32] Harald Eidheim, "When ethnic identity is a social stigma," in *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries*, ed. Fredrik Barth (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1969), 39.

[33] Eidheim, "When ethnic," 39; see White, "An African," 40-46; Mamdani, *When Victims Become Killers*; Fujii, *Killing neighbors: Webs of violence in Rwanda.*

[34] Barth, "Introduction," 11.

Though, the non-social or economic status distinguishable traits were the ones exacerbated and misinformed by colonial rule. Hutu, Tutsi and Twa were reified from a fluid categorization of class to biological differences based on physical generalizations which resulted in a socially constructed division deemed "ethnic." Falsely using the term "ethnicity" allowed colonists to skirt responsibility for the division, while successfully executing their "divide and rule" methodology to gain control of a population that was once in, at the very least, peaceful coexistence.

Regardless of the ethnicity debate, Hutu, Tutsi and Twa identities are significant to the history of Rwanda and to individual experience. Therefore, the term *ubwoko* alleviates confusion with definitions of ethnicity and best highlights the differences between the groups without imposing Western ideologies or emphasizing misinterpreted values.[35] *Ubwoko* allows a more honest evaluation of their current implications, especially in relation to lived experiences with *Ndi Umunyarwanda*, a program that seeks unification through the erasure of the Hutu, Tutsi and Twa identities.

Post-Genocide Identities: Another sect of Rwandan identity are post-genocide identities. There are six post-genocide identities used based on informants: survivors, perpetrator, bystander, refugee, rescuer and those not born. Identities were prescribed to individuals based upon involvement in the Genocide against the Tutsi. They are outlined in *Figure 1: Post-Genocide Identities*.

The categories are defined as follows: A survivor survived the genocide; to officially be recognized by the Rwandan government as a survivor, the individual can only be Tutsi (not Hutu or Twa). A perpetrator committed acts of genocide (ideation, vandalism, rape, murder, etc.). Bystanders were not victims nor added or prevented the victimization of Abatutsi. Refugees fled Rwanda during the official beginning of the conflict in 1959 through the end of the genocide in 1994. A rescuer saved Abatutsi victims. Finally, those who were categorized as unborn were born after July 1, 1994.

The affiliation of post-genocide identities with historic *ubwoko* create complexities (see final column in *Figure 1: Post-Genocide Identities*). *Ubwoko* is prohibited from applications for education, government office or employment. In contrast, post-genocide identities are not forbidden and can actually grant or deny access to certain resources like health care and welfare for survivors.[36] While Abatutsi/survivors are receiving healthcare benefits, all Abahutu are presumed to have been perpetrators.[37] *Ubwoko* was eliminated from government discourse to avoid inequalities and stigmatization but post-genocide identities creates different treatment and are directly aligned with *ubwoko*.

Between individuals in modern-day Rwanda "[all] parties try to behave as if ethnicity 'does not count.'"[38] Despite their behavior, "[Rwandans] caution that ethnicity is as present as ever in Rwanda. They believe that if Rwandans do not use the words 'Tutsi' and 'Hutu,' it is because they have found other ways of saying them."[39] Another way to say them in

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[35] Sigrun Marie Moss, "Beyond Conflict and Spoilt Identities: How Rwandan Leaders Justify a Single Recategorization Model for Post-Conflict Reconciliation," in *Journal of Social and Political Psychology* 2, no. 1 (2014): 435–449; Moss and Vollhardt, "'You Can't."

[36] "Health and Social Welfare," Republic of Rwanda, accessed April 14, 2018, http://gov.rw/about-the- government/health-and-social-welfare/
[37] See Eidheim, "When ethnic."
[38] Eidheim, "When ethnic," 54.
[39] Mbaraga, "State pushes."

through these post-genocide identities which follow *ubwoko* lines consistently.

These intersections of identity create multiple lenses of experience with the *Ndi Umunyarwanda* program. The complexities discussed in this section are pertinent to the unique experiences Rwandans have had with the program.

Understanding the *Ndi Umunyarwand*a program's situation: The understanding of the *Ndi Umunyarwanda* program was synthesized from multiple sources. There is no official English version describing the program and literature surrounding the topic is limited.

Ndi Umunyarwanda was conceived at a Youth Connekt event in 2013 and officially launched and adopted as a national campaign by the National Unity of Reconciliation Committee (NURC) within months.[40] and under it, President Kagame "called for young adults of Hutu descent to apologise for acts of genocide committed 'in their name' by their parents and relatives."[41]

According to the NURC, the program is described as follows:

"[*Ndi Umunyarwanda*] provides a forum or space for Rwandans in various social groups to discuss issues related to national unity, reconciliation and development. The program encompasses both the atrocities of the divisive past and the hope for a peaceful, reconciled and reunited country. Not all Rwandans need settle on a single interpretation, but the task is to work toward mutually acceptable accommodation. Ndi Umunyarwanda program is such a normative shift. By focusing on a shared citizenship – citizenship as a shared fate – the program restores the bond and solidarity between Rwandans."[42]

The program, as described above, encapsulates much of the public knowledge known about this program. As commented on by other scholars, details and descriptions of the program are scarce. Information translated into English is nearly nonexistent. [43]

The information that we have, however, can be discussed more in depth. First and foremost, the program calls "for young adults of Hutu descent to apologise for acts of genocide committed 'in their name' by their parents and relatives" which perpetuates a culture of apology established with the modernized Gacaca Courts, as previously discussed. [44] Since Hutu perpetrators were in the spotlight of these events, they did not have the analytical freedom

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[40] Robert Mbaraga, "State pushes campaign that critics say it is ethnically divisive," *The East African,* November 16, 2013, http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/rwanda/News/Mixed-reactions-to--Ndi-Umunyarwanda-initiative-/1433218-2075366-cjnwygz/index.html.
[41] Callixte Kavuro, "Gacaca Courts, Reconciliation and the Politics of Apology in Post-Genocide Rwanda," South African Journal of Criminal Justice 30, no. 1 (2017): 44.
[42] Republic of Rwanda, "The National Policy on Unity and Reconciliation," 112.

[43] See Catharine Newbury, "Ethnicity and the politics of history in Rwanda." *Africa Today* 45, no. 1 (Jan. – Mar. 1998); Jan Vansina, "The politics of history and the crisis in the Great Lakes," *Africa Today* 45, no. 1 (March 1998): 37-44.; "Geography," Republic of Rwanda, last modified 2017, http://gov.rw/home/geography/; Communauté des Potiers du Rwanda, "Becoming Rwandan?"
[44] Callixte Kavuro, "Gacaca Courts, Reconciliation and the Politics of Apology in Post-Genocide Rwanda," South African Journal of Criminal Justice 30, no. 1 (2017): 44.

to understand the contents of the programs and were only expected to confess and apologize.

Furthermore, although the program called for a forum for Rwandans to establish an agreed upon history and speak openly about the problems that have resulted from it, details of how the *Ndi Umunyarwanda* program is executed is vague.[45] The implementation of this nation-building encourages discussion and "a deep, 'experiential' understanding" for their participants of the past and their re-socialized identities."[46] However, through conversations it appears that the program is concretely built around "a series of messages drawn up by the NURC and communicated in the context of other programmes…[and] also within the compulsory public meetings that take place at village level. These descriptions portray this communication as less a dialogue than a top-down lesson on what it is to be Rwandan today."[47]

The top-down dialogue works to make "people believe a story of the past they are not allowed to contribute to."[48] The messaging within this story establishes "a shared moral atrocity of members of the Hutu community,"

furthering othering and villianizing the Hutu perpetrators.[49]

Ironically, with its emphasis on Hutu accountability, another of its objectives was to emphasize Rwandan identity over everything else and remove the use of one's *ubwoko* in the official, public sphere. "If ethnic hatred was to be overcome and further violence prevented, it was necessary to replace ethnic division with something else."[50] Through national unity, the program worked to shift belonging from *ubwoko* to national identity and centered around "Rwanda's moral values and Rwandan spirit" and "the replac[ement] of ethnic identity with civic identity."[51] An Executive Summary sponsored by the Rwandan government states that the program "is perceived as an effective mechanism to rehabilitate Rwandanity."[52] However, many scholars beg to differ.

This program's legitimacy is "highly criticized" and questioned by many Western scholars and other populations.[53] It is said to be built on fabricated unity that minimizes differences between Rwandans and "the emphasis on national unity has been used as a tool by the RPF-based elite for entrenching their

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[45] Mbaraga, "State pushes."

[46] Ervin Straub, Laurie Anne Pearlman and Vachel Miller, "Healing the roots of genocide in Rwanda," *Peace Review* 15, no. 3 (2003): 290.

[47] Communauté des Potiers du Rwanda, "Becoming Rwandan?" 4.

[48] Purdeková, ""Building,"; 512.

[49] Kavuro, "Gacaca Courts," 44.

[50] Communauté des Potiers du Rwanda, "Becoming Rwandan?" 1.

[51] Cori Wielenga, "'Lived' Identities in Rwanda: Beyond Ethnicity?" *African Insight,* 44, no. 1 (June 2014): 122-136; Kavuro, "Gacaca Courts," 44.

[52] Rwandan Government. *Executive Summary: Ndi Umunyarwanda Evaluation*, 2017.

[53] Edmund Kagire, "Initiators, officials defend genocide forgiveness campaign," *The East*

African, August 3, 2013, http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/Rwanda/News/Initiators-officials-defend-genocide-forgiveness-campaign-/-/1433218/1935194/-/kbvl1az/-/index.html; See M., 2013; Romeo Rugero, "Hutu Manifesto 2016," *Ishyaka Komunisti ryu Rwanda.* 2016. http://communistpartyofrwanda.tumblr.com/post/134192407498/hutu-manifesto-2016; Bret Ingelaere, "The ruler's drum and the people's shout: Accountability and representation on Rwanda's hills," in *Remaking Rwanda: State building and human rights after mass violence,* ed. Scott Straus and Lars Waldorf (Madison, WI: The University of Wisconsin Press, 2011) 67-78.

power… silencing opposition voices in the name of national unity."[54] Sigrun Marie Moss claims intersectional differences are ignored as "the Rwandan government's recategorization policy involves (psychologically) dissolving the subordinate groups rather than improving relations between those groups."[55]

The psychological dissolve of these groups, however, only happens in the public sphere. The efforts of deemphasizing *ubwoko* has rather shifted emphasis, making it taboo to speak about in public but the conversations continue in private and only within like-minded

Figure 2: Informant Intersections	
Tutsi survivor	III, VII
Hutu perpetrator	IV, VI
Hutu bystander	IX
Tutsi refugee	V, X, XI
Hutu rescuer	I
unborn Rwandan	II
unknown	VIII

circles, stagnating growth and perpetuating othering. In the effort to impose unity, this programs and others that complement it have actually made *ubwoko* more salient while simultaneously "driving it underground."[56]

The program is praised by the Rwandan government, survivors seeking peace, perpetrators pursuing acceptance and those born after genocide fighting for reconciliation. An example of this praise can be seen through a statement by Hon. Stanislas Kamanzi:

> [The] *Ndi Umunyarwanda* program helps us to fight against anyone and anything that may want to take us back. It helps us to understand that being Rwandan doesn't mean having the Rwandan nationality but being proud of the Rwandan identity and committed to work hard for the development of your Country.[57]

Results and Analysis:

The 11 informants represented six intersections of *ubwoko* and post-genocide identities *(see Figure 2: Informant Intersections.[58])* Informant VIII did not disclose either intersect, therefore is categorized as "unknown." The categories include: Tutsi survivor, Hutu perpetrator, Hutu bystander, Tutsi refugee, Hutu rescuer and Rwandan born post- genocide. All informants identified as Rwandan, but emphasis differed along the *ubwoko* divisions. For example, refugee Informants V, X and XI and survivors III and VII identified as Rwandans but unashamedly

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[54] Janine Natalya Clark, "National unity and reconciliation in Rwanda: A flawed approach?" *Journal of Contemporary African Studies* 28, no. 2 (May 2010); Scott Straus and Lars Waldorf, "Introduction: Seeing like a post-conflict state," in *Remaking Rwanda: State building and human rights after mass violence,* ed. Scott Straus and Lars Waldorf (Madison, WI: The University of Wisconsin Press, 2011); Communauté des Potiers du Rwanda, "Becoming Rwandan?" 1.

[55] Sigrun Marie Moss, and Johanna Ray Vollhardt, "'You Can't Give a Syringe with Unity': Rwandan Responses to the Government's Single Recategorization

Policies," in *Analyses of Social Issues and Public Policy* 16, no. 1 (November 2015): 436.

[56] Communauté des Potiers du Rwanda, "Becoming Rwandan?" 1.

[57] "REMA staff members in a dialogue about '*Ndi Umunyarwanda*' Program," Press Room, Rwanda Environment Management Authority (REMA), last modified November 12, 2013, http://www.rema.gov.rw/index.php?id=10&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=71&cHash=1dfabefcf77a99b156d24e9f 24f632e9.

[58] See *Appendix A: Demographics of Informants* for details on each informant.

identified as Abatutsi. Informants IV, VI and IX self-identified as historically Hutu but passionately proclaimed themselves now as Rwandans. They all were eager to discuss how all people in Rwanda are *Rwandans* and did not spend time discussing individual *ubwoko,* emphasizing that Hutu, Tutsi and Twa were gone.

The interviews were grouped by the informants' intersection of *ubwoko* and post-genocide identity and analyzed. To see more context regarding each informant including age, sex and occupation, please see *Appendix A: Demographic of Informants*.

Tutsi Survivor: Two informants – Informant III and VII – identified as male, Tutsi survivors over 50 years of age. Informant III discussed his experience as an academic and Informant VII shared his personal experiences.

Informant III immediately stated that Hutu, Tutsi and Twa are not different ethnicities: "They would be best described as social classes or occupations… The differences were created: colonization. The differences which had to do with stereotyping of behavior… by the Belgians."[59] According to Informant VII, Hutu, Tutsi and Twa are subcultures within the Rwandan culture. Both informants expressed stigmatized views of the Abatwa.

Informant VII believes *ubwoko* identification is dying but not dead. He discussed the stigma and meanings of *ubwoko* in modern Rwanda:

It doesn't mean much really; some people still cling to it. They'd like to see that they are identified by them. But it has a meaning in the sense that if I say I am a Tutsi at least I know nobody is

going to doubt my cleanliness as far as the genocide is concerned. If I say I am a Hutu people will start saying, 'oh what were you doing back in the genocide, were you part of it?' It still has that kind of stain and stigma on [*amoko*].[60]

In contrast, Informant III states: "no body today would be harassed or discriminated against because of what he is."[61] Instead the government provided each Rwandan what they need: the Twa received support (Informant III compared it to Affirmative Action), survivors got medical care and new homes, and perpetrators were reeducated to fight genocide ideology.

Overall, the two informants felt encouraged by the conversation on *ubwoko*. According to Informant VII, "[Being Rwandese] has always been my dream, to sit in a country where I'm still aware of who I am but at least I know it doesn't come with consequences. So, being a Tutsi, if I go somewhere and someone say, 'are you Hutu or are you Tutsi,' I can say 'it doesn't matter!'"[62]

Informant VII spoke well on the program: "I have always spoken about [*Ndi Umunyarwanda*] because that is the attempt, we are creating to evaluate the past and see the wrongs and the evils of ethnicity and replace them with *Ndi Umunyarwanda*."[63] Informant III believes the *Ndi Umunyarwanda* teachings are to put favoritism and discrimination in Rwanda's past. Academic Informant III saw the older generation with an attachment

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[59] Informant III, interview by author. Butare, Rwanda. April 25, 2017.
[60] Informant VII, interview by author. Kigali, Rwanda. April 27, 2017.

[61] Informant III, interview.
[62] Informant VII, interview.
[63] Informant VII, interview.

to *ubwoko* that is difficult to fight against, but the program is being accepted by the younger generation.

Informant III and VII believed *ubwoko* ideology is not dead and will not die for a few generations. Claims stating unification of all Rwandans are false in the eyes of Tutsi survivors but through programs like *Ndi Umunyarwanda*, Rwandans are fighting this ideology. *Ubwoko* should be downplayed but cannot die, because as Informant VII pointed out, the name of the genocide keeps Abatutsi, Abahutu and Abatwa alive.

Hutu Perpetrator: Informant IV and VI identified as Hutu perpetrators. Both informants were agriculturalists over the age of 50. Informant IV was a female and Informant VI was a male. They both participated in TIG (Travail d'Intérêt Général, French; "works of general service"), a reconstructive alternative to prison that focused on unlearning hate and rebuilding the communities destroyed during genocide. The interviews were translated from Kinyarwanda.

Both informants clung to their Hutu identity in the past, but each felt it was "impossible" to find Abahutu, Abatutsi and Abatwa in Rwanda today; everyone in Rwanda are Rwandese. It was evident that the reeducation within TIG created this shift in *ubwoko* ideology: "Today, a Tutsi is a friend to [a Hutu] – he can go and share everything with him…There are no differences…Everyone today is in the same line – they are Rwandese. They are walking together in daily life…We don't feel anything now, we are free from these labels," said Informant VI.[64] Informant VI saw TIG as a calling for forgiveness across Rwanda. In TIG, Informant IV learned that, "We have to

avoid [bad ideology] and they teach us how to create friendships between everyone. And to make sure to talk to people with that bad [ideology]. Our country has been living on a bad past, but we are all the same… we need to make sure everyone is *Ndi Umunyarwanda*—no Hutu, no Tutsi, no anything else."[65]

The two Hutu perpetrators believed the *Ndi Umunyarwanda* program was good and so was the governance promoting it.

Hutu Bystander: Informant IX was the only Hutu bystander interviewed. His experience was unique because he was involved in the creation of the *Ndi Umunyarwanda* program in 2014. He was 30-50 years old, a male and a member of the Rwandan Parliament. He identified as Hutu before genocide because that is what his parents told him he was but gave no explanation. Today, he identified as Rwandan and fights the *ubwoko* ideology:

> My kids will know that my wife is a Tutsi by background and I am a Hutu by background and they will know what it meant in the past…they will know that the foundation of our marriage was on Rwandanism… They were born because we broke this bridge [between Hutu and Tutsi]… So, these kids will not be Hutu, they will not be Tutsi, they will be real Rwandans: that is what I breed.[66]

Informant IX's intention of the program was to take the blame off young people for what their previous generation had done. The program was meant to create a platform to move on together with one identity. He elaborated:

> The younger generation will not understand that they have a

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[64] Informant VI, interview by author, translated by Margot Manuella. Kigali, Rwanda. April 27, 2017.

[65] Informant VI, interview.
[66] Informant IX. Interview by author. Personal interview. Kigali, May 3, 2017.

responsibility of rebuilding this nation when they are not together. If they are pointing fingers to some young people saying, "your parents destroyed the company, come rebuild it," "your parents killed us, now come rebuild [the country]." No… They have to fight for the good for this country together.[67]

Informant IX emphasized that Rwanda was in a transitional period and *Ndi Umunyarwanda* aided in the transition. According to him, the only negative aspect was that more people were not adopting the ideology. The genocide happened because of the negative ideology, and Informant IX did his part to make sure it does not reoccur.

Tutsi Refugee: Informants V, X and XI identified as Tutsi refugees. Each spent time in Uganda but Informant XI lived in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the United Kingdom before returning to Rwanda as an advisor to President Kagame in 2002. Informant V and X both worked in the civil society promoting peace and reconciliation. All three informants were men and Informant V was 18-30 years old; Informant X was 30-50 years old; and Informant XI was over 50 years of age.

Although outside of Rwanda, the three informants identified as Rwandans they nonetheless subscribed to the concept *ubwoko*. In Uganda, their *ubwoko* was not as important as where they came from, Rwanda. The Tutsi refugees found strength in the *Ndi Umunyarwanda* program because it aligned with how they had identified their entire lives. They felt they were better off identifying as Rwandan and felt that others will gain from it parting with their *amoko* as well.

Informant X believed individuals only used *ubwoko* identities when it was beneficial for

them, but he believed the Rwandan identity was always beneficial.

The benefits from one using *amoko* in the public sphere is what the government tried to prevent through this program. As explained by Informant X:

> The government is saying, feel free to belong to any group that you want. Feel free to say that you are a Hutu, a Tutsi, or you are a Twa, but you should not, you should not use those for any political ends or economic [means]… I would obviously say that I am a Tutsi, but I don't think that means much to me in Rwanda today. Because I have no advantages or benefits that accrue from the fact that I am a Tutsi.[68]

Informant X believes the program "is the right way to go" and all criticism on the program is a "baseless" form of genocide ideology. He continued: "Really to me, being a Hutu or a Tutsi or a Twa, it doesn't bring the bread on the table. But being a Rwandan helps you to understand your level of one, patriotism, love, compassion, all of those strong values, human values that are needed for a day-to-day life."[69]

The Tutsi refugees were optimistic regarding the program. Informant V said it best: "My optimism is that a time will come when the right will overcome the wrong. We are all Rwandese, not by mistake or pressure but by origin… This ethnicity is what brings people together. This is what makes people one."[70]

Hutu Resuer: Informant I was a Hutu rescuer. He claimed that the identification of Hutu, Tutsi and Twa were never the problem, instead it was how *amoko* were politically manipulated by the colonialists. He identified as Rwandan but sees segregated social groups:

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[67] Informant IX, interview.

[68] Informant X, interview by author. Kigali, Rwanda. May 3, 2017.

[69] Informant X, interview.

[70] Informant V, interview by author, Kigali, Rwanda, April 26, 2017.

Up to today, we haven't managed to fight against ethnicity in the sense that when it comes to things like wedding invitations…the wedding of the Twa is 99% Twa. And it is the same for the Hutu, the wedding of the Tutsis, still the same. Politically, everyone will go to school and have all these rights. But still there is still this idea of associating and inviting and knowing each other.[71]

Before genocide, Informant I knew his family categorized as Hutu. "The way I was brought up, I was above [identifying by *ubwoko*]. I associated with the Hutus and the Tutsis without feeling proud of being a Hutu or undermining the Tutsis."[72]Today, his identity is Rwandan but struggles with his post-genocide category as he is ostracized as a traitor by Abahutu and distrusted by survivors.

Regarding the *Ndi Umunyarwanda* program, Informant I stated: "I believe this *Ndi Umunyarwanda* is beneficial, especially to the young. Had it been taught before genocide and the government focused on teaching on Rwandaness then the genocide would not have been there." He firmly believes, however, the directives for the program come from the bottom, down and "[The government] injects the spirit of being Rwandan into the community."[73]

Informant I saw *ubwoko* as a spreading virus that must be stopped.

Unborn Rwandan: Informant II, a university student born after the genocide, did not identify with *ubwoko* categories. He stated there is no need for Hutu, Tutsi and Twa identities and it was not used: "No, there is no way that anyone can be referred to by the school or the church by the

identities. It may be for people who still have genocide ideology, they may teach their children. But properly, there is not."[74]

Informant II believed Hutu, Tutsi and Twa were all Rwandan based on culture, language and geographical location. He did, however, claim that he saw a generational difference between those who held *ubwoko* ideology. Informant II identified with the *Ndi Umunyarwanda* program for many reasons, but especially that it was a place to learn from those directing the conversation: "If someone has a misunderstanding you have the chance to give him the proper understanding [with *Ndi Umunyarwanda*] and get him to the right speed."[75] He suggested expansion of the program to communities, beyond academia.

"[The conversation on ethnicity] can't ever be bad. It is always good."[76]

Unknown: Informant VIII did not associate with *ubwoko* or post-genocide identities during the interview. He was the chief executive officer of the Rwandan Governance Board, in the 30–50 age category and identified as Rwandan. He was previously a professor who taught political science.

Informant VIII was aware of negating criticism but responded differently than other informants. He said:

Negating ethnicity is a good thing…When you look at it from outside, sometimes you don't feel the pain that people have experienced being prisoners of those identities…we have been prisoners of Hutu, Tutsi identities, I don't think we have got anything good out of it… the only thing we have gotten is just genocide? So,

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[71] Informant I, interview by author, translated by Bernard Rutikanda. Butare, Rwanda. April 25, 2017.

[72] Informant I, interview.

[73] Informant I, interview.

[74] Informant II, interview by author. Butare, Rwanda. April 25, 2017.

[75] Informant II, interview.

[76] Informant II, interview.

deterring it for me is not a bad thing…we survived [those identities].[77]

To informant VIII, *Ndi Umunyarwanda* represented similarities in Rwandan culture and the aspiration for all Rwandans to be united. He believed in the power of the program. He only spoke of his professional experience with the program.

Further Analysis: Ultimately, informants in all intersections identified as Rwandan and that *ubwoko* has no value in the modern context. Hutu perpetrators, unborn Rwandans, Hutu bystanders and the unknown informant claimed that Abahutu, Abatusi and Abatwa do not exist in Rwanda today, directly conflicting with the views held by Tutsi survivors, Tutsi refugees and Hutu rescuers. Similarly, all Rwandans interviewed believed the *Ndi Umunyarwanda* program was effective, but the same split occurred when asked the downfalls of the program. The Hutu perpetrators, unborn Rwandans, Hutu bystanders and the unknown informant saw no flaws in the program. The Tutsi survivors, Tutsi refugees and Hutu rescuers critiqued its implementation.

In both instances, Hutu perpetrators, unborn Rwandans, Hutu bystanders and the unknown informant all favored Rwandan government ideologies. The Tutsi survivors, Tutsi refugees and Hutu rescuers spoke freely of their experiences and observations. The observation creates two categories, splitting the Abahutu. The once unified and shared-experienced Abahutu have diachronically split, part staying together and the other part presently moving toward the Abatutsi experience. *Ubwoko* experience shifted, putting more emphasis on the mutually inclusive *ubwoko/*post-genocide intersect, creating mistrust,

blame and stagnation and a newly maintained group boundary.[78]

The second group (Hutu perpetrators, unborn Rwandans and Hutu bystanders) fall into a more vulnerable subsection of society—Hutu perpetrators feel they must repay society for their actions, Hutu bystanders the same but for not stopping genocide, unborn Rwandans are young and malleable—and shared similar ideologies. Through knowledge of historical cultural expectations of obedience and social conditioning of authoritative acceptance, it was perceived that these groups were did not critically dissected government ideologies before accepting them, including the *Ndi Umunyarwanda* program. The reason for this is unknown based off of the data.

Conclusion and Recommendations

The rhetoric of the program was emphasized to perpetrators and Rwandans born after the genocide. The informants who expressed *Ndi Umunyarwanda* teachings most verbatim were Informants II, IV and VI: those falling in the unborn Rwandan and Abahutu perpetrator categories. Although most skepticism came from Informant I, all eleven informants agreed *Ndi Umunyarwanda* ideology was a strong form of reconciliation.

In conclusion, individuals live through their Rwandan and mutually inclusive post-genocide and *ubwoko* identities differently. This has resulted in varying experiences and reactions to the *Ndi Umunyarwanda* program. Some believed the program to be perfect, curated by the people for the people. Others felt the ideology was a directive from the top down and injected into the population.

The findings emphasized the mutually inclusive experiences of *ubwoko* and post-genocide identities while uncovering a shift of

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[77] Informant VIII, interview by author. Kigali, Rwanda. May 3, 2017.

[78] Ervin Staub, Laurie Anne Pearlman, and Vachel Miller. "Healing the Roots of Genocide

in Rwanda." *Peace Review* 15, no., 3 (2003): 287-94.

shared experiences and a dissolving group boundary around those who historically identified as Hutu. This could all be strengthened by a larger and more well-rounded sample of informants. My recommendation would be to follow this study with a greater volume of interviews that includes more women, Twa representation and a more robust span of ages and geographical residences.

The *Ndi Umunyarwanda* program was seen as essential reconciliation process to political leaders. However, these leaders did not consider or cater to all intersections and experiences of Rwandans before implementation. The top-down, authoritative approach intimidates Rwanda's democracy instead of allowing for grass roots participation of citizens to create the conversation and come to a deeper understanding amongst themselves. This deeper understand could have the potential for deeply rooted and authentic peacefulness. If the program made changes to increase participation, it has the potential to serve all Rwandans equally "in such a way that people can be free to 'live out' their ethnic identity" in any way they choose.[79]

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[79] Ingelaere, "The ruler's."; Wielenga,"'Lived,'" 122.

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Appendix A: Demographic of Informants

	Age	Sex	Occupation	Category	Intersection	Date of Interview
I[1]	50+	Male	Agriculture	Personal	Hutu//Rescuer	25 April 2017
II	18-30	Male	Student	Personal	[2]	25 April 2017
III	50+	Male	Professor	Academia	Tutsi//Refugee	25 April 2017
IV[1]	50+	Female	Agriculture	Personal	Hutu//Perpetrator	26 April 2017
V	18-30	Male	Civil Society	Personal	Tutsi//Refugee	26 April 2017
VI1	50+	Male	Agriculture	Personal	Hutu//Perpetrator	27 April 2017
VII	50+	Male	Pastor of Anglican Church	Personal	Tutsi//Survivor	27 April 2017
VIII	30-50	Male	CEO of RGB	Political	[3]	2 May 2017
IX	30-50	Male	Member of Parliament	Political	Hutu//Bystander	3 May 2017
X	30-50	Male	Civil Society	Personal	Tutsi//Refugee	3 May 2017
XI	50+	Male	Presidential Advisor	Political	Tutsi//Refugee	9 May 2017

[1]Interview translated to English from Kinyarwanda. [2]This informant   did not state his ethnic background and he was born post-genocide. [3]This informant did not state his ethnic background or his status during genocide.

Appendix B: Example Interview Questions

Beginning each interview was a summary of the study with research intensions and researcher information. After age, occupation, and informant-identified background information was asked for.

1. Understand the definition of ethnicity from the perspective of individual Rwandans.
    a.   Growing up, were you aware of ethnicity? Was it taught in school?
    b.   What does ethnicity mean to you? Could you define it?
    c.   Do you think your experience from 1959 through 1994 has shaped this idea of ethnicity? If so, how?
    d.   What about your experience post-1994? If so, how?

2. Explore the shifts in the meaning of 'Hutu, Tutsi, Twa' over time.   a.   What do you think it means to identify by 'Hutu, Tutsi, Twa?'

3. Analyze the political and cultural implications these identities had (or have now) in the lives of Rwandans.
    a.   What do you think being 'Hutu, Tutsi, Twa' means to the government?
    b.   What do you think it means in everyday life?
    c.   Do 'Hutu, Tutsi, Twa' associated themselves in the same social circles?
    d.   How do you feel the idea of identifying as Hutu, Tutsi and Twa have shifted in your lifetime?

4. Explore the strength behind modern identifications as 'Hutu, Tutsi, Twa' or Rwandan and how this fits in with society.
    a.   Are there still practices or traditions that are identified with these ethnic identities?
    b.   How strongly did you identify as 'Hutu, Tutsi, Twa' before the conflict began?
    c.   How strongly do you identify with your ethnicity now?

5. Identify positive and negative consequences and intentions of the *Ndi Umunyarwanda Programme* as it is used in the context of ethnicity in Rwanda.
    a.   How do you feel the conversation on ethnicity is today in Rwanda?
    b.   What are the positive and negative aspects of this dialogue?
    c.   Do you feel the *Ndi Umunyarwanda Programme* has had positive consequences?
    d.   Do you feel this program is negating ethnicity in any ways?
    e.   Have you heard the critique that Rwanda is negating ethnicity What is your response?

How a Tweet Brought People to the Street: Social Media and the Success of Ni Una Menos

KAYLA FRAIN

"Ni Una Menos is part of that revolutionary lineage of feminist's politics in Argentina. We are the daughters of their disobedience. We are the *locas*, or crazy women, as the Madres [de Plaza de Mayo] were called. We are the heirs of the *desaparecidas* [disappeared] and the feminist organizations that came before us. We translate this powerful heritage into a political language trained in queer poetry and literature, a movement that I like to call *las lenguas de las locas*, [the language of the insane], amplified by a critical use of the tools of communications technology." - *Cecilia Palmeiro, member of Ni Una Menos since 2015*

Abstract

Femicide is a problem all over the globe, taking one women every six hours. In Argentina, the Ni Una Menos movement was formed with the main goal of decreasing the number of femicides happening in Argentina each year. The Ni Una Menos movement draws from the success of the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo while at the same time integrating 21st century mass media to galvanize the public towards effective social and political change.

Literature Review

When Chiara Paez was 14 years old and a few weeks pregnant, she was beaten to death by her boyfriend and his mother. Her body was found after a three day search in the garden of her boyfriend's house. A few months prior, Daiana Garcia, 19 years old, was found on the side of the road. All of her remains were inside a garbage bag. Maria Eugenia Lanzetti, 44-year-old schoolteacher was killed in front of her students by her husband when he cut her throat. Andrea Tacumán was shot dead by her boyfriend. Fiorella Aghem was murdered in the Misiones provinces by her boyfriend. Her body was found in the middle of a yerba plantation. Vanina Cattáneo was set on fire by her partner, suffering from burns on 50 percent of her body. She died a few days later. Angeles Rawson was 16 when she disappeared on the way home from gym class. Her body was found by a worker at a garbage processing plant outside of Buenos Aires. Behind every femicide there is a story just like one of these. These are just a few examples of the gender violence that is happening every single day in Argentina. The violent killings of women are not new, but within the last six years they have become more prominent in the Argentina's news reports. The statistics are startling about gender violence in Argentina; a woman dies every 30 hours due to gender based violence; one child is left without a mother every 26 hours. These crimes are called "femicides". Femicides are the killing of women because of their gender. These crimes against women can take many forms. They are committed in both public and private places, during the night or in broad daylight, and sometimes there is even a bystander. Femicide can be seen as both a political and a public health problem and it needs to be addressed.

Argentina is a country where the gender norms are extremely prevalent. These women are expected to fulfill a role inside of the house where they take care of both the children and household (Marini 1977). After the economic crisis in 2001-2002 there was hope that the government would begin to help change these gender norms as most families were sinking into poverty. Instead with 'Plan Familias' and 'Universal child allowance' the government inadvertently discouraged women from seeking non-motherhood paid employment and reinforced traditional gender roles (Lopreite 2015). 98 percent of the direct recipients of the allowance were mothers in the universal child

allowance program (Lopreite 2015). The traditional roles of motherhood are something that Argentina is proud of and believes is the best for the country (Marini 1977).

The Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo were some of the first women to push the limits as to what it means to be a mother. The Mothers stepped outside of the house and made their voices heard. They were standing up for their children and elevating women's agency by speaking out. During the *Guerra Sucia* (Dirty War) in Argentina, 30,000 people were taken by the dictatorship for speaking out against the government (Bondrea 2014). In reaction to the missing children, the mothers took to the street to look for their children. The children who disappeared were of all ages. Many were in their teens, early 20s and 30s, most of which had strong feelings against the dictatorship (Luengo 2018). The dictatorship wanted to "purge from society the idea of subversion along with the ideologies and political traditions that junta leaders connected with" (Lewis 2001). The Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo were some of the first people in Argentina to fight for human rights and to acknowledge that what the dictatorship did was not legal (Luengo 2018). The Mothers paved the way for a human rights discussions, demonstrated how to grow awareness and demand justice.
Néston Kirchner came into power in 2003 and made a change to focus more on global human rights (Muengo 2018). With the large emphasis on human rights, some women begin to make the argument that women's rights are human rights (Borland, 2007, Lopreite, 2012). With the improved definition of human rights the context was set up for the creation of the Ni Una Menos[80] movement. Social media plays an important role in how people communicate with each other and how information can be spread (Youmans 2012, Kidd 2016). The Ni Una Menos movement uses social media to grow

awareness, strategize and promote their cause. The Ni Una Menos movement began with a tweet from Ojeda after hearing about another femicide (Fuentes 2019). Feminists, activists, women and men throughout all of Argentina decided that they had had enough and began to demand the end to femicide. The use of the hashtag, #niunamenos, is an essential part of the movement and has allowed people to identify the Ni Una Menos movement and join the cause (Luengo 2018).

The Ni Una Menos movement draws from the success of the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo while at the same time integrating 21st century mass media to galvanize the public towards effective social and political change. This paper will discuss the social movement methods that the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo used and the methods that the Ni Una Menos movement is currently using. The resource mobilization theory will be used to evaluate the success of the two movements. The resource mobilization theory is based on the idea that there must be available resources that can be mobilized in order for successful social movements to occur (McCarthy and Zald 1977) Twitter and Facebook will be the main mass media platforms that will be analyzed throughout, as these platforms are the most popular vehicles used by the Ni Una Menos movement. At the time of the Ni Una Menos movement, many people saw the role of women to be inside of the house and taking care of children. As Argentina has progressed more and more women are living professional lives and choosing not to marry or conform to the traditional norms. The Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo movement were obeying these gendered norms, as they were doing what any mother would do, look for their missing children. The Ni Una Menos is something that Argentina has never seen before. The role of social media allowed the Ni Una Menos movement to gain

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[80] Not One Less. Movement that started in Argentina in 2015. Not one less woman dies of femicide in Argentina.

real traction, pushing this movement forward to make both social and political change

Femicide

According to the World Health Organization, "Femicide is generally understood to involve intentional murder of women because they are women, but broader definitions include any killings of women or girls" (World Health Organization 2014). Femicide is often committed by a man, and sometimes female family members can assist in the killings. Femicide differs from homicide because the cases of femicide are perpetrated by partners, ex-partners, male family members, and usually involve ongoing abuse in the home, sexual violence, threats, and intimindations. These are situations where the woman has significantly less power than the man.

Femicide is very prevalent around the world but especially in Latin America. Out of the top 25 countries with the highest rates of femicide around the world, 14 of them are in the Latin America and Caribbean region.

Figure 1 demonstrates the prevalence of femicide in Latin America and the Caribbean. In 2018, Brazil had the most femicides with 1,206 deaths. This is such a significant number of women to be killed by their male partner. Argentina had 255 femicides in 2018. 255 is still a strikingly high number and is significant since this is way too many women to be dying due to femicide.


Figure 1: United Nations Economic

Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean. 2018.

As indicated by the figure above, femicide is not just a problem in Argentina, it is spread throughout Latin America and the Caribbean.

It can be argued that the start of the Ni Una Menos movement began in 2012. On April 18, 2012 Argentina's Cámara de Diputados[81] approved a bill that amends the Criminal Code, "Law No. 11.179 of 1984, art. 80 to include femicide as an aggravated type of homocide" (Rodriguez-Ferrand, 2012).

> "The new provision includes the sanction of life imprisonment for an individual who kills his ascendant or descendant relative, spouse or former spouse, or a person with whom he has or has had an intimate relationship, even if they were not living together at the time of the crime. Femicide is defined as a crime of murder perpetrated by a man against a woman in the context of gender violence" (Rodriguez-Ferrand 2012).

The new amendment gives a definition to femicide, which was very much needed in Argentina. The levels of gender based violence had only been growing leading up to the amendment, so this was a much anticipated change that had to be made (Rodriguez-Ferrand 2012). In the year leading up to the amendment of the Criminal Code, there had been an increase rate of femicides in the country by 20 percent (Rodriguez-Ferrand 2012). Before the Criminal Code had been amended the murder would have just been considered a homicide. In addition to declaring femicide an aggravated form of homicide, the law denounces the killing of women as a crime of passion. Men could no longer claim that the killing of the wife or the girlfriend was a crime of passion or love (Piscopo 2016). They were committing murder and now that State of Argentina said they would

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[81] The lower house of Argentina's Congress

recognize that, which seemed like a large victory for many.

When the State of Argentina changed the law because of the increasing numbers of femicide, it gave the Ni Una Menos movement legitimacy. Many people were ambitious that this law would start to make a difference. By including femicide in the law, hope was given to the people of Argentina that the government would start paying more attention to all of the femicides occurring around the country. There was an aspiration that funding would be allocated to do more research, or even start to provide resources to people who were suffering in violent relationships. This law was only the beginning of femicide becoming more recognized across the country. It is often the case that in Latin America and other countries, where police, public prosecutors and judges in Argentina fail to take violence against women and girls seriously (Piscopo 2016). This amendment to the Criminal Code provided hope for activists, women, and many around the country.

Taking a closer look at Argentina we can see that over the last 10 years the number of femicides have remained high. Every year the total number of femicides is above 200 but stays slightly below 300 femicides. Over the last few years the trend has been over 250 femicides each year.


Figure 2: La Casa Del Encuentro 2018. Looking closely at the graph, one can notice that in 2012 to 2013 the number of femicides actually increased. As noted earlier, 2012 is the year that in Argentina the bill was passed that amended the Criminal Code. Now that

femicides have been acknowledged by the law of Argentina for the first time, one could argue that it gave women and families the confidence that they needed to denounce gender-based violence occurring in their homes and within their friends and family. This is why there is such a large jump in the number of femicides that have been reported from 2012 to 2013.

In Argentina, a woman dies every 30 hours due to gender violence (Chenou and Cepeda-Masemala 2019). A femicide can be defined as "killing women because of their gender" (Luengo 2018). Femicides are the cause of machismo which means strong masculine pride. Men feel as though they need to assert their dominance, so they kill their wife or girlfriend to prove their machismo. The Ni Una Menos movement describes femicide as, "as an action carried out by a person in order to punish and psychically destroy a woman considered to be someone's property and they see this as an act of mass murder of humanity in the body of a woman" (Abrego 2017). There are two different forms of femicide. There can be intimate femicides, where women are dying inside of their home and public/warlike femicides, when women are dying in public places with bystanders (Segato 2016). Segato proposes that "there have never been more protective laws for women's rights, training sessions for security forces, more published literature in circulation about women's rights, more prizes and recognitions for accomplishments in the field of women's rights, and yet we women continue dying" (Segato 2016). One of the biggest issues for Argentina is that no one is enforcing the laws. As Segato mentioned, the legal protection for women exists in Argentina, the problem is implementation. In 1931, Argentina was the first country to pass a statutory quota law which required at least 30 percent of political parties' nominees for the national legislature to be women (Piscopo 2016). Similarly, in 2003, a trade union passed a quota law which required women to hold 30 percent of seats on labor unions' directorates (Piscopo 2016). In 2002,

there was a law passed mandating free contraception and in 2006 a comprehensive sexual education in public schools was required. Yet contraception and sexual education is still underprovided in many rural areas throughout Argentina (Piscopo 2016). There is a need to draw attention to the fact that Argentina's government is not implementing the laws. It seems that there is a large disconnect. Discrimination is widespread throughout the country and there is limited political will and public pressure to systematically tackle gender descrimination. The community of Argentina as a whole needs to focus on these femicides and try to come up with a solution because the current plan is not strong enough. Women need to stop dying because they are a woman. When discussing femicides, Rita Segato states,

> "the warlike attitude toward women's bodies in patriarchy and in its collective representations used to have the character of the Conquest of a territory and its annexation including possession through individual and collective rape or through slavery for sexual services" (Abrego 2017).

In a patriarchal country that has thickly rooted cultural norms of machismo, it takes time to break through these walls. With the use of social media the Ni Una Menos movement has been able to gain global attention and make a call to action for women, citizens and politicians, that would not have been made possible without the aid of social media.

Traditional Gender Roles

Argentina is a country where the gender norms are very prevalent in the society. It is expected that the women stay home, cook, clean and most importantly take care of the children. "The praise of the family as the foundation of society and of parental roles as the most important vehicle for the transmission of and control upon the observance of Christian and patriotic virtues" (Marini 1977). The image of women as the caregivers fulfills the Christian and political viewpoint that the place for the

women is inside of the house. It is also stressed in the media that it is not the intention to confine women to the household but if they choose to venture outside, their household duties must always come first (Marini 1977).

Women for the most part are seen inside of the home. In figure 3, it demonstrates how the majority of the jobs in the population are filled by males. In 2019, over 60 percent of the male population was employed and only 40 percent of the female population was employed. The graph shows the trend of the two bars coming closer together. This provides hope that women are reaching some equality in the workplace.


Figure 3: "World Development Indicators." 2019

Women play an essential role in the Argentine society and the government does their best to reinforce these roles through specific policies. After the economic crisis in 2001 - 2002 the government created a program called "Plan Familias" (Lopreite 2015). The intention of this program was to pay cash transfers to poor women who were working as a mother (Lopreite 2015). Yes, this program acknowledged motherhood as a job, but it reinforced the traditional gender roles of women as mothers. Furthermore, it discouraged women from seeking non-motherhood paid employment. The government also created "Universal child allowance" (Lopreite 2015). This piece of legislation was intended to encourage families to vaccinate their children and send them to school (Lopreite 2015). When this was done, the household would receive

compensation. The program was designed to be gender neutral but when it was put into action, 98 percent of the recipients were mothers (Lopreite 2015). The goal of this program was to help reduce poverty and this part was successful. The unintended consequence was the reinforcement of traditional gender roles. These two programs have now stopped due to government funding, but when they were both in full force, these programs were contributing to the long established gender roles in Argentina.

Guerra Sucia

The *Guerra Sucia*[82] began in 1975 and lasted until 1983 (Scharpf, Balcells, & Sullivan, 2018). During this time "a campaign of state terrorism against real and suspected enemies of the state, leads to the death and disappearance of tens of thousands of Argentines and foreign nationals" (Lewis 2001). The goals of the dictatorship was to "purge from society the idea of subversion along with the ideologies and political traditions that junta leaders connected with" (Lewis, 2001). Most of the victims were young, in their teens to 30s. "This self-terrorism claimed around 30,000 disappearances of mostly students, according to their families. Whatever happened to all these people is still kept secret, but stories of torture, killings and burials at sea surfaced from the few witnesses" (Bondrea 2014). In reaction to the missing children in Argentina, the Mothers took to the streets to demand answers about those who had disappeared. Since the first time that the Mothers challenged the dictatorship, they have been making waves across Argentina. The Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo serve as an inspiration for the Ni Una Menos movement because they paved the way for human rights discussions, demonstrated how to build and grow awareness and demand justice from the government. The Mothers now serve as a symbol of resistance for the Ni Una Menos movement.

Resource Mobilization Theory

The resource mobilization theory is based on the idea that there must be available resources that can be mobilized in order for successful social movements to occur (McCarthy and Zald 1977). "Resource mobilization theory views social movements as normal, rational, institutionally rootes, political challenges by aggrieved groups" (Beneford 2000). The resource mobilization theory states that most social movements are based on grievances. There must be a support base, constituents, individuals or organizations that provide support. Social movement organizations have a number of strategic tasks, "these tasks include mobilizing supporters, neutralizing and/or transforming mass and elite publics into sympathizers, achieving change in targets" (McCarthy and Zald 1977). The resource mobilization theory also notes that there needs to be a relation to larger society. Most importantly the resource mobilization theory requires the presence of a resource. The resource mobilization theory is able to determine if a social movement is successful or not.

The Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo

In 1977, the mothers of the disappeared children mobilized to the streets to demand the truth about their children. When these mothers took to the street, many people were taken aback. The traditional gender roles in Argentina imply that a woman should be in the household. One viewpoint is that the Mothers were fulfilling their traditional gender roles by making their way to the street to inquire more information about their children, as opposed to acting against these traditional roles, for a mother in Argentina their babies are everything. Mothers invest time, energy and money into their children; as they are their livelihood. So when someone takes your children, the response is simple and quite obvious; you try to find your child, your everything. The Mothers did what they did best, they were looking out for their children. "Men tended to be the main wage earner so they could not spend everyday looking for their children. Women have been socialized to be obedient and passive, they could not simply refused to be okay with

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[82] The Dirty War

the loss of their child" (Malin 1994). Women were filling their traditional role of motherhood by showing up to march. To the Mothers, the movement was not seen as extreme or radical at the time. In the moment it was quite simple, the government had committed horrific human rights violations by taking their children, and they not only wanted, but needed answers. The Mothers showed up to the plaza with nothing more than their bodies and the intention of finding out more about their children.

The Mothers were persistent about finding the truth out about their children. They gathered in front of the Casa Rosada, which is the headquarters of the Argentine government in Buenos Aires. When the mothers of the disappeared first met they were just looking for answers from the government. After being turned down time and time again by officials, they decided it was time for them to take another approach. They began displaying the names and photographs of their loved ones who were part of the disappeared. The Mothers were gaining a great deal of attention from the people walking by. The plaza was a public place, so many people found out about their grievances. Soon after, the mothers decided to begin marching on Thursdays in the plaza. On April 30th, 1977, 14 brave women took to the streets to confront the brutal dictatorship and find answers to who had stolen their children (Femenía 1987). Four decades later and the Mothers have continued marching every Thursday at 3:30 in the afternoon (Goñi 2017). The Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo have completed 2,037 marches as of 2017 (Goñi 2017).

Resource Mobilization Theory and The Mothers

The Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo movement can be applied to the resource mobilization theory to prove that it was a successful movement. When looking at the movement from a birds eye view it is easy to think that the Mothers did not have many resources at their disposal. Even with the limited resources the Mothers made sure to mobilize them in an effective way. The Mothers utilized the Plaza de Mayo, the white handkerchief, and the role of Motherhood.

The Plaza de Mayo is an open public space. At one end of the Plaza there is the Casa Rosada[83], which is the home to the President (Bondera 2014). The Mothers originally started congregating there because they wanted to get the attention of government officials (Bondera 2014). As the government was actively ignoring the angry Mothers, people who passed by would ask questions and were curious about what was going on in front of the Casa Rosada (Bondera 2014). The location of the Plaza de Mayo served as a strong resource for the Mothers because they were able to spread the word about their movement and inform curious citizens about the violations of human rights that the government committed.

Another resource that the Mothers ultized is their symbol of the white handkerchief. The white handkerchief is also the white diaper kerchiefs and is what is used to recognize the Mothers. This is an unlikely resource but one that was very successful with this movement. The image of the white handkerchief distributed throughout the community also helped get the word out of the movement. It also provided a constant reminder about the violations that the dictatorship had committed.

The final resource that the Mothers used to their advantage is the traditional gender norms. Like it has been mentioned before, the traditional role of Motherhood is ingrained in Argentine culture. Mothers are expected to take care of their children and the household. When their children disappeared, the Mothers see it as their duty to find their children. The Mothers utilize their traditional role of Motherhood to expand this obligation and show other Mothers that they can be doing more with their lives. The

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[83] Pink House

Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo mobilized their role and were able to get hundreds of women to march with them across Argentina to find answers about their missing children.

Although not obvious upon first glance, the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo movement can be applied to the resource mobilization theory. The Mothers utilize three resources, the Plaza, the white handkerchief, and the traditional role of Motherhood. Resource mobilization theory places a large emphasis on resources and opportunity (Buechler 1993). To evaluate how the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo utilize the resource mobilization theory, it will be defined into three parts, support base, strategy and tactics, and relation to larger society (McCarthy and Zald 1977).

The Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo is a social movement that is based upon grievances. The Mothers are marching because they are grieving their disappeared children who are presumably dead. When the Mothers began their marches they were not really supported by anyone. This is not to say that people were against what they were marching for but public organizations did not immediately take notice. The Mothers used a public and open area to congregate so they did not need to have any supporters provide that. The Mothers really did not rely on any outside help from organizations. They were just happy when people wanted to join them in the search for their children.

The tactics used by the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo to mobilize supporters were the role of Motherhood and word of mouth. The Mothers movement emphasized that the role of a mother was to look for their children, and it was their duty to find out what happened to them.. Mothers also utilized word of mouth. By talking about the disappearances they were able to spread awareness of where they were meeting each week to get more citizens to join them.

The resource mobilization theory highlights the resources that the Mothers utilized to make their movement successful. The Mothers took advantage of the public Plaza de Mayo and its location in front of the Casa Rosa, the classic image and symbolism of the white handkerchief and the expansion from the traditional gender roles of a woman.

Counter Argument

It can be argued that the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo play an important role of the Ni Una Menos movement. The Mothers serve as an inspiration as they paved the way for women to advocate for their rights. But this was not the Mothers intention. By taking to the street every Thursday at 3:30pm the it can be argued that the Mothers were just fulfilling their role of Motherhood and nothing more.

The role of women is essential to the Argentine culture. It is expected that the women of Argentina fulfill all their duties inside of the household before they venture out. The daily life in Argentina is gendered. So for women this means that they are the primary caregivers for children and of their household (Borland 2007). With this knowledge it is quite clear to make the connection with why women took to the streets. During the Dirty War many kids were taken, they had disappeared. Their mothers had no idea where they were, so naturally they began to search for their children. When a child is missing the expected response of a mother is to look for her child. So it was not surprising that the Mothers took to the streets because this was fulfilling their role as a Mother. As women began to protest, they were still expected to be taking care of the household and children (Borland 2007). The mothers of the disappeared were fulfilling their role of motherhood when they took to the streets to look for their children.

This argument is important. Yes, the Mothers did fulfill their role of a women when they began marching around the Plaza de Mayo. But in doing this they did so much more. I am arguing that the primary goal of the women protesting was to empower other women and to create a space where you can challenge the status quo. The Mothers saw the wave of protests as an opportunity to make demands for gender equity and social justice.

The resource mobilization theory provides us with a comprehensive way to

analyze the success of a movement. When applying the resource mobilization theory to the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo, it is clear that they are successful. The Ni Una Menos movement adopts some key elements from the Mothers which further the Ni Una Menos argument and cause. A large part of the success that Ni Una Menos has had is due to the Mothers, but another extremely important part of the puzzle is social media. Social media is Ni Una Menos resource and they utilize all aspects of this tool. The Ni Una Menos movement draws from the success of the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo while at the same time integrating 21st century mass media to galvanize the public towards effective social and political change.

Resource Mobilization Theory

Social media is also the driving factor in the success of the Ni Una Menos movement. The resource mobilization theory model can be applied to the Ni Una Menos movement to analyze the success of the movement so far. Resource mobilization emerged in the 1970s by McCarthy and Zald as a way to study social movements. According to the resource mobilization perspective, "social movements are an extension of politics by other means, and can be analyzed in terms of conflicts of interest just like other political struggle. Movements are also seen as structured and patterned, so that they can be analyzed in terms of organizational dynamics just like other forms of institutional action" (McCarthy and Zald 1977). Resource mobilization theory emphasizes resources and opportunity (Buechler 1993). The resource mobilization theory highlights the interaction between resource availability, the preexisting organization of preference structures and entrepreneurs attempts to meet preference demand (McCarthy and Zald 1977). The Ni Una Menos movement utilizes social media as a resource and incorporates it into already existing organizations. Through applying the

resource mobilization theory to the Ni Una Menos movement it is clear that the success of the movement is because of the utilization of social media. To evaluate how Ni Una Menos utilizes the resource mobilization theory, it will be evaluated in three parts: support base, strategy and tactics, and relation to larger society.

Resource

In the 21st century social media was created, which made news spread at an even faster rate. People are able to access news and information at their fingertips. For this paper, social media will be defined as a "group of Internet-based applications that build on the ideological and technological foundations of Web 2.0 that allow for the creation and exchange of User Generated Content" (Kaplan and Haenlein 2010). Platforms such as Youtube, Instagram, Twitter, Snapchat, Whatsapp and Facebook are the most common in Argentina. As of 2018, the leading social media platform in Argentina was Youtube, where 93 percent of internet users utilize Youtube. Not far behind was Facebook at 91 percent, Instagram at 68 percent and Twitter at 46 percent ("Leading social media platforms in Argentina as of 3rd quarter 2018" 2019). When someone posts on these platforms, they are creating user generated content. User generated content can be described as "various forms of media content that are publicly available and created by end users" (Kaplan and Haenlein 2010).

For something to be considered user generated content it must fulfill three basic requirements. The first requirement is that it must be published on a publicly accessible website or on a social networking site. The second says it needs to show creative effort, and the third demands that it be created outside of the professional setting (Kaplan and Haenlein 2010). These social networks have allowed for the mobilization of social groups not just in Argentina but around the world. Social media allows people to connect even though they may be millions of miles away, and because of this social media can make the world feel smaller. Social media can also be used to facilitate events and ease the spread of information because all you have to do is "share" or "retweet" the news with a click of a button. It allows people to reach a wider audience at a

much faster pace. Social media is the driving factor for the creation, mobilization and success of the Ni Una Menos movement.

Many people are optimistic that social media will be monumental in relation to social movements. The term "techno-optimism" refers to "those approaches that emphasize the potential of social media technologies to solve social problems" (Kidd 2016). While there are some challenges with social media, techno-optimists focus on the positive. Social movements that utilize technology are not solely on the internet, as it is important that they have a balance of both communication via social media and in person. Social movements like the Ni Una Menos movement use social media to organize, generate awareness and spread information. "New social movements spontaneously generate in moments of indignation and spread virally, both online and off" (Kidd 2016). By having both social media and in person communication, social movements are ensuring that everyone is informed.

However, being too optimistic of social media raises concerns. There are three major flaws, "(i) it overstates the newness of social media; (ii) it jumps to prediction without evidence; and (iii) it underestimates the capacity of existing hegemonies to adapt to technology" (Kidd 2016). The Ni Una Menos movement has done a good job with balancing the use of social media and in person protests. It is great to have faith in social media, but one must remember that there are limitations to almost everything.

Support Base - Mothers

The Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo inspired the Ni Una Menos movement and set the stage for the movement to take place. Both the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo and the Ni Una Menos movement are based upon grievances towards the government. The Mothers provide support to Ni Una Menos by physically showing up to rallies and marches and by providing inspiration in their fight. Fighting for human rights, developing

awareness and demanding justice are three areas that the Mothers have provided support for Ni Una Menos.

Human Rights

The Mothers believed that when the dictatorship took their children that they were in direct violation of human rights. The actions taken by the dictatorship were wrong. No human should be taken away from their family and killed because of their beliefs. The Mothers felt that "all human lives are valuable and deserving of respect, regardless of the individual's particular ideological or political affiliation" (Luengo 2018). The Mothers used the human rights argument as they marched each Thursday at 3:30 in the afternoon in Buenos Aires. It was not until Argentina became a democracy in 1983 that the country officially recognized human rights as something that is legitimate and decided that as a country they were going to pay more attention to the human rights violations within their country (Lopreite 2012). Many were energized by the countries new commitment, "Argentina's new commitment to human rights provided a new opportunity structure for women, and all citizens" (Lopreite 2012) This new governmental acknowledgement of human rights allowed people to examine the atrocities that happened during the Dirty War but also provides hope for the future that there will be limited violations. The commitment to human rights also informed people of what their rights were as humans allowing them to know and be aware of the times when these rights were being taken away from citizens. Under President Néstor Kirchner, the term human rights began to develop more traction in the country. Kirchner established close links with many human rights organizations, which included the Mothers and Grandmothers of the Plaza de Mayo. This was a very symbolic act by Krichner and was continued on by his predecessor, Cristina Krichner. The attention to human rights is the immediate context for the immersion of the Ni Una Menos movement.

The Mothers marched in the street because of the human rights violations that occurred to their children. It can be argued that the Mothers were the first group to advocate for a human rights violations in the form of a social movement. The Mothers determination to find answers about their children inspired the Ni Una Menos movement. The Ni Una Menos movement echoes the fight of the Mothers for human rights issues.

Developing Awareness

The Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo quickly developed a routine after seeing just how many women came to join the movement. The movements began with just a few mothers walking down to the house of the President to try and discover more information. Everytime the authorities refused to allow the women to proceed any further. As time went on, this gathering of Mothers grew exponentially. The Mothers utilized word of mouth to spread information. The Mothers also made themselves known by protesting in a public place. Since they were in the plaza, it is a very public place. People who were walking by and curious about the Mothers were about to spread awareness about their fight and grow the movement that way. In no time the movement had grown to about 300 women. Once the movement got to a significant size they became more structured. The Mothers met every Thursday at 3:30 in the afternoon, wearing a white head kerchief and chanting "Bring them back alive" (Bondrea 2014). The Mothers did a lot to develop their image and bring awareness to their cause.

The repetition of the movement is one of the key factors that helped bring awareness to the movement. The Mothers became a symbol of reliability. The people in the community knew that if they wanted to participate in a march, the Mothers would be at the plaza every Thursday at 3:30 in the afternoon. The white handkerchief also helped bring attention to the cause. The white handkerchief allowed the Mothers to be easily identified and quickly became a symbol for the movement. Also by having the white handkerchief become the symbol, this was able to be drawn, put on posters and spread throughout the country. The white handkerchief are one of the most distinguishing features of the Mothers (Bondrea 2014). Whenever one sees a white handkerchief on the sidewalk or in a poster, the immediate association is the Mothers. The Ni Una Menos also utilizes the handkerchief which ties them to the Mothers. For the Mothers, the handkerchief represents diapers and the purity of Motherhood (Bouvard 2004).

The Ni Una Menos movement learned from the Mothers how to bring awareness to their movement. Even though the Ni Una Menos movement occurs a few decades later the strategies used by the Mothers are still relevant. The Mothers utilized word of mouth. Mothers would tell other moms about their plans and then they would all meet up. With the use of technology, the spread of information can be wider. So for the Ni Una Menos movement word of mouth is also used, but takes place on social media. People are sharing with their friends, inviting others and texting everyone that they know about a gathering. The Mothers also used the plaza to their advantage to bring awareness to their cause. The plaza for the Mothers is like social media to Ni Una Menos. Social media is a public platform that Ni Una Menos uses to spread their message. Another tactic that made the Mother successful is their consistency and reliability. The Mothers met every Thursday at the same time in the same place (Bondrea 2014). The Ni Una Menos movement embodies this strategy by marching every June 3rd. The protest on June 3rd is both consistent and reliable. When the Ni Una Menos took it upon themselves to also use a handkerchief, they were using the symbol that the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo use. The green handkerchief echoes the white one of the Madres, "activists today are making the connections to the women who have led struggles and refused to give up on their vision of social justice for decades" (Levy 2017). The

handkerchief is a direct connection between the two social movements and it is something that will keep the group connected for decades to come.

Demanding Justice

The Mothers also represent persistence in their demand for justice. When the authorities told the Mothers that they could not go any further into the President's house, this did not stop them. The Mothers were on a mission. The determination of the Mothers is exhibited in the spirit of the Ni Una Menos movement. The Ni Una Menos movement demands justice for victims of femicide and an end to femicide, but they do not stop there. The movement also demands equal pays and abortion rights for women in Argentine. The inspiration to demand for justice in the Ni Una Menos movement comes from the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo. Like the Mothers, the Ni Una Menos movement is a symbol of resistance.

Support Base - Creation of the Ni Una Menos Movement

An essential building block of the Ni Una Menos movement was the reading marathon that took place in March 2015. The reading marathon aimed to raise awareness of the killings of women in Argentina(Luengo 2018). The event was sparked after the murder of nineteen-year-old Daiana García. The reading marathon event was launched on social media through a Facebook page that encouraged activists, journalists, artists, writers and families who had been affected by femicide to join "a marathon of readings, projections and performances against femicide" (Fuentes 2019). The event was called "Ni Una Menos" by Vanina Escales, as she wanted to give urgency is the response needed for the daily murders of women (Fuentes 2019, Chenou and Cepeda-

Másmela 2019). During the event, participants exchanged stories, testimonials, and hopes for the future of women and activists. The reading marathon played a large role in the creation of the Ni Una Menos movement as it was useful in presenting the problem at hand: violence against women. It also enlarged the audience by making more people aware of the issue. This was achieved by having the event be created on social media, thus making easier for people to invite their networks. Ni Una Menos also took what they had learned from the Mothers about building awareness at had the reading marathon in a public place. They decided to host the event in a central location, the national library of Buenos Aires. Here, people were able to join the reading marathon even if they had not heard of the event prior.

On May 11th, 2015, radio journalist Marcela Ojeda was outraged to hear about yet another femicide in Argentina. Ojeda posted a single tweet that sparked the global movement Ni Una Menos, "Actrices, políticas, artistas, empresarias, referentes sociales...mujeres, todas, bah...no vamos a levantar la voz? NOS ESTAN MATANDO"[84]. Ojeda's tweet was in response to the discovery of Chiara Paéz body, a fourteen year old girl buried alive. The tweet triggered a response of 252 likes and 197 retweets[85] (Fuentes 2019). Ojeda's tweet prompted the street demonstrations across all of Argentina. Marcela Ojeda was not the only one who took to Twitter to voice her frustration. She was joined by television journalist Florence Etcheves, journalist Hinde Pomeraniec, director of Barcelona Ingrid Beck, and television journalist Valeria Sampedro. The group of women began to organize a march that would bring awareness to femicide and call for action. Even though these women had not met each other before, they were all united under the same cause.

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[84] Actresses, politicians, artists, business women, social representatives … women, all of us, bah … are we not going to raise our voices? THEY ARE KILLING US.

[85] The tweet now has 250 retweets and 735 likes

These women used social media to get the word out about the first march. They created a NiUnaMenos twitter account, which now has 69.6K followers so they could continue to spread the news. The women asked friends and family members to post pictures with the hashtag #niunamenos just so they could get the word out more. Through doing so, the women were working to make the problem visible.

Less than a month after Ojeda's tweet the first march had been organized and took place June 3, 2015. There were about 200,000 people in Buenos Aires and thousands of people in cities all across Argentina that took place in the march (Chenou and Cepeda-Mámela 2019). Out of the 200,000 people who attended the march in Buenos Aires, 61.2 percent of the people marching found out about the march through a form of social media.


Figure 4: De Angelis, Carlos. 2015.

This data emphasizes the point that social media was so important in getting people to the streets for the Ni Una Menos movement. Social media allowed for the leaders of the movement to get the word out fast, it took less than one month for the whole march to come together. As shown by the graph, over 60 percent of people out about the march through social media. The other ways that people heard about the march was through television and through friends. Television was around 12

percent and friends was under 10 percent. It also shows how powerful and widespread social media is.

Every June 3rd, the Ni Una Menos movement marches, "Ponemos cuerpo, palabra, banderas y carteles para decir que la violencia machista mata y no sólo cuando el corazón deja de latir. Porque la violencia machista también mata, lentamente, cuando coarta libertades, participación política y social, la chance de inventar otros mundos, otras comunidades, otros vínculos"[86] (niunamenos.org). By using the #niunamenos as the slogan for the June 3rd march, the hashtag was able to cross national borders and inspire other movements in neighboring countries.

Strategies and Tactics

The Ni Una Menos movement has been able to use social media to come up with strategies and tactics. Just one march gave the movement lots of media attention. *El País* stated, "Argentina is experiencing a time of great political turmoil and division in the middle of the electoral campaign. However, the mobilization of #NotOneLess has been so great that all candidates have backed this group's demands" and *La Nación* described, "the demonstration managed to unite clashing flags under one slogan: shouting down femicide and changing a culture of violence. [It was] an encounter where people from all social classes, creeds, and ideologies visualized #NotOneLess" (Luengo 2018). The movement gained national attention and this could not have been done without the help of Twitter to get the word out. The creation of the Ni Una Menos movement relied on Twitter to spread the word about the movement, gain a greater audience, and get people to the street to march throughout Argentina.

The Ni Una Menos continues to utilize social media as a way to keep people informed

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[86] We put body, word, flags and posters to say that macho violence kills and not only when the heart stops beating. Because sexist violence also kills, slowly, when it restricts freedoms, political and

social participation, the chance to invent other worlds, other communities, other ties.

and create a call to action. A year after the first demonstration in June 2015, Ni Una Menos held a second rally in June 2016 where they used the hashtag #VivasNosQueremos[87], which sites the march against gender violence that was held in Argentina (Fuentes 2019). On October 19, 2016 there was a sporadic march in which the leaders of the Ni Una Menos organization used Twitter to mobilize the public. On October 12, 2016 Lucia Pérez, was brutally murdered. The march on October 19, was inspired by Lucia Pérez and demanded an end to the violence of partiachy, the right to legal, safe, and free abortions, and for opening space for all our life (niunamenos.org). For this march, the Ni Una Menos movement used the hashtag #NosotrasParamos[88], and they also adopted the hashtag #MiercolesNegro, taken the Polish women who just had a strike against a planned abortion ban and used the hashtag #BlackMonday.

Social media is used to continue to mobilize people towards short term and long term solutions for femicide. One of the campaigns that Ni Una Menos ran was the "De la foto a la firm"[89]. In which the activists asked celebrities and public officials to do more to support the movement while they had been great with posting selfies and pictures, the activists wanted more. The organizers were asking the celebrities and public officials to sign a document in which they pledged to get resources to end violence against women. Through this campaign, the activists were able to get the issue of gender violence on the political agenda during a presidential election year. This got politicians talking about gender based violence throughout their political campaigns and made people more aware of the issue. This campaign utilized social media, paired with a call to action encouraging people in a position of power to do something more.

The hashtags are what mobilized the people in the case of Argentina. A hashtag can be considered "technopolitics" meaning, "the centrality of uses of technology in the organization, communication and performance of collective action is contemporary social movements" (Fuentes 2019). By creating a hashtag of the slogan, it brought people together, and made it easy for people to see what Ni Una Menos as doing, as when you looked up the movement you would see the hashtag. The hashtag works "as anchors to retrieve what has been said and done in response to femicide or gender violence more broadly, hashtag such as #NiUnaMenos enable movements to expand their base, exploiting dispersion, multiplicity and a-synchronicity" (Fuentes 2019). The use of all of the different hashtags allows the Ni Una Menos movement to expand, making it more well known and international while at the same time mobilizing the masses within a short time period.

Relation to larger society

Since 2015 those involved in the Ni Una Menos movement have fought to bring about a lot of change in their society. The Ni Una Menos movement has been extremely successful in making people aware of femicide in Argentina.

In 2016, President Mauricio Macri created a national plan to fight violence against women in Argentina ("National Action Plan for the Prevention, Assistance and Eradication of Violence against Women." 2016). This plan was titled "The National Action Plan for the Prevention, Assistance and Eradication of Violence against Women" ("National Action Plan for the Prevention, Assistance and Eradication of Violence against Women." 2016). The goals of this plan were to create a network of women refuges, create a budget for the electronic tagging of violent men, introduce

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[87] #WeWantOurselvesAlive
[88] #WomenStrike

[89] From picture to signature

gender violence in school curriculum, staff a telephone helpline for women, and gain access to microcredit to promote economic autonomy for women ("Argentina Announces New Gender Violence Plan." 2016 and "National Action Plan for the Prevention, Assistance and Eradication of Violence against Women." 2016). These were very ambitious goals for Argentina, but much needed as the femicide rate was continuing to increase.

It has been three years since the creation of President Macri's plan, and there has been little improvement. If anything, Argentina has seen an increase in femicide. In 2018, there were 19 femicides in the month of January. In January of this year, there were 30 femicides in 31 days. This was an increase of 11 femicides in one month just a year apart. This has created some major movement within the activist communities in Argentina. Mujeres de la Matria Latinoamericana (MuMaLá), a feminist activist group, is calling for Argentina to declare a state of emergency. The goal of declaring a state of emergency to allow MuMaLá to get their budget back for two years, so then they can make breaking out of systemic violence a priority.

Later this year, the Commissioner for International Cooperation and Development granted eight million Euro to Argentina to "boost efforts and strengthen institutions to make sure that women and girls never have to live in fear again" with the goal of achieving true gender equality and living in a larger society. This is great for Argentina, as they have been granted funds to help combat the ever growing issue of femicide. So far, the funds have yet to be allocated to a specific resource.

The Ni Una Menos movement is still very active in Argentina. There most recent march was on November 25th, which was the International Day for the Elimination of Violence against Women (Santillana 2019). The Ni Una Menos movement led this movement with the message, "sexual violence is political violence" (Santillana 2019). Since 2015, the Ni

Una Menos movement has been fighting to bring about equality to women.

In an interview with the New York Times, cartoonist and writer Maitena Burundarena states, "The solution has to come from society, it won't come from the state, not all men are like that, we have to win over the good ones, no right-thinking man can tolerate violence against women. But someone has to start teaching the ones who don't understand it that women are not the property of men" (Goñi 2015). The problem of femicide is so deeply rooted in their society that a few changes to the law might not make a difference. The Ni Una Menos movement is trying to change how society views and talks about femicide. Ni Una Menos is trying to prevent femicide from ever occurring again, and is doing this by trying to change the perception in society in Argentina that the killing of women is not okay.

Counter Argument

Social media can be dangerous for social movements. This paper argues that social media helps to galvanize people to the streets for the Ni Una Menos movement. But it is important to recognize that social media does not always work. Many people will argue that social media actually has no effect on a social movement. These people argue that "social media is an impressive patina that in actuality does little to fundamentally transform the way that human beings relate to each other in the real world" (Kidd 2016). Social media creates a barrier and it becomes hard for people to relate in the world of the internet. Malcolm Gladwell argues that people are motivated by close relationships. This would be high risk activism. People who are deeply connected to each other will make a greater difference for the cause. Social media does not allow for close relationships because they are all via the internet. Social media also does not encourage a lot of action. As seen in the

Ni Una Menos movement, "Social media encourages people to participate by posting and liking, not by going into the streets" (Kidd 2016). People do not mind liking or sharing a message, but when they actually have to do something, then people are not that reliable.

Even though there can be an argument made for how social media does not play a role in social movements. In the Ni Una Menos movement social media played a large role and did inspire action. Social media was the driving force behind getting people to the streets to protest gender based violence in Argentina. It can be argued that the Ni Una Menos movement would not exist without the existence of Twitter.

Conclusion

The Ni Una Menos movement draws from the success of the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo well at the same time integrating 21st century mass media to galvanize the public towards effective social and political change. By applying the resource mobilization theory to both the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo and the Ni Una Menos movement it is clear that they are both successful in gaining awareness and demanding justice. Even though the resources used by the groups were different, the Mothers still managed to inspire the Ni Una Menos movement. There is still more research to be done in this area. To further my research, I think it would be useful for someone to expand on what other countries who are facing a similar issue of femicide are doing to create change in their country, if they are doing anything.

Gender-based violence is an extremely important subject that needs to be discussed. It is not just something that happens in other countries, it is happening right here in the United States. I think in general more research needs to be done in

this area, as it is something that people tend to avoid because of the sensitive nature of the topic. It is our duty as researchers, academics and citizens to not let gender based violence become an epidemic.

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Multiculturalism as a Way to Religious Tolerance

Zahira Yusifova, Aydan Baghirli, Fatima Fataliyeva, Elvin Valiyev, And Murad Malik Aslanov

1. Introduction:

Religion in its core has existed side by side with human beings for thousands of years, shifting its shape and form along the way. Started by the caveman societies using deities and supernatural powers to explain basic characteristics of nature, this kind of mindset provided comfort and motivation for early humans to continue discovering and researching their surroundings. Gradually, beliefs in the supernatural became more complex throughout the years, with deities encompassing every single action and aspect of life, with Ancient Egypt and Ancient Greece serving as prime examples of this shift. At this point, with Abrahamic religions being the predominant belief systems in the world, where one deity is the source and cause of everything, intolerance to other religions decreased steadily up to modern times. This, however, does not mean that discrimination and prejudice have totally vanished from the societies. While the Dark Ages with the Crusades and the Inquisitions around the globe are long gone, people identified by their religion and often belonging to a religious minority groups in a specific country face hardships and barriers in various parts of their lives. Even in communities with self-proclaimed "progressive" views on the modern world, this kind of persecution still runs rampant. But in a world plagued with discrimination toward religious minorities, are there any

countries capable of setting an admirable example to the rest? Those kinds of countries do exist, and all of them follow a similar pattern.

Thus, the goal of this paper is to discuss the existing cases of religious oppression around the world emphasizing Azerbaijan as a role model country to tackle religious intolerance and presenting multiculturalism as the best way to inculcate mutual respect and forbearance between people. To do so, we will review a number of relevant case studies underlining those that target on minimization of religious persecution, intolerance and disrespect. All in all, this review paper gives count to the existing problems around the globe followed up by the representation of Azerbaijan's multicultural commitment as a role model in fostering peace and love among people of various nations and religions living in this country. The paper is accompanied by the due references and terminates with some concluding remarks.

2. Literature Review:

2.1. The Concept of Multiculturalism and Religious Tolerance Globally

In contemporary society, as an aftermath of globalization, the idea of multiculturalism is widely practiced in many countries. According to Kaya, nowadays, violence and racism are excluded from the gentrification of society; as a result, multiculturalism stands for an ability to integrate cultures, minority groups, races, and ethnicities within the borders of any country without sacrificing the original identity [90]. Multiculturalism in its prime was observed during the centuries of the Ottoman Empire[91]. Ottoman multiculturalism strongly intertwined with the word "tolerance", which, for instance, is and continues to be a solid part of Turkish history, starting from the early days of the Ottoman Empire. That kind of multiculturalism

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[90] Aykhan Kaya, "Multiculturalism and Minorities in Turkey," in *Challenging Multiculturalism: European*

Models of Diversity 2013, ed. Raymond Taras (Edinburg: Edinburg University Press, 2013), 313

[91] Ibid., 299

managed to positively affect economic, social and political issues. However, multiculturalism has its own share of opponents. West believes that "multiculturalism is perceived as the greatest safeguard against cultural conformity that leads to racism, fascism, and totalitarianism." [92] In addition, thepropaganda of multiculturalism is used by many international organizations including European Union (EU). According to Kaya, the perspective of EU was discussed during a summit in December of 1999 and completely changed the political viewpoints in Turkey, opening up new religious perspectives on social, ethnic and political rights [93]. For instance, Kurds, Islamists, Armenians and a number of religious and ethnic groups in Turkey have become supporters of EU, seeing the EU as the beacon of political stability and peace. In addition to multiculturalism, tolerance is something that we should strive and fight for[94]. Tolerance is sometimes called a "Soft Multiculturalism", where minorities should not face unfair discrimination and people of different cultures and customs should be tolerated and treated on a level playing field.

The modern progressive world, however, did not manage to achieve the level of tolerance needed to eliminate discrimination, with numbers of countries speaking for themselves. In this respect, Marshal provides examples of China, India, Pakistan, Indonesia and Nigeria where the cases of religious oppression, mainly, violent attacks on religious minorities, have considerably increased [95]. Although religious majorities enjoy high levels of acceptability in their respective regions, religious minorities still suffer from persecution. According to the biannual report presented by Australian Survey of Social Attitudes (AuSSA), local Australians were asked to specify their attitudes towards the members of certain religious groups. In this respect, Muslims and Jehovah's Witnesses were ranked as the least preferred ones[96]. While the Jehovah's Witnesses were considered to be "Australians with an undesirable religion", Muslims were treated simply as "undesirable immigrants", both grouped in the category named "Keep out of Australia". Due to Australia being a predominantly Christian country, Greek Orthodox, Anglican, and Presbyterian were widely accepted within the society[97].

Discrimination of the minority has always carried within itself numerous consequences that impact governmental decisions. In the United States, for example, based on a 1986 CBS/New York Times Immigration Poll, persecuted and historically oppressed religious denominations have a higher tendency to support mass immigration, also a disadvantaged minority, with Jews being the strongest supporters [98]. Non-religious communities were also involved in the poll, with atheists and agnostics holding pro-immigrant stances. A similar poll was conducted in 1988 in France and Germany, called Euro-Barometer 30, using random sampling. The results were no different from the results of the 1986 poll, with non-Catholics more likely to accept immigrants. On a 4-point scale, not belonging to the Catholic denomination increases the tolerance to migrants by .610 points [99]. That is, governments and

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[92] Patrick West, "The Poverty of Multiculturalism," *Studies: An Irish Quarterly Review* 94 no. 374 (2005): 151

[93] Kaya, "Multiculturalism and Minorities in Turkey," 309.

[94] West, "The Poverty of Multiculturalism," 152.

[95] Paul Marshall, "Patterns of Contexts of religious Freedom and Persecution," *The Brandywine Review of Faith and International Affairs* 2 no.3 (2004).

[96] Gary Bouma, "Minority Religious Identity and Religious Social Distance in Australia," in *Australia:*

Identity, Fear and Governance in the 21st Century 2012, eds. Juliet Pietsch and Haydn Aarons (Canberra: ANU Press, 2012), 52.

[97] Ibid., 53

[98] Joel Fetzer, "Religious Minorities and Support for Immigrant Rights in the United States, France, and Germany," *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 37, no. 4 (1998): 44.

[99] Ibid., 46

citizens shape their countries, and all of the examples above explicitly demonstrate that.

Lester and Roberts consider that "religious tolerance requires the establishment of an environment where believers are able to feel comfortable expressing their religious identity."[100] However, in the modern world, it is not so difficult to come across nations that show intolerant and disrespectful attitude toward the religious minorities since, typically, people in such communities consider their beliefs as a correct religious approach and force members of religious minorities to accept their "true" religion. [101] As an illustration, in one of the biggest Eastern countries India, the members of Hindu right-wing parties in their speeches constantly emphasized that all minorities, including religious minorities, must become a part of Hindu culture.[102] Therefore, they coerced people to accept their ideology. Even, in 2002, hundreds of Muslims who were considered as a religious minority, were killed by Hindus in Gujarat state with the help of the police and some public officials.[103] This case is the most extreme form of religious intolerance that, unfortunately, resulted in the brutal murder of innocent people whose fault was merely their religious affiliation. Indonesia's transition to democracy has been accompanied by religious violence where Catholic refugees from non-independent East Timor still languish in the western half of the island. [104] Another example is Laos which follows the patterns of Vietnam where the government has sought to control the major Buddhist group, and has also been violently repressive of the rapidly growing churches among the tribal people. [105] Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan make it almost impossible for non-approved Muslim and Christian groups to have legal status, and then persecutes them as legal.

The list can be continued with numerous cases of religious oppression. Besides, statistics and records indicate that religious intolerance exists not only in the Eastern countries but also in many developed countries. In fact, it is terribly disappointing that religious intolerance of local people, which is a flagrant violation of human rights, is frequently encountered in the freedom of choice defender and supporter countries. As a result, all of these cases serve as proof of the degree of religious intolerance demonstrated by governments and people even in the biggest and the most powerful countries around the world.

2.2. The attitude of Azerbaijan toward Religious Minorities

At some historical point, Azerbaijan has also witnessed religious oppression. In 1920th when the Soviet regime was established in Azerbaijan, the Ministry of Education and Confession of the ADR (Azerbaijan Democratic Republic) was abolished. Moreover, all religious teachings both in private and public schools were prohibited. One of the most significant days in Islamic religion – *Ashura* underwent criticism during the imperial time at the end of the nineteenth beginning of the twentieth century. And only with the acceptance of independence in 1991 and the advent of a new government, all these bans were lifted.

One aspect that makes a country multicultural is its geographical location; Azerbaijan, which is located in intersection of various cultures and civilizations, is one of these countries with multicultural population including such ethnic diversities as Udins, Ingiloys, Krizes, Hilalugs, Budugs, Tats, Talishs, Lezghins; immigrant diversities, i.e. Russians, Ukrainians, Belarusians, Kurds, Jews, Greeks, Assyrians, Germans, Tatars; and finally, religious diversities, i.e. Muslims (≈94.2%), with Sunnis

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[100] Emile Lester and Patrick Roberts, "The Distinctive Paradox of Religious Tolerance: Active Tolerance as a Mean between Passive Tolerance and Recognition," *Public Affairs Quarterly* 20 no. 4 (2006): 334.

[101] Martha Nussbaum, "Religious Intolerance," *Foreign Policy* 144 (2004): 44.

[102] Ibid

[103] Ibid

[104] Marshall, "Patterns of contexts of religious freedom and persecution."

[105] Ibid

(≈15%) and Shias (≈85%), also, Christians (≈4.6%), and Jews (≈1.2%), living together and enjoying their rights and traditions. Fortunately, the concept of multiculturalism as well as religious tolerance and respect are strongly supported by the current government, which has been selected by the local people. Today, government's proper interferences including annual allocation of the state budget on religious needs, financial and moral support for language-minority schools, and organization of religious and national celebrations, have more important impact on the integration of ethnic, religious, and cultural minorities within the country.[106] While many governments do not allocate funds for religion, Azerbaijani government policy has always satisfied the cultural and religious needs of its citizens without any distinctions. [107] Moreover, according to national policy, the Constitution of Azerbaijan ensures equal rights and opportunities to representatives of different nations in various work spheres. According to Kunina, Milli Majlis, a national assembly of Azerbaijan, consists of representatives of different ethnic diversities such as Russians, Lezghins, Kurds, Tats, Talishs and others. [108] Consequently, delegates of the minority groups noticeably contribute to the development of the country. In his speech, the President Ilham Aliyev always points out that the "traditions of multiculturalism have always existed in Azerbaijan for centuries indeed, merely, it has been differently called, but the essence hasn't changed".[109] The idea of multiculturalism in this country is strongly supported by the population.

It is not random that decisions of a government about such crucial issues are successfully implemented; normally, they are implemented only when they get approval from the locals.[110] The decree of the President of Azerbaijan "On the Protection of the Rights and Freedoms and on the State Support for the Promotion of the Languages and Cultures of National Minorities, Smaller Peoples and Ethnic Groups Living in the Republic of Azerbaijan" was ratified by the government of the Republic of Azerbaijan; the President's Office established a special department for national minorities' support. [111] Additionally, Youth for Alliance of Civilization (YAOC), an organization of the United Nation's Alliance of Civilization (UN AOC), was initiated in 2007.[112] The main goal of this project was to gather 45 young leaders who represent various cultures and religions to participate in the process of solving conflicts created by religious and cultural phobias. According to Ahmadov, this movement was established with the purpose to raise awareness in young people about the cooperation against misunderstanding, misconception and extremism due to the fact that they are considered to be more vulnerable to negative ideological trends.[113] Moreover, Global Youth Movement for AOC (GYMAOC) was founded to institutionalize this movement in April 2011 in Baku.[114] According to President Ilham Aliyev, one of main goals of Azerbaijan is to enable everyone to benefit from financial development, growth of the oil industry, equal rights and choice of any belief. [115]

[106] Ramiz Mehdiyev et al., *The President of the Republic of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev on The Azerbaijani Model of Multiculturalism* (Baku: BBMM Publisher, 2017), 362.

[107] Irina Kunina, "Multiculturalism in the Caucasus: The Azerbaijani Model," *Baku International Forum*, 2011. http://bakuforum.az/multiculturalism-achievements-and-problems/?fid=2254

[108] Ibid

[109] Mehdiyev et al., *The President of the Republic of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev on The Azerbaijani Model of Multiculturalism*, 362

[110] Ibid., 496

[111] Kunina, "Multiculturalism in the Caucasus: The Azerbaijani model."

[112] Alpay Ahmadov, "GYMAOC" Initiative as an Instrument of Multiculturalism Process", *Baku International Forum* (2011). http://bakuforum.az/multiculturalism-achievements-and-problems/?fid=2254

[113] Ibid.

[114] Ibid.

[115] Mehdiyev et al., *The President of the Republic of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev on The Azerbaijani Model of Multiculturalism*, 362

In line with the above-mentioned, national and religious minorities in Azerbaijan can benefit from social, cultural and educational aspects of life. For instance, the existence of a Russian community within Azerbaijan gives opportunity for the Russians to read newspaper, to watch TV channels, and to receive education in their native language. People can get education in the Russian language not only at schools, but also at higher educational institutions, colleges and universities operating in the country.[116] Ukrainian language is likewise respected and used by the Ukrainian faculty that operates at Baku Slavic University.[117]

As previously mentioned, people can choose their beliefs without any restrictions by the Azerbaijani government; consequently, many places of worship such as Orthodox and Catholic Churches and Jewish Synagogues are as equally valued as Mosques in the country. For example, Holy Myrrhbearers Cathedral, built in Baku in the 20th century by philanthropist Haji Zeynalabdin Taghiyev, was reconstructed in the 21st century by another Azerbaijani benefactor. Moreover, the government did not confine itself to just giving oral support to religious minorities but realized it with its actions. For instance, one of the oldest churches in the Caucasian region – the Church of Caucasian Albania – has been restored and provided its use for Christians with the command of the President.[118] The church, blessed by pontiff Iohanne Pavel, was rebuilt by preserving traditions of the previous one.[119] One of the ethnic and religious minorities living in Azerbaijan throughout its history have been followers of Judaism. During recent years, Azerbaijani government together with the Muslim community reconstructed an extant Jewish Synagogue. Another peculiarity that

makes Azerbaijan different from other countries is its preservation of a place called the "Red Village" where Jews have lived for the longest period of time in one area in Azerbaijan. Neither the government nor local people interfere in the lives, traditions and religious practices of Jews in the country. For instance, in the streets of Azerbaijan, people can freely wear kippah, which is a Jewish male head covering. Moreover, such religious events as Shabbat and Torah dedication ceremony (the holy book in Judaism) are held without any prejudices by the Azerbaijani nation. In his press conference with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, President Aliyev underlined that there were seven Synagogues and five Jewish schools in Baku such as Chabad Ohr Avner inaugurated in 2010.[120] Before that, Azerbaijani government had never allowed opening educational institutions for pious minority groups due to the fear of radical religious ideologies. Ignoring this risk, the former leader of Azerbaijan, Heydar Aliyev, who always placed a great emphasis on education and minority groups of the country, initiated establishment of the Jewish school in 2003. His move is respected and blessed by many Jewish people and leaders. Moreover, according to Jewish Telegraphic Agency, Executive Director of the Federation of Jewish Communities Avraham Berkowitz commented on Aliyev's humanitarian action toward Jews in the following way: "It is important that in the current international situation, the leader of a Muslim country can stand up to protect the rights of its minority."[121]

A strong support for religious institutions by Azerbaijanis exists not only inside the country but also outside it. According to *Georgian Today* newspaper, a memorandum was signed in 2014 between Azerbaijan and

[116] Ibid., 379

[117] Ibid., 368

[118] Ibid., 496

[119] Kunina, "Multiculturalism in the Caucasus: The Azerbaijani Model."

[120] Mehdiyev et al., *The President of the Republic of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev on The Azerbaijani Model of Multiculturalism*, 504.

[121] Lev Krichevsky, "Azerbaijan to Legalize Jewish School," *Jewish Telegraphic Agency* 2003. https://www.jta.org/2003/04/06/life-religion/features/azerbaijan-to-legalize-jewish-school

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Georgia so that the State Oil Company of Azerbaijan Republic would provide free gas for churches, mosques, synagogues and monasteries in Georgia.[122]

Today we can observe a certain number of schools and other educational institutions open for religious minorities where people do not only get education in their mother tongue but are allowed to celebrate and commemorate all important dates and days according to their nationalities and confessions. For instance, at the end of June - beginning of July Bashkir, Idel-Uralian, and Tatar nations of the country can celebrate a *Sabantuy* - a very old tradition among farming communities going back to the times when Bashkir and Tatar nations were roaming tribes. Yet, this all does not detach religious minorities from the mainstream country events and holidays.

One of the controversial issues regarding the religious majority is a division of Islam into Shia and Sunni branches. The majority of people living in Azerbaijan are followers of Islam, which was divided into two groups such as Shia and Sunni. The division arose when the community was deciding who would replace the Prophet Mohammad when he died in 632 AD. Various features of these two groups triggered development of different systems of law and theology. Sixty-three percent of 43 countries have an official state religion named Sunni Islam, Shia Islam or just Islam.[123] According to Abdo *et al.* the majority of Shias are rooted in Iran, Iraq, Azerbaijan, and Bahrain, with its plurality in Lebanon, whereas Sunnis compose majority in more than forty countries from Morocco to Indonesia.[124] Today, ancient

religious split has caused increased conflicts in the Middle East and Muslim countries.[125] Nevertheless, Muslims from these two groups have lived in Azerbaijan side by side without any struggle and problems for hundreds of years. Also, Sunnis and Shias can marry each other and pray at the same mosques. As Abdo *et al.* say, "They share faith in the Quran and the Prophet Mohammed's sayings and perform similar prayers, although they differ in rituals and interpretation of Islamic law."[126] One of the reasons for people's positive attitude toward religious freedom is that only 21% of Azerbaijanis believe that religion plays an essential role in their lives. Due to this low percentage of pious people, Azerbaijan is considered as one of the least religious (secular) countries in the world.[127] As earlier indicated, those members of Sunnis and Shias have peacefully lived in several countries throughout the centuries, and it can be implied that Azerbaijan is on par with these countries.[128] Thus, all these mentioned examples once again prove that Azerbaijan is a multicultural country and is capable of sharing its experience with other countries to fight persecutions and discrimination in the world.

Conclusion

Absolute tolerance to every single individual, regardless of his/her ethnicity and obtained identity, is a utopian fantasy that can never be achieved due to human nature at its core, but achieving the best possible level of tolerance is a manageable task. Azerbaijan, with its rich and colorful history and experience of true discrimination at a time, has committed itself to reach that kind of level, and is on the

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122 socar.ge, 2014.

123 Pew Research Center, "Many Countries Favor Specific Religions, Officially or Unofficially," *Pew Research Center* (2017). http://www.pewforum.org/2017/10/03/many-countries-favor-   specific-religions-officially-or-unofficially/

124 Geneive Abdo et al., "The Sunni-Shia Divide", *Council on   Foreign   Relations*   (2016). https://www.cfr.org/interactives/sunni-shia-divide#!/sunni-shia-divide

125 Ibid.

126 Ibid.

127 "Azerbaijan Population", *World Population Review* (2018). http://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/azerbaijan-population/

128 Abdo et al., "The Sunni-Shia Divide."

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right route. Mutual respect, tolerance and understanding continually reign in the country. The practice demonstrates that in contrast to those countries where the governments and people give way to hate, aggression, oppression, disrespect and intolerance toward religious minorities, countries with religious tolerance and a multicultural approach are capable of rapid development in many fields. Usually, countries and their representatives claim to stand for tolerance and open-mindedness, but it is rare when a country delivers on that promise. If Azerbaijan and other countries guided by multiculturalism continue setting an example and become the frontrunners for religious tolerance, that trend of false promises will eventually decline. Many developed countries claim to be the bedrock of democracy and tolerance to people of all identities, but without basic equal treatment to all religious denominations, that original claim is worth the fraction of its actual meaning. Countries worldwide should dedicate their time to thoroughly analyze and come up with adequate solutions to religious intolerance issues.

Acknowledgement

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